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Abstract 
This thesis examines the process of change in management accounting and control 
systems (MACSs) in a Thai financial services organisation. Specifically, it traces how a 
strategic performance measurement, the Balanced Scorecard (BSC), was introduced, 
constructed, modified and re-defined over a period of time and in different organisational 
units of the organisation. The major aim of the research is to achieve an understanding of 
how an innovative management control idea, the BSC, was made operable in a particular 
organisational context. This research is based on intensive field study which involved in- 
depth interviews, direct observations and documentation analysis. Drawing on actor- 
network theory (ANT), the research illustrates how the BSC idea was brought into the 
organisation. It describes the way in which various actors mobilised their interests and 
concerns to construct the BSC, shows how the BSC collided and was reconciled with 
other networks of performance measurement and management control, and illustrates the 
way in which the all-encompassing nature of the BSC affected the design and 
implementation process. 
The study provides insights into how a global management idea like the BSC is 
introduced into an organisation and influences organisational practices while, at the same 
time, being localised and shaped by local practices. It sheds light on the process of 
change in performance measurement practices in an organisational context, as well as 
enhancing our understanding of the ways in which an integrated performance 
measurement system such as the BSC operates. In particular, the research illustrates how 
two key BSC concepts that are controversial in the existing literature - the notion of 
`balance' and cause-and-effect relationships - were mobilised within the organisation. It 
shows that although these concepts are broad and abstract, creating complexities in 
designing the BSC, they can have a positive impact, generating discussions and solutions 
among organisational members. In addition, the study shows that the BSC construction 
process involves ongoing translations by heterogeneous actors - both local and global, 
human and non-human - who/which attempt to build networks of associations to support 
their own agenda and beliefs. The case study shows that resistance to the new system 
does not necessarily lead to a failure of system implementation; rather, it can be a positive 
force, providing opportunities for relevant actors to modify and appropriate the system. 
Moreover, the research shows how local BSC meanings and identities emerged via its 
interplays with these actors, and how the ongoing translations led the BSC to become 
something that it was not initially. However, this does not mean that the BSC and its 
implementation failed. Rather, it suggests the ability of the BSC to be shaped in different 
ways to make it work in specific situations. Arguably, it is this open nature of the BSC, 
which allows different actors to interpret, modify and construct their own versions of it, 
that makes it powerful. 
Keywords: management accounting change, integrated performance measurement, 
Balanced Scorecard, actor-network theory, financial services 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1. Research Rationale 
During the past two decades, there have been considerable changes in the nature of 
management control and performance measurement practices, and an increasingly broad 
and challenging level of debate about them. At the level of everyday business reality, 
accounting numbers, which have long been used to monitor and manage performance at 
various levels within organisations, have been increasingly criticised for being 
detrimental to the competitiveness of contemporary organisations. At a more 
fundamental or theoretical level, the `relevance' of MACSs has also been questioned 
(Johnson and Kaplan, 1987; cf. Bromwich and Bhimani, 1989; Ezzamel et al., 1990; 
Hopper, 1990; Hopper and Armstrong, 1991; Johnson, 1992,1994; Hoskin and Macve, 
1994). With increasing concern about technical and theoretical limitations of 
conventional MACSs, academics and consultants have broadened the horizons within 
which management accounting and control ideas are discussed and evaluated, and at the 
same time, a range of innovations has been developed to address some of the problems 
associated with traditional MACSs. Examples of these initiatives include activity-based 
costing and management, strategic management accounting, economic value measures, 
and integrated performance measurement. 
In the light of these rapid changes in technologies and their deployment in an increasingly 
competitive environment, as well as a proliferation of management accounting and 
control initiatives, issues around accounting change have become one of the central issues 
of interest among accounting scholars. Particularly after Hopwood (1987, p. 207) argued 
that "... very little is known of the processes of accounting change", an increasing number 
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of scholars have examined the accounting change process from various perspectives. 
Empirical research on the accounting change process has shown that implementing a new 
MACS is a complex process which involves a number of technical, economic, 
organisational and institutional issues. The danger of constructing overly rational, 
efficiency explanations of the change process has been recognised, and broader, cross- 
disciplinary approaches have been brought into the accounting arena. 
Within the management accounting and control initiatives, increasing emphasis on 
linkages between management accounting and strategy, and the integration between non- 
financial and financial performance measures, can be observed. Among these 
management accounting innovations, the BSC is one of the best-known models, and it has 
gained increasing popularity among business organisations. BSC dissemination began in 
Anglo-Saxon countries in the 1990s and since has developed into a global phenomenon 
(see results from survey studies, e. g. Silk, 1998; Kald and Nilsson, 2000; Anonymous, 
2001; Rigby, 2001; Speckbacher et al., 2003). 
While many of the management accounting and control innovations are initiated in the 
US or Europe, innovative management accounting ideas have now spread to emerging 
economies, including Thailand. In today's globalisation era, as communication 
technologies become more advanced and sophisticated, organisations in different 
countries have become more closely connected in increasingly diverse ways. Increasing 
numbers of organisations in Thailand have begun to adopt innovative western 
management ideas. Particularly following the financial crisis in 1997, many Thai 
organisations have adopted western management systems and concepts with the 
expectation that these `modem' management systems will improve the efficiency of the 
13 
organisations and hence help both the public and investors regain confidence in them. 
Among western management accounting and control initiatives, the BSC has received 
considerable attention. A 2002 survey examining BSC usage among Thai listed 
companies showed that 26% of the respondents reported that they had implemented the 
BSC, while 47% were considering adopting it (Decharin, 2003). From a discussion with 
a senior officer of the Office of the Public Sector Development Commission, I learned 
that government agencies are also being encouraged to adopt the BSC, with many having 
already adopted it. Therefore, among Thai organisations, in both private and public 
sectors, the BSC has become one of the most popular performance management concepts 
today. 
Despite the popularity of the BSC in business communities and increasing interest in 
accounting change among accounting scholars, there has as yet been relatively little 
research critically examining how the BSC is developed and used in an organisational 
context (Ittner and Larcker, 1998b, 2001; Otley, 1999,2001; see also Luft and Shields, 
2003; Neely, 2005). Also, such research has focussed in general on western organisations 
operating largely in developed world or global contexts, rather than on organisations in 
developing countries. Furthermore, to the best of my knowledge, there is no published 
research on the detailed process of implementation and use of the BSC in Thai 
organisations. 
The BSC differs from most other management accounting and control concepts in at least 
two respects. Firstly, it contains a number of broad, open and abstract concepts which 
allow multiple interpretations (Nerreklit, 2003; Ax and Bjornenak, 2005). Secondly, the 
BSC attempts to encompass many areas of management, from strategic to operations 
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management. However, when it is introduced into an organisation, the BSC inevitably 
encounters other management systems and practices. The open and all-encompassing 
nature of the BSC can make the process of constructing a BSC different from the process 
of constructing other management accounting and control technologies, even if there are 
many comparable management of change issues. 
There have been attempts in the existing literature both to define and to list the 
characteristics of the BSC (see a discussion on the issue in Malmi, 2001; Luft and 
Shields, 2003; Speckbacher et al., 2003; see also Ahrens and Chapman, 2006b). This is 
of course valuable, but it remains problematic because of the BSC's open and evolving 
development. It is worth noting, in this regard, that even the BSC's creators, Kaplan and 
Norton, have redefined their BSC. Empirical findings from large-scale, primarily survey- 
based, studies confirm this problem by showing that the way the BSC is applied varies 
across organisations (see Hoque and James, 2000; Malmi, 2001; Speckbacher et al., 
2003). Given this, it is perhaps not wholly surprising that research studies vary in their 
conclusions about the effectiveness of the BSC, with Ittner, Larcker and Randall (2003) 
failing to find statistical differences in the emphasis on non-financial measures between 
firms that claimed to have adopted the BSC and those that did not. Empirical evidence 
from studies such as these raises significant and continuing questions concerning the 
nature of the BSC (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006b). 
While large-scale empirical research studies have shown that there are various versions of 
the BSC with varying effects, this type of study is less suited to exploring how and why 
the BSC has become used in a particular way in a specific organisation at a certain time. 
As the BSC is an open concept and encompasses wide areas of management, it is likely 
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that specific circumstances and conditions in which people in the organisation manage 
their performance will have an impact on how organisational participants interpret, design 
and use the BSC. Therefore, in order to understand how and why the BSC is used in a 
certain way, it is important to undertake studies that explore its use in detail in the 
contexts in which it is developed and used. An intensive field research study in an 
organisational setting enables the researcher to examine how local actors and specific 
circumstances may influence the process of constructing the BSC and give rise to 
different versions of the BSC in practice. In addition, it allows the researcher to examine 
and explain inter-relationships between the BSC and other control system elements 
(Otley, 1999). 
Although we can observe emerging research which attempts to examine the process of 
BSC implementation and the use of the BSC in its organisational context (e. g. Malina and 
Selto, 2001; Kasurinen, 2002,2003; Hansen and Mouritsen, 2005), there is still a need for 
further intensive field research to examine how the BSC is developed and used in its 
organisational context over a period of time. It is also important for the researcher to pay 
attention not only to the process of developing and implementing the BSC, but also to the 
nature, identity and meaning of the BSC as it is being constructed. As Ahrens and 
Chapman (2006b, p. 11) argue, "... we do want to know more about the nature of the BSC 
and the elements of organizational activity with which the BSC is supposed to interact. " 
An intensive field research study which critically examines how the BSC is introduced 
and constructed in an organisational setting over a period of time, and examines how the 
BSC is shaped by local conditions and circumstances, will enhance our understanding of 
the process of management accounting change as well as the nature of the BSC. 
Additionally, a study investigating the BSC in a significantly different cultural setting, 
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and in a business context that is outside the western type of business culture generally 
studied to date, may throw particularly interesting light on the range of ways in which the 
BSC may be developed, and on some of the limits to those possibilities. 
1.2. Research Questions and Research Objectives 
The present research investigates how the BSC idea was introduced to the organisation, 
and examines how the BSC was localised and made operable in practice in the Thai 
financial services organisation. The study also explores the way in which the BSC is used 
and examines its significance for people within the organisation. The study is conducted 
in a Thai organisation in order to examine how global management ideas initiated in 
advanced economies are translated when they are placed in organisations in a developing 
country such as Thailand. A financial services organisation was chosen as the focus of 
this study primarily because in Thailand banking is one of the sectors currently 
undergoing significant change, both in terms of structure and management practices. 
Prior to the 1997 financial crisis, the sector was highly protected and organisations had 
many traditional ways of conducting business. However, since the crisis, the sector has 
become much more open, with many western management practices having been 
adopted. Thus, the banking sector is an interesting focus for exploring the dynamics and 
tensions between traditional and modern management practices. 
The research study has three main objectives. The first objective is to critically examine 
the process of how an innovative management accounting and control idea, the BSC, is 
made operable in a particular organisational setting. The second objective is to examine 
changes in the Thai banking sector, and to investigate how changes in management 
control practices, particularly performance measurement practices, within the Thai 
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financial services organisation take place in the context of such a changing environment. 
The third objective is to provide critical analysis and discussion of the way in which the 
BSC is transformed through a detailed intensive field study. Also to be analysed is the 
way in which local conditions and circumstances play roles in shaping the identities and 
meanings of the global management accounting and control innovation, when the 
innovation is implemented in a context where there could be tensions between the new 
innovation and the existing strong traditional management practices. The study aims to 
enhance our understanding of the process of change in management accounting and 
control, as well as the nature, use and meanings of the BSC in practice. 
The key research question of the study is: How is the American performance management 
concept, the BSC, translated into practice in a Thai financial services organisation? Sub- 
questions that were extrapolated from this main question include the following, although 
in the course of undertaking the research study, it was possible to answer some in more 
depth than others: 
  What is the plausible range of reasons that the organisation adopted the BSC? 
  What are the purposes of adopting the BSC and how far does the BSC achieve its 
purposes? 
  How is the BSC made operable in a particular organisational setting? 
  How do relevant actors play a role in constructing networks of support, in 
transforming or in resisting the BSC implementation and continued operation? 
  How, and to what extent, is the BSC spread within the organisation? At which 
level(s) of the organisation is the BSC developed? If it is developed at more than 
one level, how are the BSCs developed and used at different levels related? 
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  How is the BSC reconciled with other measurement practices, particularly 
budgetary control? 
  How does the integrative nature of the BSC impact on the implementation 
process? 
  How are the notions of `balance' and cause-and-effect relationships 
operationalised? 
  Is the BSC linked to rewards? If so, how? How does the linkage (or lack of 
linkage) with rewards affect the implementation and utilisation of the BSC? 
  How far has the BSC become institutionalised as a set of practices within the 
organisation? 
  How does the BSC play a role in managing performance in the organisation? 
What does the BSC mean to organisational members? 
  What are the implications of BSC adoption? 
In order to attempt to answer this extensive list of questions, an intensive field-based 
research approach was adopted. The analysis of the research is based upon a 
constructivist approach, in which the BSC is treated as a boundary object, an object which 
is "both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of the several parties 
employing [it], yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites" (Star and 
Griesemer, 1989, p. 393). The conducting of a `performative' study (i. e. a study that 
considers how the BSC is deployed and `performs' in practice) enables the researcher to 
examine not only the process of how the BSC is constructed and translated into practice, 
but also the meaning, value and identity of the BSC technology itself. 
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1.3. The Scope of the Research 
As just noted, the Thai banking industry has been considerably protected, and banks have 
operated as a cartel, with bankers, state bureaucrats, politicians and business organisations 
tightly connected and tending to cooperate closely. At the same time, the banking sector 
plays a major role in the Thai economy, as banks are the major providers of capital for 
businesses. Partly due to the unique political and historical circumstances within which 
capitalism developed in Thailand, Thai banks retain many strongly traditional ways of 
conducting business, as my field research confirms. 
Nevertheless, in today's global capitalism era, advanced technologies have lessened 
boundaries between countries. Financial systems in different countries have become 
more closely connected. International financial institutions, such as The Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) and The International Monetary Fund (IMF), have also 
played important roles in supervising the global financial system, making practices of 
financial institutions in different countries converge, and Thailand has not been outside 
this process. 
Consequently, the Thai banking industry has become increasingly integrated with the 
global financial system since the late 1980s, when the Thai monetary authorities started to 
liberalise the Thai financial services industry and to widen the Thai capital market. In 
other words, significant change was taking place even before the 1997 financial crisis. 
However, in retrospect, that event clearly forced the industry to be more open to foreign 
competitors. After the crisis, the struggling banks were either taken into state ownership 
or merged and sold to foreign investors, who, consequently, have come to play an 
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increasingly significant role in the Thai banking industry, prompting alterations in the 
patterns of conducting business. 
Within the context of this changing environment and the increasing number of foreign 
competitors, most, if not all, of the Thai financial services institutions have significantly 
changed their management practices and systems. Many of the new practices 
implemented are influenced by international practices and global financial systems. 
Management practices and systems popular in western countries have been adopted. 
Nevertheless, when the new systems have been brought into organisations with strongly 
traditional management practices, it is inevitable that the new systems have encountered 
some resistance. To make the new systems operable, organisations have had to find ways 
to translate the new systems so that they `fit' with traditional management practices and 
systems. In many situations, the new systems have been modified and re-defined as they 
have been combined with existing practices and traditions. This research examines how 
the BSC was made operable in a Thai financial services organisation with strongly 
traditional ways of conducting business, which, at the same time, was attempting to 
become a more modem and global organisation. 
1.4. Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is organised into 8 chapters. Chapter 1 has introduced the field and scope of 
the research thesis and specified in a preliminary way some of the key research problems 
and issues confronted in the thesis. It provides an overview of the research and describes 
the purposes and scope of the research. 
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Chapter 2 critically reviews the literature relevant to the study. It discusses the 
development of MACSs and the emergence of recent management accounting and control 
initiatives relevant to performance measurement. Particular attention is paid to the 
literature on the BSC, a performance measurement initiative which is the focus of this 
research. The literature on accounting change is also examined from various 
perspectives. Gaps in the existing literature are identified and research questions are 
raised and addressed. 
In Chapter 3, the methodological and theoretical approach undertaken by the researcher to 
conduct the research is outlined. The philosophical assumptions underpinning the 
research are discussed, and the research methodology justified. Chapter 3 also describes 
the research design, explains how the research was conducted, and discusses the 
theoretical approach underlying the analysis of the research findings. 
Chapters 4 to 6 present the body of empirical material gathered in undertaking this study. 
Chapter 4 describes the development of the Thai economy in general, and the 
development of the Thai banking sector in particular. It examines the historical contexts 
in which the case organisation is located, with emphasis on roles that the state and other 
insitutions play in developing the sector. Changes in the sector during the past decade, 
particularly during and after the 1997 financial crisis, are also discussed. 
In Chapter 5, the historical background and a development of the case organisation is 
provided. The chapter presents the structure and profile of the case organisation, and 
discusses recent initiatives within the organisation. 
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Chapter 6 examines more closely the way in which the BSC initiative was translated into 
practice in the case organisation over time. It discusses how the BSC idea was brought 
into the organisation, and describes how it was made operable. Emphasis is placed on the 
events and activities associated with the process of constructing and translating the BSC. 
It also describes how the BSC idea was localised when it travelled to different units 
within the organisation. 
Chapters 7 and 8 are the analytical and reflective chapters. Chapter 7 provides a 
discussion of the key issues emerging from the research, and compares and contrasts the 
empirical findings of the study with existing literature. Chapter 8 presents the 
conclusions drawn from the research and highlights the theoretical contributions and 
managerial implications of the research. Some limitations of the study are also discussed, 
as are possible directions for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1. Introduction 
The preceding chapter presented an overview of the current research. It introduced the 
research area and discussed the background of the research problems. In this chapter, the 
research problems are further investigated. The main objectives of the chapter are to 
critically review the literature on management accounting and control relevant to the 
current study (particularly in the field of performance management), to identify any gaps 
in the extant literature, and to determine how this research will help fill such gaps and 
hence contribute to the literature in the field. 
Accounting numbers have long been used to monitor and manage performance at various 
levels within organisations. Nevertheless, during the past two decades, they have been 
widely and increasingly criticised for being detrimental to the competitiveness of 
contemporary organisations. Particularly after the publication of Relevance Lost: The 
Rise and Fall of Management Accounting (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987), the technical 
limitations of conventional MACSs have become a growing concern among both 
practitioners and academic researchers. Consequently, a number of innovative 
management accounting and control ideas have proliferated, both from within the 
practitioner and research communities. One of the key themes that has informed this 
drive for innovation has been a focus on increasing and improving the integration 
between non-financial and financial performance measures, and along with this seeking to 
improve the linkages between management accounting and strategy. 
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At the same time, while the technical dimensions of management accounting and control 
systems have continued to be a focus of many management accounting and control 
studies, the importance of the organisational and behavioural dimensions of accounting 
have been increasingly recognised and factored into research studies. Research with this 
focus has, whether explicitly or implicitly, acknowledged and sought to address the 
limitations in more rational-economic or positivist approaches to accounting research, and 
has frequently mobilised what Baxter and Chua describe as "more `critical' frames which 
do not necessarily characterize management accounting as an invariable quest for 
efficiency and effectiveness" (Baxter and Chua, 2006, p. 43). A range of critical 
philosophical and sociological approaches have been brought into the accounting arena in 
this process. This chapter will argue that this `alternative' set of approaches to 
accounting research has enhanced our understandings of management accounting 
practices in various ways. 
To locate this study in this emergent research literature, this chapter critically reviews and 
discusses a range of research areas which are relevant to the study. It starts with a 
discussion on the early development of MACSs and outlines the debates around the 
problems of conventional MACSs, and the context in which recent innovative 
management accounting ideas emerge. Among the innovative management accounting 
ideas emerging from the debates on `relevance' of MACSs is the BSC, the performance 
measurement framework which is the main focus of the current study. Thus, extant 
literature on the BSC is also reviewed. To provide a theoretical background on how the 
innovative management accounting ideas are implemented in practice, literature on 
management accounting change is also discussed. 
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The chapter is organised into 5 sections. Section 2.2 presents an overview of the 
development of MACSs, and introduces the context in which the BSC emerged. Section 
2.3 explores existing literature on the BSC and addresses performance management issues 
that are particularly relevant to the BSC. Section 2.4 discusses previous studies which 
investigate changes in management accounting and control from various perspectives. 
Research examining management accounting change with an emphasis on the BSC is also 
reviewed. Finally, Section 2.5 discusses the implications of previous research on the 
current study and addresses the research questions. 
2.2. Development of Management Accounting and Control Systems and the 
Emergence of Balanced Scorecard 
In today's organisations, a management approach with an emphasis on numbers is 
pervasive. Quantitative performance measurements for all organisational levels are 
prevalent. The statement `what gets measured, gets done' is widely known, particularly 
among practitioners, but whether the claim is true has been questioned in academic 
literature (Johnston et al., 2002). 
Management practices with an emphasis on numbers are not a recent phenomenon. In the 
1950s, Ridgway (1956, p. 240) noted, "There is today a strong tendency to state 
numerically as many as possible of the variables with which management must deal. The 
mounting interest in and application of tools such as operations research, linear 
programming, and statistical decision making, all of which require quantifiable variables, 
foster the idea that if progress toward goals can be measured, efforts and resources can be 
more rationally managed. " Neely (2005, p. 1266) similarly notes that "the desire to 
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quantify and the unanticipated consequences of quantification" have long been recurring 
themes in management control, particularly performance measurement, research. 
Scholars have offered explanations why a quantitative approach to management, of which 
accounting forms an important part, is appealing. Porter (1995), for example, suggests 
that a decision made by number, emphasising `facts' and evidence has the appearance of 
being fair and impersonal. "Quantification is a way of making decisions without seeming 
to decide. Objectivity lends authority to officials who have very little of their own" (p. 
8). Chua (1996, p. 140) also suggests that quantitative evidence has an image of 
`neutrality', `objectivity', and `independence'. As she puts it in her 1986 Accounting 
Review article, "Accounting information is particularly useful for the legitimization of 
activities because they appear to possess a neutral, technical rationality. Numbers are 
often perceived as being more precise and `scientific' than qualitative evidence. " (Chua, 
1986, p. 617) 
Among the numbers that are used to manage, accounting figures constitute one of the 
most important sets, and one which has long been utilised to monitor and manage 
performance at various levels within organisations. Nevertheless, the issue of when 
MACSs first emerged is subject to debate among accounting historians. With different 
views on the motive for modem managerialism, accounting scholars have provided 
different accounts on the origin and the development of MACSs. This has also led to 
different views on the current problems of MACSs, as discussed briefly next. 
While debate on the emergence of MACSs is still ongoing, the limitations of MACSs are 
increasingly recognised. In the 1960s, Caplan (1966) questioned the behavioural 
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assumptions of the traditional MACSs; the effectiveness of conventional MACSs has also 
been heavily criticised. In the debate on the problems of conventional MACSs, 
Relevance Lost (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987) is often referred to. It has been regarded as 
one of the major catalysts for changes in management accounting (Burns and Vaivio, 
2001), as after its publication, a number of `new' MACSs that aim to alleviate the 
problems of traditional MACSs have been developed. 
Despite the popularity of the book Relevance Lost, its thesis is not without challenge, and 
has provoked great debate, both at theoretical and technical levels, among accounting 
scholars. At the fundamental, theoretical level, the approach Johnson and Kaplan took to 
analyse the development and current problems of MACSs has been criticised, and various 
scholars have offered alternative explanations for the development and `relevance' 
problems of MACSs (See Loft, 1995; Roslender, 1996; MacDonald and Richardson, 2002 
for a review). At the technical level, scholars and consultants have attempted to develop 
management accounting and control initiatives to address some of the technical 
limitations of the conventional MACSs. For Johnson and Kaplan, after criticising 
conventional MACSs and proposing remedies for MACSs in Relevance Lost, they later 
went in opposite directions in suggesting how MACSs could regain their `relevance'. 
The former now advocates the total abandonment of MACSs, whereas the latter argues 
for the `improvement' in the MACSs, and after having first promoted activity-based 
costing (ABC) and activity-based management, he moved on, in conjunction with David 
P. Norton, to developing the BSC. 
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2.2.1. The Emergence of Management Accounting and Control Systems 
Standard costing and budgetary control can be considered one of the earliest forms of 
MACSs. 1 Accounting ratios which measure earnings in relation to investment, such as 
return on investment (ROI) and residual income (RI), were later developed, and it is 
claimed that these measures will encourage optimal investment selection by divisional 
managers, and help ensure that the performance of each division is harmonised with the 
owners' goal for the firm as a whole (Bromwich and Walker, 1998). 
Although it is generally agreed that standard costing and budgetary control is the earliest 
form of MACSs (Fleischman and Tyson, 1996), the first use of accounting numbers in the 
management of organisations is controversial. Scholars from different perspectives have 
provided different accounts of the motive for the emergence of the MACSs, therefore 
offering different views with regard to when the MACSs emerged. Conventional 
business historians and economic-rationalists argue that MACSs were developed to 
improve control and enhance efficiency. In contrast, many critical accounting historians 
have contended, primarily based on the perspective of Foucault or Marxism, that MACSs 
were primarily used to de-skill, dis-empower, and control workers (Fleischman and 
Tyson, 1996). 
2.2.1.1. Economic Rationalist Perspective 
From the economic rationalist perspective, MACSs were driven by searches for economic 
efficiency and profit. MACSs development was seen an economic-rational response to 
the new business demands to improve control. From this perspective, the development of 
MACSs is, therefore, largely related to changes in the economic and technological 
1 Although standard costing and budgetary control are interrelated, the existence (or absence) of one 
technique does not imply the existence (or absence) of the other (Boyns, 1998). 
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environment as well as changes in the mode of organising the production and 
organisational structure. 
This group of scholars has argued that the early cost and management accounting systems 
were developed around the 1850s in textile mills2 (Johnson, 1972,1981; Johnson and 
Kaplan, 1987) and railroads (Chandler, 1962,1977; Chandler and Daems, 1979). The 
cost accounting and management practices within railroads were then transferred to mass 
production firms, including distribution and retailers and steel factories in the 1880s 
(Kaplan, 1984). 
From this perspective, cost accounting systems arose as a result of a new kind of need, 
first recognised in the single economic activity firms which emerged as a consequence of 
the Industrial Revolution. Adopting cost accounting and control created and exploited the 
opportunity for firms to gain economies of scale by investing significant amounts of 
capital in their production process and employing workers on a long-term basis, rather 
than relying on the external markets to exchange their outputs and paying labour by 
piecework. When the firms began to conduct economic exchange internally instead of 
relying on direct economic exchange with external markets, market prices for 
intermediate products were absent. As a result, cost accounting information was needed 
"to identify the different costs for the intermediate and final products of the firm ... to 
provide a benchmark to measure the efficiency of the conversion process... [and] to 
2 Johnson and Kaplan (1987) agree with Chandler (1977) that the textile mills were not considered the 
`modern' enterprise. To qualify as a `modem' enterprise, the firm must have many operating units and be 
managed by "a hierarchy of salaried executives" (Chandler, 1977, p. 1) rather than being managed by its 
owner. However, Johnson and Kaplan (1987, p. 44) argue that "conversion cost accounting, the earliest 
example of management accounting, appeared in textile factories even before the first railroads were 
built.. 
. 
[Railroads] were not the first economic enterprises that used cost accounting to rationalize internally 
coordinated processes". 
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provide incentives for workers to achieve productivity goals" (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987, 
p. 8). 
The analysis of the emergence of MACSs from the economic rationalist perspective has 
been criticised for neglecting the wider social, political and historical contexts of 
management accounting development (see Hopwood, 1987), and also arguably for not 
even being a particularly accurate history of the internal development of cost accounting 
practice as such (e. g. Hoskin and Macve, 2000). Therefore, accounting scholars from 
critical perspectives have suggested alternative explanations for the rise of modern 
managerialism and MACSs. 
2.2.1.2. Foucauldian Perspective 
One strand of criticism of the economic rationalists' account of the emergence of MACSs 
draws on Michel Foucault's concepts of disciplinary and power-knowledge relation. The 
Foucauldian perspective has been used in accounting research, particularly management 
accounting, since the 1980s to examine the ways in which management accounting 
`truths' have emerged, and to explore the power relations embedded in the operation of 
MACSs (Baxter and Chua, 2006). The analysis of accounting history from the 
Foucauldian perspective has broadened the context within which the history of 
accounting was traditionally situated; it emphasises that historical, social, political and 
ideological contexts of accounting are no less important than economic or technical 
contexts (Stewart, 1992). 
From a Foucauldian perspective, managerialism and MACSs are not seen as an economic 
rational response to the new business demand. Rather, it is either seen as a new form of 
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control resulting in the emergence of the `governable person' (Miller and O'Leary, 1987), 
or "one particular expression of a new kind of knowledge-based `disciplinary' power" 
(Hoskin and Macve, 1994, p. 5). From the Foucauldian perspective, the core element to 
consider when the modem management control began is to distinguish "between the 
development of engineering standards for materials and machine efficiency and the 
transfer of such performance measurements to human behaviour" (Fleischman et al., 
1995, p. 162). 
In their view, the conventional histories can be empirically or evidentially inaccurate 
because a search for the first event where financial accounts were used for cost 
calculation in order to identify the origin of management accounting can be misleading; 
this kind of cost calculation does not necessarily prove the implementation of a 
systematic, constant and continuous approach to cost identification and control, since as a 
form of calculation it was a feasible way of developing the information contained 
financial accounts once those accounts became meticulous and accurate records of 
transactions. As Ezzamel et al. (1990, p. 157) argue, "There is indeed no a priori reason 
why this event [i. e. simple cost calculation] should not have occurred at any point 
following the invention of double entry bookkeeping in the late 13`h century". 
Widespread examples of cost calculation can be found in the historical record from the 
eighteenth century on, particularly in Britain after the emergence of the Industrial 
Revolution (e. g. Stone, 1973 in Charlton Mills; McKendrick, 1970 and Hopwood, 1987 
in Wedgwood pottery; Jones, 1985 and Edwards, 1989 in South Wales). 
From a Foucauldian perspective, it is important to identify the crucial discontinuities from 
previous accounting and management practices (Hoskin and Macve, 1988). For Hoskin 
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and Macve, the discontinuity that marks the beginning of a managerial system of cost 
accounting is the development of the modem business enterprise as described by 
Chandler in The Visible Hand (Chandler, 1977). However, they diverge at the level of 
accounting historical detail from the Chandler explanation which sees the new form of 
modern business as being largely the work of pioneering US businessmen. Instead, they 
see the men who make the breakthroughs to deploying managerial practices grounded in 
forms of accounting used to shape and control production and activity across and 
organisational setting as all being graduates of the United States Military Academy at 
West Point. The first development of a `modern' form of managerialism is identified by 
Chandler as taking place at the US Armory at Springfield in the 1830s, which is the first 
single-unit enterprise to coordinate workforce activity through tracking output and the 
quality of worker performance simultaneously. Hoskin and Macve now identify a West 
Point graduate, Daniel Tyler, as the person who introduced at Springfield Armory what is 
seemingly the first system for tracking costs and worker activity simultaneously, thus, 
enabling a standard cost and time to be calculated for each activity involved in 
manufacturing and assembling a musket. Tyler developed this system through 
undertaking in 1832 what is seemingly the first recorded `time and motion study' to set 
the norm of what the good worker could and should achieve, and to determine the piece 
rates (Ezzamel et al., 1990; Hoskin and Macve, 1994). 
Hoskin and Macve (1988) demonstrate that the review of Springfield's labour practices 
conducted by Daniel Tyler led to a new system which involved "a requirement to work a 
`full-day' and based on measures of time spent in the manufacture of various parts -a full 
accounting for labour productivity" (p. 38). This is, from their Foucauldian perspective, 
the point at which modem managerialism emerged, with the practices of accounting 
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playing "a central and crucial role, by enabling the establishment of the historically new 
principle that humans are numerically accountable to objective norms of performance" 
(Hoskin and Macve, 1994, p. 6). 
2.2.1.3. Marxist and Labour Process Perspective 
Another major strand of criticism of the traditional and economic rationalists' account of 
the emergence and development of MACSs comes from the Marxist and labour process 
perspective. Accounting literature from this perspective has demonstrated how 
management accounting is implicated in the creation of an unequal society (Baxter and 
Chua, 2003). It enables us to appreciate the contradictory role of management accounting 
in contemporary organisations, that is, accounting as a set of technologies which stabilise 
and manage local conflict, while at the same time, promoting underlying differences that 
sustain enduring societal conflicts (Baxter and Chua, 2006). 
Studies of management accounting history based on the Marxist and labour process 
perspective do not focus their discussion on the time of the origin of MACSs; rather, they 
argue that analysis based on neoclassical economics can offer only a partial explanation 
of the emergence and development of MACSs. Hopper and Armstrong (1991, p. 405) 
argue that "accounting controls were not a consequence of economic or technological 
imperatives, but rather were rooted in struggles as firms attempted to control labour 
processes in various epochs of capitalistic development. " 
One of the insights emerging from the critical perspectives of the history of accounting is 
the view that accounting is not a neutral and objective process and its development is not 
a natural evolution of administrative technologies. On the contrary, accounting 
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technologies are historically and culturally contingent phenomena (Baxter and Chua, 
2006). Accounting is seen as "an important part of a network of power relations which 
are built into the very fabric of organisational and social life" (Miller and O'Leary, 1987, 
p. 240). Accounting history is viewed as "the formation of one particular complex of 
rationalities and modes of intervention among many, a complex that has itself been 
formed out of diverse materials and in relation to a heterogeneous range of issues and 
events" (Miller et al., 1991, p. 396). 
With different views on how MACSs emerged and developed, accounting scholars have 
provided different opinions on the problems of MACSs. Scholars from a conventional 
and economic rationalist perspective view the problems of MACSs as the result of their 
failure to evolve in order to keep pace with the changing technological and economic 
environment. On the other hand, scholars from a Foucauldian perspective argue that 
MACSs were bound to be problematic from the outset, while labour process theorists 
argue that the `relevance' of MACSs should not be evaluated by the accuracy of the 
information the systems provide. 
2.2.2. Managing by the Numbers -'Relevance' Debate 
Although accounting numbers have been pervasively used to measure and manage 
performance in organisations for more than a century, some scholars argue that 
`managing by the numbers' - where managers rely on financial numbers to run their firms 
- is a recent phenomenon (e. g. Johnson, 1994; Johnson and Kaplan, 1987). Johnson 
(1994) argues that `managing by the numbers' arose in the US after World War II. He 
blames a spread of the multidivisional form of business organisation after the war and 
business education in the US after the 1950s for the rise of this type of management. 
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2.2.2.1. Failure of Management Accounting and Control Systems to Evolve - 
Johnson and Kaplan's Analysis of `Relevance' Lost 
In the book Relevance Lost, Johnson and Kaplan argue that managers started to believe 
that they could run their firms by financial numbers when MACSs ceased to develop to 
keep pace with the increasing complexities in production technologies. From Johnson 
and Kaplan's perspective, the failure of MACSs to evolve in response to new business 
demands has led to a loss in `relevance' of the MACSs. Moreover, in their view, this loss 
in `relevance' is one of the reasons for a decline in the competitiveness of American 
businesses. 
Johnson and Kaplan (1987) argue that "today's management accounting information... is 
too late, too aggregated, and too distorted to be relevant for managers' planning and 
control decisions" (p. 1). They contend that management accounting reports do not help 
organisations to reduce costs or improve productivity; management accounting systems 
fail to provide accurate product costs, and may also lead to myopic behaviour, as 
management accounting focuses on the short-term monthly profit and loss statement (p. 
1-3). 
In their view, management accounting served its purpose well when it first emerged, but 
lost its relevance partly due to a failure to evolve in response to major changes in business 
technology and environment. As Kaplan (1984, p. 390) argues, "Virtually all of the 
practices employed by firms today and explicated in leading cost accounting textbooks 
had been developed by 1925. Despite considerable change in the nature of organizations 
and the dimensions of competition during the past 60 years, there has been little 
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innovation in the design and implementation of cost accounting and management control 
systems. " 
As discussed in the preceding section, economic rationalists, including Johnson and 
Kaplan, view MACSs development as an economic rational response to new business 
demands in order to improve control. Therefore, when MACSs fail to develop in 
response to changes in competitive environment, in their view, MACSs have lost their 
`relevance'. 
In addition to MACSs' failure to evolve, Johnson and Kaplan (1987) blame business 
education and an increase in demand, from the stock markets, for audited financial 
statements, leading to the dominance of the external financial accounting statements, for 
the loss in `relevance' of MACSs. To regain this `relevance', Johnson and Kaplan (1987) 
propose a separation between the costing systems for process control and those for 
product costing. They also suggest a more extensive use of non-financial performance 
measures, which can highlight key areas such as manufacturing, marketing, and research 
and development success. 
The book Relevance Lost has drawn considerable attention from accounting scholars, and 
has led to a great attempt to `improve' conventional MACSs. It has provoked debate on 
the issues around the `relevance' of MACSs, including what is meant by `relevance', why 
management accounting lost its `relevance', and how to make them `relevant' once again. 
Nevertheless, Johnson and Kaplan's analysis has been criticised in respect of their 
proposed theoretical approach, their historical analysis and their suggested remedies. 
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From a managerialist perspective, Bromwich and Bhimani (1989) argue that Johnson and 
Kaplan's claims are not sufficiently supported by empirical evidence. In addition, the 
arguments based on examples of American firms may not be applicable to firms in other 
countries, such as the UK, as firms in different countries may have unique historical, 
economic, industrial and institutional development circumstances. The issues of whether 
the remedies proposed can be operationalised have also been raised (see Noreen, 1987). 
From a critical perspective, the transaction cost theory adopted by Johnson and Kaplan to 
explain the genesis and development of MACSs is criticised, as discussed in Section 
2.2.1. Alternative accounts of the history of MACSs development are provided, and 
different interpretations for the `relevance' of the MACSs are offered. Even Johnson later 
developed a criticism of his own analysis of the problems of MACSs and the remedies he 
and Kaplan had proposed in Relevance Lost. 
2.2.2.2. Problems Embedded in the Genesis of Management Accounting and 
Control Systems - an Alternative View of `Relevance' from a Foucauldian Perspective 
Whereas Johnson and Kaplan (1987) argue that management accounting's `relevance' 
lost is a recent phenomenon, accounting scholars from the Foucauldian perspective 
contend that the problems of using accounting for human accountability are embedded in 
the genesis of the systems. As Ezzamel et al. (1990) argue, "cost management based 
upon accounting was problematic - and bound to be problematic - from its outset" (p. 
157). They suggest that "[a]ccounting's `problem' is inherently related to its power in 
performance measurement and in the creation of accountability. The `problem' has been 
there from the beginning and it is as accounting's power in making performance visible 
has grown that the inherent problem has also become more visible" (p. 164). 
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From a Foucauldian perspective, the development of MACSs is not seen as technical 
progress to meet new business and organisational needs; rather, it is regarded as a more 
complex process closely connected to social movements at the time (Hoskin and Macve, 
1994). In line with this approach, Miller and O'Leary develop the thesis that it is MACSs 
which create a `governable person', embracing the individuals and making them 
accountable by reference to pre-determined performance standards (Miller and O'Leary, 
1987). MACSs create "a new way of seeing each individual worker in terms of norms 
and deviations from the norm" (Ezzamel et al., 1990, p. 159). 
Ezzamel et al. (1990) argue that what western organisations have ignored is the fact that 
"persons rendered calculable do not passively accept this new reality: they sooner or later 
begin to calculate their own self-interest" (p. 163). Ezzamel et al. (1990) suggest that to 
`improve' MACSs, focus should be placed on behavioural and organisational contexts in 
which MACSs operate, rather than on the technical issues of cost calculation and 
identification. They suggest, "[W]e should be thinking systematically about the 
underlying accounting problem that has been there from the outset. How best can we 
make the accounting numbers work within the overall system of control so that they 
become really effective complementary and interlocking ways of both describing and 
driving real-world performance while being aware of and responsive to the ways that a 
population of calculable persons changes and evolves" (p. 165). 
2.2.2.3. `Relevance Being Refocused' - Another Explanation from the Labour 
Process Perspective 
Whereas scholars from the Foucauldian perspective have argued that a development of 
MACSs should not be seen as evolutionary progress, and have suggested a greater 
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consideration of the behavioural and organisational contexts of MACSs, labour process 
theorists offer an alternative negation of Johnson and Kaplan's (1987) thesis. Drawing on 
labour process theory (Braverman, 1974), Hopper (1990) and Hopper and Armstrong 
(1991) argue that the transaction cost framework, underpinning Johnson and Kaplan's 
analysis, excludes social and political issues from the analysis. They argue for a broader 
and more critical institutional analysis around capitalistic development. 
Hopper and Armstrong (1991) argue that transaction cost theory views management as a 
search for process efficiency; thus, from the transaction cost perspective, `relevance' of 
management accounting depends on the timeliness, accuracy and relevance of 
information. Nevertheless, from the labour process perspective, management is seen as 
an intensification of control over the labour process. Accounting controls are viewed as 
an attempt to control the labour process in various eras of capitalistic development. 
Therefore, from this perspective, the `relevance' of management accounting is judged by 
the results it achieves, rather than the accuracy of the information. As they argue, "the 
accuracy of budgets and internal attributions of cost might be regarded as irrelevant, so 
long as they serve to focus managerial effort in the directions desired by those who 
control the organisation" (Hopper and Armstrong, 1991, p. 410). From the labour process 
perspective, the stagnation of management accounting development during the 1920s, 
when the power of labour increased remarkably, is `relevance being refocused' rather 
than `relevance lost' (Roslender, 1996). 
Despite controversies over Johnson and Kaplan's analysis, a number of management 
accounting and control initiatives have emerged during the past two decades. While 
attempts to reform MACSs are prevalent, Johnson (1992,1994) has shifted his position 
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from calling for the management accounting reform proposed in the Relevance Lost to 
suggesting a replacement of management accounting with total quality management 
(TQM)-based performance measures. 
2.2.2.4. Total Abandonment of Management Accounting and Control Systems - 
Johnson's Self-Critique 
In his paper in Critical Perspectives on Accounting, published in 1994, Johnson questions 
the analysis of management accounting problems and the remedies he and Kaplan 
proposed in 1987. In 1987, Johnson and Kaplan attributed the post-war decline in the 
competitiveness of American businesses to a failure to develop MACSs in response to 
changes in needs of modem businesses. In contrast, Johnson now suggests that 
management accounting has always been problematic. 
In his book (1992) and paper (1994), Johnson contends that American businesses have 
lost their competitiveness, particularly relative to Japanese counterparts, largely because 
of the way in which American companies are managed. He argues, "Relevance was not 
lost by using improper accounting to manage; it was lost by improperly using accounting 
information to manage" (Johnson, 1994, p. 262 italics in original). He argues that prior to 
World War II, accounting information was also distorted, too aggregated and too late to 
control operations. However, in his view, at that time accounting systems were not used 
to control the operations processes; rather, they were used to report operating results. In 
his view, whereas American managers today focus on achieving financial results, 
Japanese managers pay considerably greater attention to process, quality and customer 
satisfaction, which are critical for contemporary businesses. 
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To resume their competitiveness in today's global economy, Johnson advises American 
businesses to replace their MACSs, a top-down control focusing on results, with TQM, a 
bottom-up approach, emphasising employee empowerment, customers and processes. He 
argues, "Accounting-based control information motivates the work force to manipulate 
processes for financial ends. Global competition requires companies to use bottom-up 
information that empowers the work force to control processes for customer satisfaction" 
(Johnson, 1992, p. 1). In his view, TQM adoption will help enhance the competitiveness 
of American, and other western, businesses. 
Johnson's analysis of the causes of a decline in American competitiveness and the 
remedies proposed have been criticised by various accounting scholars. Williams et al. 
(1994), and Yuthas and Tinker (1994) argue that Johnson neglected structural variables, 
such as wage costs and domestic market success/failure in his analysis. They argue that 
the post-war malaise of American competitiveness was rooted in structural conditions, 
rather than management calculation problems. They also question Johnson's assumption 
of the superiority of Japanese business performance over that of American counterparts. 
Johnson's emphasis on TQM as a solution to the problem has also been questioned. 
Williams et al. (1994) cast doubt on Johnson's assumption that TQM will satisfy the 
interests of all different stakeholders. In addition, Ezzamel (1994) argues that Johnson 
did not fully investigate the less beneficial aspects of TQM practices; neither did he 
consider the social and organisational dimensions of TQM implementation. 
A number of scholars (e. g. Sewell and Wilkinson, 1992; Boje and Winsor, 1993; Parker 
and Slaughter, 1993; Munro, 1995) have criticised TQM as merely an attempt by 
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management to intensify their control over employees. The `hard' aspects of TQM, 
which involve top-down techniques of measurement, monitoring and control, may not 
engender any significant differences from management accounting control (Ezzamel, 
1994). Ezzamel (1994, p. 275) argues, "The very notion of quality is curiously reduced to 
measures of quantity. What is initially presented as a conscious policy of employee 
empowerment on closer examination turns out to be yet another manifestation of top- 
down managerialism; the rhetoric of empowerment runs into the reality of hierarchical 
control. " 
In addition, Ezzamel (1994) argues that Johnson ignores the positive consequences that 
accounting's constitutive role can have. He argues that the replacement of MACSs with 
TQM-based performance measures may neither resolve the problems of performance 
management, nor enhance the competitiveness of firms. To resist the power effects of 
accounting, Ezzamel (1994) suggests that we should transform accounting practices into 
socialising forms of accountability by using accounting "in a manner that would reflect 
and enact a sense of self which, while confirming the individual attributes of the self, 
promotes the interdependence of self and other" (p. 277). In his view, this will help shift 
attention from focusing on accounts to a focus on "... processes of accountability which 
emphasize interdependence in relations between self and the other" (p. 277). 
Within the debates on the emergence and `relevance' of MACSs at the fundamental, 
theoretical level, broader social theories have been brought into the accounting arena. 
Accounting technologies are seen as social and institutional phenomena which are 
historically and culturally contingent rather than purely technical tools for efficiency and 
effectiveness (Baxter and Chua, 2006). While this group of scholars focus their debates 
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on the theoretical level of the issues, other groups of academics and consultants have 
engaged in a discussion at a more technical level, and have attempted to develop `new' 
management accounting and control models which address some of the problems of the 
traditional MACSs. 
2.2.3. Recent Management Accounting and Control Initiatives 
Following heavy criticism of the effectiveness and appropriateness of the MACSs for 
management control in contemporary organisations, a number of management accounting 
and control initiatives have been developed with the aim of solving, or at least alleviating, 
problems associated with conventional MACSs. These `advanced' MACSs are usually 
associated with catchy acronyms, for instance, activity-based costing (ABC), activity- 
based management (ABM), activity-based budgeting (ABB), value-based management 
(VBM), and' balanced scorecard (BSC). Otley (2001) suggests that the emphases of 
recent MACSs initiatives have changed from those of conventional MACSs in several 
ways - from historic to forward-looking; from control to planning; from internal to 
external; from cost to value; and from production to marketing. 
For MACSs used for performance measurement and management in particular, two major 
strands of development emerged - economic value metrics and integrated performance 
measurement frameworks. Economic value metrics proponents focus on arriving at a 
single financial measure that will incentivise managers and employees to maximise 
shareholder value. On the other hand, integrated performance measurement frameworks 
advocates argue for a `balanced' set of performance measures, comprising financial and 
non-financial indicators. 
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Debate on the strengths and weaknesses of the use of single and multiple performance 
measures can be found as early as the 1950s (see, for example, Drucker, 1954; Ridgway, 
1956). In the 1990s, this debate still continued, particularly among consultancy firms 
which attempted to battle over the supremacy of their version of the performance 
measurement system. As Otley (2001, p. 246) notes, in the mid-1990s proponents of the 
Economic Value Added' (EVA®), one of the well-known versions of economic value 
metrics, accused the BSC approach of being a mechanism that distracted line managers, 
who, thus, "took their eye off the ball", while BSC advocates claimed that BSC was 
clearly designed to generate shareholder value, and was not a stakeholder model as others 
might have suggested. 
Nevertheless, Otley (2001) suggests that some changes in this battle can be observed in 
recent years. The two streams of development are not mutually exclusive, although they 
are fundamentally different in some respects. The importance of using multidimensional 
performance measures for lower management and shop floor employees is recognised by 
economic value metrics proponents (Otley, 2001), while financial performance still 
remains one of the important dimensions in all multidimensional performance 
measurement frameworks. In addition, many organisations supplement non-financial 
performance measures with economic value metrics (Cooper et al., 2001). 
2.2.3.1. Economic Value Metrics 
During the past two decades, the issue of how to create value for shareholders has 
dominated debates among business organisations. Cooper et al. (2001) argue that the 
focus on maximising shareholder value is plausibly a result of the strong influence of 
stock markets and the dominance of shareholders over other stakeholders, particularly in 
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the US and UK. Within management accounting and performance measurement 
literature, a concern that traditional accounting ratios do not reflect the economic value of 
the firms has been raised. For instance, Rappaport (1998) argues that accounting 
measures are not consistent with economic value as accounting measures are affected by 
accounting choices; they do not take into account of the time value of money, and thus 
cannot capture the contribution from intangible assets which are critical for organisations 
operating in knowledge economies. Following the criticisms of accounting ratios, 
Rappaport proposes the use of shareholder value added, which is fundamentally based on 
the net present value concept. He argues that by creating value for shareholders, all other 
stakeholders will also benefit as, in his view, "... to continue to serve all stakeholders, 
companies must be competitive if they are to survive.. .a company's 
long-term destiny 
depends on a financial relationship with each stakeholder that has an interest in the 
company.. . all stakeholders are vulnerable when management 
fails to create shareholder 
value. " (Rappaport, 1998, p. 7) 
While Rappaport (1998) argues for the use of the net present value technique, which is 
fundamentally different from accounting measures in several respects, many other 
economic value measures are based on the concept of conventional accounting ratios, 
such as RI and ROI, but with some adjustments to alleviate the problems of traditional 
measures. Among the economic value metrics, EVA®, developed by Stern Stewart & Co. 
is one of the most well-known versions. It is based on the concept of RI, a conventional 
accounting-based performance measure. EVA® is defined as adjusted operating income 
after tax minus a capital charge. Stern Stewart & Co. recommends up to 160 adjustments 
to operating income in EVA® calculation in order to eliminate distortions created by 
external accounting rules. 
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Stewart (1991) claims that EVA® is superior to the traditional RI, and will promote 
efficient use of capital. However, empirical evidence supporting this claim is limited 
(Ittner and Larcker, 1998b; see Ittner and Larcker, 2001 for a review). Chen and Dodd 
(1997) argue that some conventional accounting measures, such as RI, can also motivate 
managers to use capital efficiently. In addition, the EVA® calculation is relatively more 
complicated and the implementation of EVA® is more costly. Empirical evidence 
exhibits no major difference between the correlation of EVA® and stock return, and the 
correlation of RI and stock return. Thus, Chen and Dodd (1997) argue that the use of 
EVA® maybe less beneficial to the organisation, compared to the use of traditional RI. 
Whereas some scholars regard EVA® as simply an adapted version of RI, Otley (2001) 
argues that EVA® gains its value from incorporating the measure into a wider philosophy 
of performance management (cf. Mouritsen, 1998). In addition, O'Hianlon and Peasnell 
(1998) suggest that Stem Stewart recognises the problems related to the use of RI as a 
single-period performance indicator, and attempts to alleviate the problems as reflected in 
a series of adjustments to generally accepted accounting principles in determining EVA®, 
the use of the non-zero EVA® benchmark, and the `bonus bank' concept. 
In 1997, Bacidore et al. raised the question of the correlation between a single-period 
EVA® and shareholder wealth, and developed another economic value measure - refined 
economic value added (REVA). REVA is defined as the difference between net 
operating profit after tax and the cost of capital on the market value of the firm. The 
distinction between REVA and EVA® is that REVA assesses its capital charge for the 
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period t on the market value of the firm at the end of period t-1, rather than on the book 
value of assets at the end of period t-1. 
Bacidore et al. (1997) assert that REVA is a superior measure for top management, as it 
reflects the opportunity cost to the owners of the unrecorded goodwill component of 
value. They also claim that REVA outperforms EVA® in predicting shareholder value 
creation. Nevertheless, O'Hanlon and Peasnell (1998) develop the critique that REVA 
violates the clean surplus definition of RI, whereas the clean surplus is vital for the long- 
run linkage between RI and economic value. Thus, O'Hanlon and Peasnell (1998) argue 
that REVA may not be an appropriate alternative to EVA®. 
Another economic value metric that has received considerable attention is Cash Flow 
Return on Investment (CFROI), developed by the Boston Consulting Group. CFROI is 
calculated by dividing inflation-adjusted cash flow by the inflation-adjusted cash 
investment. CFROI advocates claim that CFROI is noticeably superior to conventional 
accounting measures and EVA®. A partner at HOLT Value Associates claims that 
"CFROIs are ideally suited to displaying long-term track records, whereas a Stern 
Stewart-type EVA is in millions of dollars, heavily influenced by asset size, and 
unadjusted for inflation-induced biases. " (Meyer, 1996, p. 41) G. Bennett Stewart III 
responds, "CFROI is literally a consultant's concoction. It was quite an imaginative 
development by a consulting firm, but it is not well grounded in the basic elements of 
corporate finance theory. CFROI attempts to measure shareholder wealth - which is not 
clearly related to maximizing shareholder wealth. " (Meyer, 1996, pp. 41-42) 
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In 2002, O'Hanlon and Peasnell proposed an excess value created (EVC) measure, which 
includes a backward-looking articulation between past accounting numbers and the value 
created during a multi-period interval to a well-recognised residual income-based 
valuation relationship. By combining the backward-looking and forward-looking parts, 
the EVC will hold, regardless of accounting conservatism or a change of accounting 
measurement method, because periodic errors will simply alter the balance between the 
realised and expected residual income, and the sum will be the same. 
Despite considerable interest among accounting academics in economic value metrics and 
the battle among consultant firms over the supremacy of their versions of economic value 
metrics, little is known about the relative internal benefits of employing different 
economic value measures and traditional accounting measures as the key internal 
performance measure (Ittner and Larcker, 1998b, 2001). CFROI critics argue that the 
measure is too complex for managers to understand (Meyer, 1996). Some companies that 
have implemented EVA®, such as AT&T, have also abandoned the measure in favour of 
conventional accounting measures (Ittner and Larcker, 1998b). AT&T indicated that 
EVA® is too complex for most employees to understand, and total shareholder return 
between December 1992 and December 1996 was negative, even though internal EVA® 
was positive. Malmi and Ikäheimo (2003) find that none of the organisations they studied 
applied the concept in a comprehensive manner as the normative literature has argued. In 
particular, the use of EVA® based bonuses was seriously challenged. 
2.2.3.2. Integrated Performance Measurement Frameworks 
While some scholars and consultants focus on developing a single financial measure that 
can reflect shareholder value, another group of scholars and consultants attempt to 
49 
develop performance measurement frameworks which integrate strategically-orientated 
non-financial indicators with financial performance measures. This group of scholars and 
consultants have argued that financial performance may not be able to reflect the 
capability of organisations to perform in the future. In addition, other stakeholders are 
increasingly involved in the operations of today's organisations. Thus, in their view, a 
supplement of non-financial indicators, to capture interests of other stakeholders, is 
necessary. 
Since the late 1980s, there have been a number of calls for the integration of non-financial 
and financial performance measures (e. g. Johnson and Kaplan, 1987; Eccles, 1991). 
Although the call for a `balanced' set of performance measures is not completely new 
(see Drucker, 1954, for example), Eccles (1991) argued that there were only few 
organisations which gave equal attention to non-financial measures in determining 
strategy, bonuses and other rewards. Advocates for integrated performance measurement 
frameworks claim that performance measurement systems with a `balanced' set of 
performance indicators can better capture the link between operational actions and an 
organisation's strategy (Nanni et al., 1992; Kaplan and Norton, 1996b). 
In today's organisations, integrated performance measurement systems are prevalent. 
Various scholars have offered plausible explanations for the widespread adoption of non- 
financial performance measures. From a technical perspective, limitations of financial 
measures can be one of the reasons. Financial performance indicators have been heavily 
criticised for encouraging myopic short-term decisions, as they do not provide a clear link 
between short-term actions and long-term strategy. In addition, financial measures have 
been criticised for being characteristically historical and backward-looking; they are 
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considered results of past actions, rather than the drivers for future value (Hemmer, 1996; 
Inner and Larcker, 1998b). Moreover, financial measures have been criticised for not 
being able to capture the value of some critical intangible assets, such as human resources 
and research and development (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987). The integration of the 
strategically-orientated non-financial performance indicators found in the integrated 
performance measurement models is often perceived as a technical improvement to 
conventional accounting-based performance measurement systems. The adoption of non- 
financial performance measures is perceived as one of the ways that will help improve 
efficiency and organisational performance. 
Scholars from the contingency perspective have argued that changes in the competitive 
environment and business strategies can also explain the adoption of integrated 
performance measurement systems. From the contingency perspective, organisations 
adopt non-financial performance indicators to match organisational characteristics and the 
competitive environment. Scholars from this perspective have investigated relationships 
between the use of non-financial performance measures and various contextual variables, 
for instance, strategy, organisational structure, size and culture (See Langfield-Smith, 
1997; Chenhall, 2003,2006, for a review). 
Empirical studies have found associations between organisations' strategy and their 
choice of performance indicators. Chenhall and Langfield-Smith (1998b), and Perera et 
al. (1997) find that firms employing a customer-focused strategy rely more on non- 
financial, customer-related performance indicators. Other scholars have also found an 
association between quality- and customer-focused production technologies, such as 
flexible manufacturing, TQM, and Just-in-Time, and a focus on non-financial 
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performance measures (e. g. Daniel and Reitsperger, 1991; Banker et al., 1993; Abernethy 
and Lillis, 1995; Ittner and Larcker, 1995,1997; Chenhall, 1997; Fullerton and 
McWatters, 2002). 
Relationships between organisational structure and non-financial performance measures 
have also been established. As Scott and Tiessen (1999) find, the involvement of inter- 
and intra-departmental teams is positively associated with the use of multidimensional 
performance measures. 
While scholars from the contingency perspective focus their analysis on the competitive 
environment, scholars from the institutional perspective argue that a wider set of 
institutional factors and the relative power among different stakeholder groups can also 
influence performance measure choice. For example, Brignall and Modell (2000) argue, 
based on empirical observations in the UK and the Scandinavian public sector, that 
interrelationships (i. e. power, conflicts and interests) between key stakeholders play a 
significant role in determining dimensions of performance incorporated in the 
performance measurement systems of the organisation. In a study of a Norwegian health 
care sector, Modell (2001) finds that organisational legitimacy is no less important than 
improving efficiency in developing a multidimensional performance measurement 
system. Hussain and Hoque (2002) also find that, in the four Japanese banks studied, 
several institutional factors drove these banks to adopt non-financial performance 
measures, although they argue that economic constraints seem to have been the most 
forceful factor. 
%k 
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While reasons for non-financial performance measurement are still debated among 
accounting scholars, a number of other integrated performance measurement frameworks 
have been developed in addition to the BSC. This is important to bear in mind since 
some of the issues addressed here in relation to BSC implementation may be of relevance 
in undertaking research into other similar frameworks. 
For instance, Keegan et al. (1989) develop a `performance matrix', which recognises the 
importance of cost/non-cost and internal/external dimensions of performance measures. 
In 1991, Fitzgerald et al. developed the `results-determinants' framework, which 
highlights the linkages between past business actions (determinants or leading indicators) 
and results (lagging indicators). The results-determinants framework is tailored for 
service organisations. It comprises four sets of leading measures - quality of service, 
flexibility, resource utilisation, and innovation - and two sets of lagging indicators - 
competitive and financial performance. A mix of measures along the six dimensions may 
vary across the three different generic service types. 
In the same year, Lynch and Cross proposed the `performance pyramid', which promotes 
the monitoring of different aspects of performance at three different levels of the 
organisation - business unit, process, and department. Lynch and Cross (1991) claim 
that the performance pyramid will help maintain the link between strategy and operations, 
as strategic objectives will be translated from the top at corporate level down to the 
operational level, and the operations will be measured from the bottom to the upper level. 
The performance pyramid also emphasises the link between measures for internal 
efficiency and those for external effectiveness within each organisational level. 
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The BSC was therefore developed in a context of re-thinking performance measurement 
systems more generally. After criticising and proposing `performance measurement 
systems for the future' in Relevance Lost, Kaplan, together with David P. Norton, put 
forward the BSC in the Harvard Business Review in 1992. BSC supplements the 
traditional financial performance measures with three dimensions of non-financial 
performance - customer, internal business process, and innovation and learning. BSC 
also emphasises the relationships among the four dimensions of performance and the link 
between performance measures and strategy. 
Innovation has not stopped there. In 2001, Neely et al. developed the `performance 
prism', which focuses on the diverse needs and desires of different stakeholders. Five 
aspects of performance - stakeholder satisfaction, strategies, process, capability, and 
stakeholder contribution - are measured under the system. Stakeholder contribution can 
be considered one of the unique characteristics of the framework. 
Although each multidimensional performance measurement framework suggests different 
sets of performance indicators, some of them overlap. They also share a number of 
commonalities. For example, performance dimensions in most of the frameworks reflect 
the concern of both internal and external stakeholders. In addition, financial 
performance, which is an object of interest to shareholders, remains crucial in these 
frameworks, and for most models, financial performance is described as the ultimate goal 
of organisations. Moreover, the link between strategies and performance measures is 
emphasised in all frameworks. 
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Despite the widespread of integrated performance measurement systems, relatively little 
light has as yet been shed empirically on the question of how the adoption of non- 
financial measures benefits organisations (Ittner and Larcker, 1998b). Scholars from the 
contingency perspective have argued that firms that adopt integrated performance 
measurement systems to `match' their contextual variables, such as strategy, technology 
and structure, should have superior performance. Nevertheless, empirical studies have 
yielded mixed results (see Chenhall, 2003,2006 for a review). 
While Chenhall (1997), and Sim and Killough (1998) find that the combination of TQM 
and/or Just-in-Time and the use of non-financial performance measures is associated with 
higher performance, Perera et al. (1997) do not find a link of customer-focused strategy 
and the use of non-financial performance measures, and organisational performance. One 
of the major differences between Perera et al. 's study and those by Chenhall and Sim and 
Killough is that Perera et al. did not examine whether the performance measures were 
linked to pay and promotion for the managers, whereas Chenhall and Sim and Killough 
incorporated incentive compensation into their analysis. This may plausibly account for 
the divergent results. 
Although academics cannot yet reach a conclusion as to whether the adoption of non- 
financial performance measures or integrated performance measurement systems will 
lead to better performance, integrated performance measurement systems are popular 
among practitioners. A number of organisations have implemented, or are considering 
implementing one of the integrated performance measurement frameworks, and some 
organisations have attempted to develop their own framework. 
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2.3. The Balanced Scorecard 
Among the integrated performance measurement frameworks, BSC is arguably the most 
well-known. It has attracted tremendous interest and has been adopted by numerous 
organisations worldwide. BSC dissemination began in Anglo-Saxon countries and has 
later become a global phenomenon. Silk (1998) suggests that approximately 60 percent 
of the US Fortune 1000 companies have either implemented or have been experimenting 
with a BSC. From the article published in Management Services, in the UK in 2001,57% 
of the companies surveyed reported using BSC, while 56% of the current non-users 
planned to adopt it in the following year (Anonymous, 2001). In continental Europe, 
BSC has also been pervasively adopted (see Kald and Nilsson, 2000; Malmi, 2001; 
Speckbacher et al., 2003; Ax and Bjornenak, 2005). The BSC has also been dispersed to 
emerging economies, including Thailand. As disclosed in a survey examining BSC usage 
among the Thai listed companies conducted in 2002,26% of the respondents reported that 
they had implemented BSC, while 47% were considering adopting it (Decharin, 2003). 
Among business communities, BSC has become one of the most popular performance 
measurement concepts today. 
BSC has become widely known since 1992, when Kaplan and Norton published their 
article, `The Balanced Scorecard - Measures that Drive Performance' in Harvard 
Business Review. However, the history of BSC has not been without dispute. While 
Kaplan and Norton (1992) claim that the BSC was developed from a year-long study in 
12 leading American companies, Arthur M. Schneiderman contends that the first BSC 
was created in 1987 at Analog Devices, where he was working as a vice president of 
quality improvement and productivity at the time. Schneiderman argues that he was the 
process owner for non-financial performance measurement and the BSC. In his website, 
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he describes the BSC and its evolution at Analog Devices. He also provides information 
on how Kaplan became connected with Analog Devices and offers the evidence of 
Kaplan's reference to Analog Devices in Kaplan and Norton's papers/books. 
(www. schneiderman. com) 
While Schneiderman disputes the provenance of the original of the BSC, many scholars 
have questioned the novelty of the idea at a more general level. A similar performance 
measurement tool, Tableau de Bord, has been commonly used in France since the 1930s 
(Epstein and Manzoni, 1998; Bessire and Baker, 2005). In addition, the integration of 
financial and non-financial performance indicators and the emphasis on linkages between 
strategy and performance indicators are not unique to the BSC. As discussed in Section 
2.2.3.2, many other performance measurement frameworks which also incorporate non- 
financial performance measures into the models and emphasise relationships between 
strategies and performance measures were developed prior to the Kaplan and Norton BSC 
and were in development independently of the Analog Devices version. 
As BSC has gained in popularity among practitioners, research into its various aspects has 
started to emerge. Some studies focus on technical aspects of the BSC, including BSC 
design and consequences of BSC adoption, whereas others place more emphasis on the 
dissemination and implementation process. 
2.3.1. The Balanced Scorecard Concept and Its Evolution 
Within the extant BSC literature, what constitutes BSC is a subject of debate. Various 
versions of BSC are found in organisations that claim to have adopted BSC (see Malmi, 
2001; Speckbacher et al., 2003). Even Kaplan and Norton have redefined their BSC. 
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BSC was originally described as a performance measurement system which overcomes 
the limitations of the systems that rely exclusively on financial performance indicators 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1992). BSC complements traditional financial indicators with three 
additional sets of non-financial performance indicators - customer, internal process, and 
innovative and learning. Kaplan and Norton (1992) argue that BSC will help provide 
answers to four basic questions of organisations: (1) How do customers see us? (2) What 
must we excel at? (3) Can we continue to improve and create value? (4) How do we look 
to shareholders? In their 1992 paper, they also claim that BSC helps to minimise 
information overload and forces managers to focus on a manageable set of the most 
critical performance measures. 
In 1993, Kaplan and Norton argued that BSC is "[m]uch more than a measurement 
exercise, the balanced scorecard is a management system that can motivate breakthrough 
improvements... " (p. 134). They also claimed that "... the balanced scorecard is most 
successful when it is used to drive the process of change" (p. 142). 
Later in 1996, they claimed that "we have seen some companies move beyond our early 
vision for the scorecard to discover its value as the cornerstone of a new strategic 
management system" (Kaplan and Norton, 1996b, p. 75). Since 1996, Kaplan and Norton 
have presented their BSC as a strategic management system which translates vision and 
strategy into key performance measures (Kaplan and Norton, 1996a, 1996b, 2001a, 
2001b, 2001 c, 2004). 
Kaplan and Norton (1996a, pp. 29-30) argue that "the best Balanced Scorecards are more 
than a collection of critical indicators or key success factors. The multiple measures on a 
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properly constructed Balanced Scorecard should consist of a linked series of objectives 
and measures that are both consistent and mutually reinforcing. " They further argue that 
the BSC "is more than a new measurement system. Innovative companies use the 
scorecard as the central, organizing framework for their management processes. " (pp. 18- 
19) Kaplan and Norton (1996b) propose four management processes which they claim 
help link long-term strategic objectives with short-term actions. The four processes 
include (1) translating vision; (2) communicating and linking; (3) business planning; and 
(4) feedback and learning (p. 77). 
To communicate corporate strategies to organisational members, Kaplan and Norton 
propose a `strategy map', which illustrates the relationships of strategic objectives that are 
organised into four perspectives (see Figure 2.1). Kaplan and Norton (2001b) claim that 
the `strategy map' is a general framework for describing and implementing strategy that 
will help an organisation to create a common understanding of strategy among 
organisational units and employees. 
While Kaplan and Norton still uphold their claim that the BSC is a strategic management 
system, in recent years, they have further emphasised the notion of `alignment', which in 
their view, will help create value for organisations. In their 2004 article, emphasis is 
placed on the alignment between intangible assets (i. e. human capital, information capital, 
and organisation capital) and the strategy of the organisation. In their 2006 book, the 
focus is on the alignment of corporate, business units, support units, external partners (i. e. 
customers, suppliers and other alliance partners), boards and shareholders with strategy. 
While in the previous books, Kaplan and Norton emphasise the development of the 
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strategy map at strategic business unit level, in the 2006 book, they focus on integrating 
business units to create value at corporate level. 
Improve shareholder value 
  Share price   Return on capital employed 
Financial 
perspective 
F-- - I Revenue growth strategy Productivity strategy 
Build the Increase Improve Improve use 
franchise value to cost of assets 
customers structure 
  Revenue from   Customer   Operating cost   Asset 
new sources profitability per unit produced _ 
utilisation 
Customer 
perspective 
Customer value 
Product leadership 
proposition Customer intimacy 
Operational excellence 
Product/service attributes Relationship Image 
r 
Price Time General Smart f requirement shopper 
Quality Selection 
Internal 
process 
perspective 
Build the franchise Increase customer Achieve operational Become a good 
through innovations value through excellence through corporate citizen 
customer management operations and through regulatory 
processes logistics processes and environmental 
processes 
Learnin Employee Technology Corporate culture 
and growth competencies 
perspective 
Figure 2.1: Example of the BSC strategy map (Kaplan and Norton, 2000, p. 168) 
It can be seen that the BSC concept, as proposed by Kaplan and Norton, has changed 
from a multidimensional performance measurement which supplements financial 
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indicators with non-financial ones to a form of strategic management which is integrated 
into the centre of the organisation's management systems. They argue, "The balanced 
scorecard, since its introduction in 1992, has evolved into the centerpiece of a 
sophisticated system to manage the execution of strategy. " (Kaplan and Norton, 2006, p. 
259) With changes in the BSC concepts, as proposed by Kaplan and Norton, many 
scholars have attempted to define what BSC is. 
Within the academic BSC literature, one group of scholars has attempted to distinguish 
BSC from other integrated performance measurement models by focusing on the set of 
techniques proposed in the BSC concept. Malmi (2001), for example, suggests that for a 
measurement system to be qualified as a BSC, (1) it should contain financial and non- 
financial performance indicators; (2) performance indicators should be derived from 
strategy; and (3) the system should contain perspectives of performance which are 
derived from the original four perspectives of the BSC framework, although the name of 
the perspectives might be different,, or there might be more or fewer than the original four 
perspectives. In his view, a measurement system without a cause-and-effect logic can 
also be qualified as a BSC; otherwise most of the early BSCs would not be considered 
BSCs at all. 
Whereas Malmi (2001) argues that causal chain logic is not necessary for the systems to 
be qualified as BSC, other scholars argue that a causal chain is an essential element. 
Nerreklit (2000, p. 70) argues that "[t]he cause-and-effect chain is central to the balanced 
scorecard. The chain distinguishes the model from other approaches. " Hoque and James 
(2000, p. 3) also put forward a similar argument that "[t]he use of a BSC does not mean 
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just "using more measures"; it means putting a handful of strategically critical measures 
together in a single report, in a way that makes cause-and-effect relations transparent... " 
Speckbacher et al. (2003) argue that it might be useful to classify BSC into three types: 
(1) BSC as a specific multidimensional performance measurement framework that 
combines financial and strategically-orientated non-financial measures; (2) Type 1 BSC, 
which additionally describes strategy by using cause-and-effect relationships; and (3) 
Type 2 BSC, which also implements strategy by defining objectives, action plans, results 
and connecting incentives with BSC (p. 363). 
While debate on what constitutes BSC is ongoing in the academic community, various 
versions of the BSC can be found empirically. Speckbacher et al. (2003) find from a 
survey study of large firms in German-speaking countries that out of 42 companies which 
claimed to adopt a BSC, only 21 firms employed a cause-and-effect relationship. 
Moreover, 12 firms out of the 21 that employed a cause-and-effect relationship linked 
their BSC measures to incentives. Similarly, Ittner, Larcker and Randall (2003) find from 
a survey study of American financial services firms that 76.9 percent of the firms that 
claimed to use BSC placed little or no reliance on the cause-and-effect relationships. 
In contrast to scholars who have attempted to define BSC by looking at its technical 
properties, Hansen and Mouritsen (2005) argue that what BSC is cannot be determined a 
priori. In their view, "the BSC is given content and identity via the relations it entertains 
with other entities in practice" (p. 129). Based on empirical research in four different 
organisations, they argue that identities and meanings of the BSC emerged through the 
translation process, and that it is internal organisational problems, rather than external 
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environment, that conceptualise what strategy, corporate value and BSC are. They offer 
an analysis of the BSC as a boundary object (Star and Griesemer, 1989), as the BSC is 
"plastic enough to appeal distinctly to a local situation where its identity is moulded 
through the specific network of affairs that make it up... [but] also plastic enough to keep 
an identity that traverses between the contexts of its applications" (Hansen and 
Mouritsen, 2005, p. 148). From this perspective, in order to understand what BSC is, it is 
important to put BSC in the contexts in which it is developed and mobilised. 
While the BSC idea may have changed and it is difficult clearly to define the nature of it 
if it is taken out of the contexts in which it is used, the BSC has some underlying issues 
which are important for organisations that attempt to develop and utilise it. 
2.3.2. Dimensions of Performance and Performance Indicators 
As discussed in the previous section, BSC supplements financial performance measures 
with three sets of non-financial indicators. Kaplan and Norton (1996a) suggest that the 
four perspectives proposed should be considered as a template, rather than a rigid 
framework, and what perspectives to measure should depend on the industry 
circumstances and strategy of business units. Nevertheless, they also claim that "[t]he 
four perspectives of the Balanced Scorecard have been found to be robust across a wide 
variety of companies and industries" (Kaplan and Norton, 1996a, p. 34). In this respect, 
empirical research has shown that the BSCs of different organisations may contain 
different aspects of performance, and in many cases, it contains more or less than four 
performance perspectives (see Malina and Selto, 2001; Malmi, 2001, for example). As 
Ahrens and Chapman (2006b, p. 16) have noted, "Even the idea that a BSC would 
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comprise four families of measures has proven not to act as a definitional boundary in 
terms of what people will attach the label to. " 
Kaplan and Norton (1996a, pp. 10-11) claim that BSC reflects a `balance' between 
internal and external measures, between driver and outcome measures, and between 
objectively quantified outcome and subjectively judgemental driver measures. However, 
many scholars have cast doubt on whether the BSC is `balanced'. Otley (1999) argues 
that Kaplan and Norton's 1992 version of the BSC preserves the `balanced' nature of the 
scorecard better than the 1996 version, where they suggest a linear causal chain from 
innovation and learning to financial performance. In his view, in the 1992 version, for the 
organisation to be successful, all objectives need to be achieved. However, in the 1996 
version, financial performance is presented as an ultimate aim of the organisation. As 
Kaplan and Norton (1996a, p. 150) argue, "A Balanced Scorecard must retain a strong 
emphasis on outcomes, especially financial ones like return-on-capital-employed or 
economic value added. Many managers fail to link programs, such as total quality 
management, cycle time reduction, reengineering, and employee empowerment, to 
outcomes that directly influence customers and that deliver future financial performance. 
In such organizations, the improvement programs have incorrectly been taken as the 
ultimate objective" (emphasis added). 
Another group of scholars argue that the BSC is not `balanced' because it neglects some 
key organisational stakeholders, such as suppliers, public authorities and community 
(Nerreklit, 2000; Brignall, 2002; see also Malmi, 2001). Brignall (2002) argues that 
operations of business organisations can have a significant impact on society and 
environment, and organisations should be held accountable for their action. Nevertheless, 
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the managerialist approach adopted by Kaplan and Norton in designing the BSC largely 
ignores these wider societal and environmental matters. 
With regard to the issue of other stakeholders, Kaplan and Norton (1996a) argue that 
interests of any groups of stakeholder can be addressed in the BSC, as long as these 
measures reflect critical aspects of performance that will create competitive advantage for 
the organisation. They argue, "we don't think all stakeholders are automatically entitled 
to a position on a business unit's scorecard. The scorecard outcomes and performance 
drivers should measure those factors that create competitive advantage and breakthroughs 
for an organization" (p. 35). For Kaplan and Norton, the BSC is not a stakeholder 
approach to measure organisational performance, but a tool for enhancing shareholder 
value (Kaplan and Norton, 2001b). Although Kaplan and Norton (1996a) claim that more 
perspectives can be added to the scorecard, they do not offer a suggestion as to whether 
and how the additional perspective should be placed in the causal chains (Norreklit, 
2000). 
While there is debate on what is meant by `balance' and whether the BSC is `balanced', 
empirical research has shown that companies tend to focus and place higher weight on 
financial indicators, which are outcome measures. Non-financial, driver performance 
indicators tend to receive only limited attention from organisations that claim to employ 
the BSC. A survey of 60 BSC firms conducted by Towers Perrin in 1996 found that these 
firms placed, on average, 56 percent of relative weight on financial indicators in their 
scorecard (Ittner and Larcker, 1998b). Ittner, Larcker and Meyer (2003) also find that in 
the financial services firm studied, financial performance became the primary determinant 
of bonuses. In many cases, financial measures have received increasing weight over the 
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years (Malina and Selto, 2001). Difficulties in measuring non-financial performance may 
help explain why non-financial indicators receive relatively less attention over time. As 
Malina and Selto (2004) find from their study of one US Fortune 500 company, the 
company dropped some performance indicators when their experience showed that these 
indicators could not be measured inexpensively, accurately and objectively. 
2.3.3. Cause-and-Effect Relationships 
Another issue fundamental to the BSC concept is related to causal relationships between 
dimensions of performance. A cause-and-effect relationship is one of the important 
elements of the current version of the BSC. As Kaplan and Norton (1996a, p. 149) argue, 
"Every measure selected for a Balanced Scorecard should be an element of a chain of 
cause-and-effect relationships that communicates the meaning of the business unit's 
strategy to the organization. " (emphasis in original) Kaplan and Norton suggest a linear 
causal relationship among aspects of performance; that is, improvement in learning and 
growth performance will lead to improvement in internal business process, which will, in 
turn, enhance customer performance and eventually lead to better financial performance. 
In their view, strategy is "a set of hypotheses about cause and effect" which "can be 
expressed by a sequence of if-then statements" (p. 149). They cite the following 
example: 
If we increase employee training about products, then they will become more 
knowledgeable about the full range of products they can sell; if employees are more 
knowledgeable about products, then their sales effectiveness will improve. If their sales 
effectiveness improves, then the average margins of the products they sell will increase. 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1996a, p. 149) 
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Kaplan and Norton (1996a, p. 149) argue that "[t]he measurement system should make 
the relationships (hypotheses) among objectives (and measures) in the various 
perspectives explicit so that they can be managed and validated. " 
Whereas Kaplan and Norton emphasise a close relationship between strategy and 
performance measures, empirical evidence suggests that in practice, it is difficult for 
organisational members to clearly define and reach consensus on strategy (Epstein and 
Manzoni, 1997; Kasurinen, 2002; see also Malmi, 2001). Organisations also find it 
difficult to identify a cause-and-effect relationship between dimensions of performance. 
As Ittner and Larcker (1998b) observe, from a survey sent to vice presidents of quality for 
major US firms, less than 55 percent of the respondents could directly relate their quality 
initiatives to operational, productivity, or revenue improvements. Only 29 percent of the 
respondents could relate them to accounting returns, and only 12 percent to stock returns. 
In addition, only 28 percent could relate customer satisfaction measures to accounting 
returns. 
The assumed unidirectional cause-and-effect relationship among dimensions of 
performance has also been criticised. As Norreklit (2000) and Brignall (2002)3 have 
argued, financial performance which is normally seen as outcome or result can also act as 
a leading indicator driving other dimensions of performance. In turn, operational 
measures which are normally assumed as drivers can also be results. It is plausible that 
the improvement in business processes and quality can lead to greater customer 
satisfaction, which may sometimes lead to better financial performance. However, in 
3 BSC is not the only integrated performance measurement framework Brignall (2002) criticises for the 
assumed cause-and-effect relationship. He also develops a critique of the `performance pyramid' and 
`results-determinants', other integrated performance measurement frameworks which also emphasise the 
linkages between driver and outcome performance. 
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order to improve business processes and quality, organisations may need capital for their 
investments; they, thus, need satisfactory financial performance beforehand. In this 
respect, financial performance can be considered the driver of business process, quality 
and customer performance. 
In addition to the debate on the assumed unidirectional cause-and-effect relationship, the 
existence of causal chains between non-financial and financial measures has been 
questioned. Nerreklit (2000) argues that the causal chain idea proposed by Kaplan and 
Norton is a logical relationship rather than a cause-and-effect relationship, and as such, it 
cannot be determined and validated empirically. She also argues that the BSC does not 
capture the time dimension, which is problematic if one attempts to verify the cause-and- 
effect relationship because there could be a time lag between cause and effect. 
A number of scholars have attempted to examine empirically relationships between non- 
financial and financial performance, particularly the associations between customer 
satisfaction and financial performance. However, these studies have yielded divergent 
results. Banker et al. (2000), and Behn and Riley (1999) find positive associations 
between customer satisfaction and future accounting performance in the hotel and airline 
industries respectively. Anderson et al. (1994) also find a positive association between 
customer satisfaction and contemporaneous accounting return on investment from a study 
of 77 Swedish firms. However, Anderson et al. (1997) find a positive relationship 
between customer satisfaction and contemporaneous accounting return on investment 
only in the manufacturing sector; in the services sector, the associates are either weaker or 
negative. Ittner and Larcker (1998a) find that customer satisfaction measures are leading 
indicators of customer purchase behaviour, accounting performance and current market 
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value, but the relation between customer satisfaction and future performance is non- 
linear; and in similar vein to the results from Anderson et al. (1997), at firm level, results 
vary by industry. Foster and Gupta (1997) find positive, negative, or insignificant 
relationships between customer satisfaction and future customer profitability, depending 
on the questions included in the satisfaction measures. 
While many scholars still attempt to verify relationships between non-financial and 
financial performance, empirical evidence suggests that many BSC adopters place little or 
no emphasis on the business model or cause-and-effect relationships (Ittner, Larcker and 
Randall, 2003; Speckbacher et al., 2003). In many cases, a generic strategy map and 
causal chains are developed by consultants. Only small numbers of firms actually use the 
business model for management purposes or attempt to validate the causal chains 
established (Ittner, Larcker and Randall, 2003). 
While the debates on cause-and-effect relationships are still ongoing among accounting 
scholars, Mouritsen (2005) has recently developed the proposition that causality does not 
necessarily imply statistical relations as may tend in practice to be the case 
conventionally. Rather, causality can be mobilised in different ways. lie argues that 
causality concept of the BSC approach can be seen as logical relations - "something that 
makes good sense" which reflect "ambitions how an entity is supposed to function" or 
"inductive experiences about how an entity functions". Or it could also be viewed as 
"managerial agendas - something to which supplementary actions have to be added. " (p. 
107) From Mouritsen's (2005) argument, it can be inferred that in order to understand 
what causality may mean and how organisations interpret and use the concept, it is not 
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sufficient to simply ask managers whether their BSC contains causal chains. Rather, it is 
important to observe how the causality concept is mobilised in a specific situation. 
2.3.4. Balanced Scorecard in a Wider Context of Management Control 
Systems 
While dimensions of performance and causal chain relationship are fundamental concepts 
underlying the BSC, which are important for organisations wishing to adopt the BSC, 
another crucial issue is the relationship between BSC and other management control 
systems. BSC is a performance measurement system that attempts to incorporate many 
management areas, from strategic to operations management, into one system. It links 
information from different systems, some of which have not traditionally been considered 
accounting systems, into one set of reports (Bjernenark and Olson, 1999). Seal (2001) 
suggests that the development of the BSC reflects the diffusion of general management 
concepts, rather than management accounting per se. With the ambition to embrace many 
management areas, BSC inevitably encounters other management control systems that are 
in place. 
Empirical evidence suggests that despite the adoption of `advanced' MACSs including 
the BSC, traditional MACSs, particularly budgetary control, still play an important role in 
managing performance in contemporary organisations (Hartmann, 2000; Bums and 
Vaivio, 2001). In addition, there are many other non-accounting management controls 
which attempt to monitor performance from various perspectives. While some of these 
systems may have been recently developed and implemented, others may have long been 
embedded in organisational practices. These management technologies have different 
focuses and define `performance' differently (Hansen and Mouritsen, 1999), although 
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there might be some overlaps. One of the questions raised is how BSC is implicated in a 
wider set of management control systems (Bums and Vaivio, 2001; Otley, 2001). 
2.3.4.1. Balanced Scorecard and Budgetary Control 
Scholars and consultants have provided some normative suggestions as to how BSC could 
be placed in relation to other management control systems. With regard to the relation 
between the BSC and conventional MACS, budgeting, Kaplan and Norton (1996a) argue 
that organisations should place BSC at the centre of the corporate management system 
and incorporate a budgeting process to support BSC (See Figure 2.2). In Kaplan and 
Norton's view, traditional budgeting creates barriers to strategic implementation (see 
Figure 2.3). Kaplan (1996b, 2001c) claims that BSC emphasises the relationships 
between strategy and performance measures; thus, by linking budgeting process to 
support BSC, companies can ensure that their budgets support their strategies. 
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While Kaplan and Norton (1996a) argue for the integration of budgeting into the BSC 
process, some normative literature has argued for a replacement of budgeting with the 
BSC in organisational planning and control. This line of argument is commonly found in 
Scandinavian countries, where non-budget management, or `beyond budgeting', is one of 
the key management fashions. As Wallander (1999, p. 419) has argued, 
[Traditional budgeting] is a cumbersome way of reaching conclusions which are either 
commonplace or wrong.. . 
if you believe in your budget it might hinder you from adapting 
to new situations. If you do not believe in it, there is no point in making it... I have tried 
to explain the general principles that I think should form the basis for constructing an 
alternative controlling and steering system.. . Modern companies already 
have myriads of 
operational, financial and physical measures. The problem is to choose a limited number 
of them.. . The now popular concept of the 
"balanced scorecard" is a useful tool to help 
you clarify your thinking. 
Similarly, Ax and Bjernenak (2005) observe that in one of the best selling BSC books in 
Sweden, that by Olve et al. (1997), the idea of the integration of BSC and non-budgeting 
management is discussed in several places, and there is also a section entitled, "The 
balanced scorecard as a substitute for the budget". Ax and Bjernenak (2005) also observe 
that in Sweden the question of `budget or balanced scorecard? ' is one of the hot topics of 
discussion among leading consultancy firms. 
Whereas the normative literature has suggested different ways to integrate the BSC with 
budgeting, empirical research on the issue is limited. Malmi (2001) finds that most of the 
companies he studied developed BSC independently from the budgeting process, with the 
exception of two companies which changed their control systems (i. e. target setting and 
performance measurement) to be based on BSC instead of budget. Although Malmi 
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(2001) may have provided some evidence as to how the BSC and budgeting process are 
related, our understandings on the issue are limited. Malmi (2001) does not provide an 
in-depth view of how organisations in which the BSCs have been developed 
independently of the budgeting process use their BSC in relations to budgetary control. 
There is also limited empirical evidence from organisations outside Scandinavian 
countries. Otley (1999) suggests that as it is unlikely that organisations will abandon 
budgeting and replace it with BSC, it is important to investigate how the BSC operates in 
relation to budgetary control. 
While little empirical research has examined the relationships between BSC and 
budgeting, the issue of how the BSC is implicated in a wider set of management control 
systems is also largely unexplored. Kaplan and Norton (1996a) argue for a connection 
between BSC and various types of management systems, including strategic management 
process, budgeting and resource allocation, human resource management, and operations 
management systems. Otley (1999) suggests that organisations may use BSC as an 
interactive control system while handling others as diagnostic control in order to focus 
management attention on the BSC. Despite some normative suggestions, limited 
empirical research has investigated how the BSC is used in relation to other control 
systems (Otley, 2001). Although Tuomela (2005) has examined how the organisation 
uses a strategic performance measurement system similar to the BSC interactively, the 
issue of how BSC is operated in relation to other management control systems is left 
unexamined. 
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2.3.4.2. Relationships between Balanced Scorecard and Reward Systems 
Incentive and compensation, both financial and non-financial, is one of the key issues in 
performance management. A number of empirical studies have investigated the impact of 
performance-based incentive plans on performance at various levels (e. g. Banker et al., 
1996,2000,2001; Ittner et al., 1997; see Ittner and Larcker, 2001 and Luft and Shields, 
2003 for a review). In the normative literature, an allocation of targets at the personal 
level and a link between BSC and reward systems are recommended (see Kaplan and 
Norton, 1996a, 1996b, 2001 a, 2001 c; Atkinson, 1998, for example). 
Among the empirical studies, Speckbacher et al. (2003) find that 71 percent of the 
companies which had adopted BSC in their study tied their incentives, either directly or 
indirectly, to BSC measures. Nevertheless, Tuomela (2005) does not find tight 
connections between the BSC and managerial bonuses in the organisation under 
investigation. Malmi (2001) finds that organisations link BSC to reward systems in 
various ways. Among the thirteen organisations studied that have bonus programmes, 
four of them do not link BSC to the existing bonus programme. However, three 
organisations tie bonuses to some or all of the BSC measures but to no other measures 
outside BSC, whereas six organisations link part of the bonus to achievement of BSC 
targets and part of the bonus to other measures. 
Although these studies may have shed some light on whether and how organisations tie 
their BSC to incentives, a number of issues related to relationships between BSC and 
reward systems are left unexamined. As Otley (1999) has argued, little is understood 
with regard to how BSC can be linked to incentive systems. In his view, this is a very 
important issue, as reward structures "have the potential to destroy the impact of an 
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otherwise well-designed scorecard" (p. 376). He also argues that in order to understand 
how the BSC is linked to rewards and how it might impact behaviour and performance, it 
is important to examine the issue in the contexts in which the BSC is operated, as from 
his perspective, culture, particularly national culture, can have a significant impact on 
how organisational members react to performance-based incentive systems (cf. Merchant 
et al., 1995; Awasthi et al., 2001). 
2.3.5. Consequences of Balanced Scorecard Adoption 
In spite of the popularity of the BSC, little empirical evidence suggests that performance 
of organisations is improved with the use of BSC (Ittner and Larcker, 2001). Limited 
empirical research has investigated whether BSC adoption and usage has enhanced 
performance, and the studies examining the issue have yielded, at best, mixed results. 
Hoque and James (2000) conducted a survey-based contingency study of 66 Australian 
manufacturing companies, finding a positive relationship between BSC usage and 
perceived improved organisational performance, measured by ROI, sales margin, capacity 
utilisation, customer satisfaction and customer quality. Similarly, Davis and Albright 
(2004) have more recently conducted a quasi-experiment, comparing performance of 
branches in an American bank which have and have not implemented BSC. They find 
that branches that have implemented BSC outperform branches that have not. 
In contrast, from a survey of 140 Australian manufacturing firms, Chenhall and 
Langfeld-Smith (1998a) find that firms only perceive moderate benefits from using 
BSC, 4 and BSC is ranked 22 out of the 42 management accounting practices surveyed in 
terms of perceived benefits received by organisations. In an intensive survey study of 
4 BSC was given a score of 4.17 out of 7 (Chenall and Langfield-Smith, 1998a). 
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American financial services firms, Ittner, Larcker and Randall (2003) do not find a 
significant relationship between BSC usage and the economic performance of the 
organisations, although they do find a positive relationship between BSC usage and 
system satisfaction. 
Whereas some scholars focus their analysis on the financial performance consequences of 
BSC adoption, others place their emphasis on BSC's role as a strategic management tool. 
Kaplan and Norton (1996a, 1996b, 2001a) have claimed that BSC users have benefited 
from using BSC as a strategic management system, as it helps translate vision and 
strategy into key performance indicators (KPIs), communicate strategy to employees at 
lower levels, and make strategy everybody's everyday job. Nevertheless, Norreklit 
(2000) questions whether BSC would be able to perform its function as a strategic 
management tool, as it is essentially a hierarchical and top-down approach to 
management control. In Norreklit's (2000) view, the top-down approach will create 
external commitment from employees and managers, rather than internal commitment; 
that is, employees will try to find ways to achieve results in the areas that are measured, 
although this may be achieved at the expense of other critical areas. She also argues that 
the hierarchical top-down approach will make it difficult for the BSC to be rooted in a 
dynamic environment in which contemporary organisations are situated. Moreover, 
employing a top-down approach to strategic management and control may also imply that 
insofar as organisations succeed via emergent strategy rather than top-down rational 
planning strategies (Mintzberg, 1987), strategic success cannot be generated or captured 
by the BSC. 
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In terms of empirical research in this area, Malina and Selto (2001) have attempted to 
examine the effectiveness of using BSC as a strategic communication and management 
control tool in a particular organisation. They found that the effective management 
control attributes of the BSC led indirectly to positive outcomes through strategy 
alignment and effective motivation. Nevertheless, in that organisation, the BSC did not 
possess or demonstrate the attributes of effective strategic communication; therefore, they 
were not able to examine whether the effective strategic communication attributes of the 
BSC could increase motivation and lead to positive outcomes. Ittner, Larcker and Meyer 
(2003) studied this issue in a retail bank, and conclude that in that setting, the 
implementation of a BSC compensation plan did not bring any significant changes in 
branch managers' understandings of strategic goals. 
Although research on benefits of BSC adoption has yielded inconclusive results, BSC has 
nevertheless been adopted by organisations worldwide. Many organisations have sought 
and implemented MACSs, which, in their view, will benefit them from both an economic 
or legitimacy perspective. With the widespread adoption of management accounting and 
control initiatives, including the BSC, issues around changes in management accounting 
and control have become one of the significant research strands among accounting 
academics. 
2.4. Management Accounting Change 
With rapid changes in business environment and the proliferation of a number of 
innovative MACSs during the past two decades, accounting change has become one of 
the central issues of focus among many accounting scholars. Various issues relating to 
change have been investigated. Some scholars focus their analysis on antecedents, pre- 
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conditions or reasons for changes. Studies which focus on the change process have also 
proliferated, particularly since Hopwood (1987, p. 207) argued that "very little is known 
of the processes of accounting change". Issues relating to consequences of change have 
also been examined, and various perspectives have been employed to examine the issues. 
2.4.1. Management Accounting Change from Various Perspectives 
2.4.1.1. The Factor-Based Approach to Examining Management Accounting 
Chan e 
One stream of research on management accounting change focuses the analysis on factors 
influencing change and/or the change process. These studies have often tended to focus 
on identifying factors that advance or hinder the change process with an aim to develop a 
general model of change. A factor-focused approach has been employed to examine the 
implementation of various accounting technologies, for example, ABC (e. g. Shields, 
1995; Anderson, 1995; Anderson and Young, 1999), performance measurement (e. g. 
Vaivio, 1999b; Kasurinen, 2002; Cavalluzzo and Ittner, 2004), and management 
accounting reports (Cobb et al., 1995; Helliar et al., 2002). Many of the factor-based 
studies are influenced by contingency arguments (e. g. Anderson and Young, 1999; Baines 
and Langfield-Smith, 2003), but some others are influenced by institutional theory (e. g. 
Vaivio, 1999b). 
Although factor-based studies may have shed some light on general factors that may 
influence the change process, there are several limitations. This type of study tends to 
remain largely ahistorical, acontextual and aprocessual (cf. Pettigrew, 1985). 5 In 
addition, these studies often consider each factor separately, interrelationships between 
5 Vaivio (1999b) is among few exceptions that focus on process and capture contexts in which change is 
taking place in the analysis. 
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factors being largely neglected (Granlund, 2001). Moreover, there is seemingly virtually 
no limit to the number of possible factors affecting the implementation process and 
outcome (Malmi, 1997); thus, researchers could come up with an endless list of factors. 
2.4.1.2. Management Accounting Change from an Institutional Perspective 
In addition to factor-based studies, management accounting change has been examined 
from an institutional perspective. This stream of research places emphasis on the 
influence of institutions and the institutional environment on management accounting 
change. Major strands of institutional theory commonly used to explain accounting 
change process include new institutional sociology (NIS) (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983,1991), and old institutional economic (OIE) theory (see 
Scapens, 1994; Burns and Scapens, 2000) (see Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006 and Scapens, 
2006 for a review). 
Research drawing on NIS theory places emphasis on the influence of the external 
institutional environment on the change process. Many of the early NIS studies argue 
that organisations adopt new management accounting systems for reasons of legitimacy 
rather than for efficiency. It is the institutional environment that affects the adoption of 
the new MACS. When the new system is adopted for legitimacy purposes, many 
organisations adopt them ceremonially; the formal system and the actual practice of the 
organisation become de-coupled (see Carruthers, 1995). 
NIS has been criticised for neglecting the issues of power and interest of agency or actors; 
organisations are seen as passive actors mimicking similar organisations and adapting 
their structures to conform to institutional demands (see Oliver, 1991; see also Mouritsen, 
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1994). The dichotomy between institutional and technical pressures has also been 
criticised (see Powell, 1991). In more recent research on management accounting 
change, scholars have attempted to extend the NIS to capture roles of agency into their 
analysis (see, for example, Abernethy and Chua, 1996; Modell, 2001; Collier, 2001; 
Major and Hopper, 2004). Accounting scholars have also attempted to capture economic 
pressures into their analysis (see Brignall and Modell, 2000; Hussain and Hoque, 2002; 
Major and Hopper, 2004). 
Whereas NIS research places emphasis on the external institutional environment, 
accounting scholars who adopt an OIE approach tend to concentrate their analysis on 
internal institutional elements within the organisation, with a focus on organisational 
routines and their institutionalisation. Drawing on OIE, Burns (2000) explores 
accounting change in the Product Development Department of a UK chemical 
manufacturer. Soin et al. (2002) examine the process of ABC implementation in the 
Clearing Department of a UK-based multinational bank. Some of the OIE studies focus 
their analysis specifically on the issue of resistance to change (e. g. Granlund, 2001; 
Lukka, 2007). Although OIE and NIS may place emphasis on different levels, some 
scholars combine OIE and NIS in their analysis to capture both internal and external 
institutional elements (e. g. Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005; Yazdifar et al., forthcoming). 
Research drawing on institutional theory has demonstrated the danger of constructing 
overly rational efficiency explanations of accounting change. It examines accounting 
choice as a longitudinal complex social construction process which involves not only 
technical issues, but also behavioural, organisational and institutional elements. The 
82 
importance of contextual issues which may have an impact on the change process is also 
highlighted. 
2.4.1.3. Diffusion of Management Accounting Systems as Management Fashion 
While research adopting a factor-based approach or institutional theory has often tended 
to focus its analysis on change within organisations, another line of research into 
management accounting change tends to place emphasis on how a particular accounting 
technology diffuses at a broader macro, typically national, level (Wenisch, 2004 is among 
few exceptions). This strand of research usually draws on the diffusion of innovation or 
dissemination of management fashion theory (Abrahamson, 1991,1996). 
Diffusion studies tend to focus on how and how far a particular accounting technology is 
disseminated to other, usually national, contexts. From a diffusion perspective, 
management accounting technologies are developed or invented by the innovators who 
put energy into the technologies, which are then spread to potential adopters, who may 
adopt the technologies for different reasons. Based on empirical research investigating 
ABC diffusion in Finland, Malmi (1999) argues that the early adopters choose ABC for 
reasons of efficiency. In the take-off stage, fashion-setting plays an important role, but in 
a later stage of diffusion, the influence of fashion-setting organisations diminishes, and 
the adoption of the technology can be explained by mimetic behaviour and efficient 
choice. Bjarnenak (1997) argues that while many traditional diffusion studies emphasise 
the demand side of the diffusion process (i. e. potential adopters), the supply side (e. g. 
innovators, media, consultants) also plays a significant role in disseminating accounting 
technology. In 2005, Ax and Bjornenak examined diffusion of BSC in Sweden with a 
focus on the supply side of the process. 
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Although factor-based, institutional and diffusion studies may focus on different aspects 
of change and provide different explanations for management accounting change, one of 
the common themes among these studies being their focus on what slow down or 
accelerate the change process. The accounting technologies being implemented are 
usually taken for granted. It is often assumed that these systems are well-defined, 
designed and then either implemented or not as a consequence of resistance (Preston et 
al., 1992), with little attention being paid to the technology itself. The issue of how 
organisations or actors may play a role in modifying the technology to make it suit their 
contexts is largely unexamined. To address this issue, another theoretical approach, 
ANT, has been brought into the accounting arena. 
2.4.1.4. The Actor-Network Theory Approach to Studying Management 
Accounting Change 
ANT has attracted growing interest among accounting researchers who attempt to 
understand the nature of change in accounting systems and practices. In the ANT studies, 
management accounting technologies are not described as being diffused into 
organisations as `ready-made', stable, and immutable objects; rather, management 
accounting technologies are seen as being constructed through associations of human and 
non-human actors which are temporary and fragile (Baxter and Chua, 2006). The focus 
of the analysis is usually on how accounting technology has struggled to become a 
`matter of fact' in particular networks. In the analysis, attention is given to human and 
non-human actors and their relations that play a role in the construction process; 
therefore, technologies and artefacts, such as computer and information systems, 
inscriptions, and system manuals, which are significant in the process of making 
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accounting systems operable, are captured in the analysis. The ANT approach enables 
researchers to avoid an asymmetric focus on macro/external (e. g. contingency theory, NIS 
theory) or micro/internal (e. g. OIE theory) elements that may influence accounting 
change. 
The ANT approach has been employed to examine the introduction and translation of 
various management accounting technologies, for example, budgeting and responsibility 
accounting (Pinch et al., 1989; Preston et al., 1992; Lowe, 2000), casemix cost accounting 
systems (Chua, 1995), ABC (Briers and Chua, 2001), enterprise resource planning (ERP) 
systems (Quattrone and Hopper, 2001,2005; Lodh and Gaffikin, 2003; Dechow and 
Mouritsen, 2005) and performance measurement systems (Andon et al., 2007). 
Pinch et al. (1989) examine the experiments of clinical budgeting in the UK National 
Health Service (NHS). They explore how different versions of `clinical budgeting' were 
presented by different people in order to gain acceptance from the clinicians. They also 
focus their analysis on how the experiments were described as a `success' by some actors, 
but not a great `success' from the authors' perspective. 
In similar vein to Pinch et al. (1989), Preston et al. (1992) examine the production of 
budgeting technologies in the NHS in the UK, but at a more detailed process level. 
Drawing on Latour (1987), they explore specific linkages between government statements 
and the introduction of an accounting technology within a particular district. Preston et 
al. (1992) propose the notion of 'fabrication 16 to examine the process of change. Their 
findings suggest that management accounting systems are not well-defined technologies 
6 Fabrication is defined as "an attempt to examine the chains of reasoning and mechanisms of influence 
between structured forces in the determination of the direction of change and human agency in the 
determination of the pace of that change" (Preston et al., 1992, p. 565). 
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that are designed and then implemented. Rather, the management initiatives are 
fabricated, being modified, strengthened and undermined during the process. 
Management accounting initiatives, too, are not "fixed technologies with well-defined 
purposes"; they are "changing constructions" (p. 561). The management initiative arises 
as much out of its implementation as out of its design, and the fabrication occurs 
throughout the utilisation process. 
Also in the healthcare sector, Chua (1995) conducts a detailed micro-ethnographic study 
of the introduction and development of casemix accounting and costing systems in three 
Australian hospitals. She examines how a wider discussion of problems and reforms in 
the Australian public sector, including health care, was translated into the trial of a new 
costing system in the three hospitals. Drawing primarily on the work of Latour and 
Callon (e. g. Latour, 1987; Latour and Woolgar, 1979; Callon, 1986; Callon et al., 1986), 
Chua (1995) explores how four major groups of actors - academics, hospital personnel, 
State Department officials and Commonwealth bureaucrats, all of whom had diverse 
interests, formed a network to support the new costing system. She also examines how 
the new cost model became a powerful rhetorical and representative device, and how the 
inscriptions produced from the new cost system translated the patient into different types 
of products, categorised by classes of diagnoses, of the hospitals, which were depicted as 
multi-product firms. 
Examining the introduction of another accounting technology, Briers and Chua (2001) 
investigate how ABC was trialled in an Australian manufacturer. The authors follow 
networks of global and local actors or actants and allies to examine how accounting 
change occurred, how change was enacted, and what the preconditions and processes of 
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change were. The authors also examine how different technologies competed in an 
attempt to find their place in the organisation. 
In addition to ANT, the authors employ the concept of `boundary object' (Star and 
Greisemer, 1989). Briers and Chua (2001, pp. 241-242) argue that a boundary object ties 
actors with different goals together because "it is common to multiple groups but is 
capable of taking on different meanings within each of them". The concept of `boundary 
objects' may not be consistent with the ANT idea, as ANT suggests ceaseless and 
borderless organising, therefore, boundaries cannot be drawn. Nevertheless, a `boundary 
object' concept is useful to explain management accounting ideas/initiatives which are 
viewed as common, although sometimes only at a surface level, across different parts of 
the world. 
From the empirical findings of their study, Briers and Chua (2001) argue that change is 
the outcome of many interconnections between local and cosmopolitan networks of actors 
and actants. Diverse actor worlds are mediated and temporarily stabilised with the aid of 
boundary objects. They also argue that change is cyclical; "[N]ew accounting 
technologies were adopted on faith, made to `work/succeed' temporarily, and then 
abandoned" (p. 237). However, "[r]ather than argue that accounting systems that succeed 
are those that `fit' the strategic imperatives of dominant stakeholders, this study argues 
that success and failure is a fragile construction that turns on the strength of diverse ties 
tying together many heterogeneous elements" (p. 267). 
From a review of studies of change in management accounting which draw on ANT, 
several implications of management accounting research that aims to examine the 
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implementation of a particular accounting technology can be identified. One of the 
important issues is the temporary and fragile nature of MACSs. ANT studies have shown 
that accounting technologies are fragile at the outset .7 "[Management accounting] 
numbers are built on the shifting and transient interests of disparate groups of 
organisational participants who work incessantly to maintain the `position' (Latour, 1987, 
p. 50) of (their) numbers and influence over organisational functioning" (Baxter and 
Chua, 2003, p. 102). Accounting numbers and technologies are constructed through the 
temporary assemblages of heterogeneous actors who pursue their diverse interests. 
Moreover, "[the technological projects] do not exist at the outset, they have to be 
invented, they only come to exist little by little, step by step, and they can easily be wiped 
out when people stop believing, when a particular idea loses its currency" (Miller, 1997, 
pp. 362-363). With the temporary nature of accounting assemblages, ANT studies have 
pointed out the danger of attributing failure to implement a new accounting technology to 
managerial ignorance or resistance caused by `wider forces', as accounting technologies 
are fragile at the outset. 
Furthermore, with the changing and fragile nature of management accounting systems, it 
might be difficult to regard the implementation of accounting technologies in terms of 
`success' or `failure'. As Pinch et al. (1989) have demonstrated, when the introduction of 
a management accounting technology is presented as a `success' by one actor, others 
actors might describe it differently. Preston et al. (1992) have also shown that while one 
may describe the process as failing, it might just reflect the process of technological re- 
7 Similar to ANT studies, governmentality studies also suggest the fragile and temporary nature of 
accounting assemblages (e. g. Miller and O'Leary, 1987,1994a). However, governmentality studies tend to 
avoid an enquiry into the detailed uses and functioning of accounting as mobilised by organisational 
members (Ahrens and Chapman, 2007). 
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fabrication. "[T]he designation of an episode as a success or a failure is itself a 
fabrication. " (Preston et al., 1992, p. 589) 
This line of research reminds us that the `identity' and `value' of the innovations or 
technologies do not lie in the technologies themselves. Rather, they largely depend on 
how actors around them enact and enrol the technologies (see Preston et at., 1992; Briers 
and Chua, 2001). As Latour (1987) has argued, "[T]he fate of technology is more 
fraught. It lies in the hands of those who come after the `inventor' and success/failure is a 
social accomplishment by many different human and non-human elements. " (Briers and 
Chua, 2001, p. 240) 
Moreover, ANT studies have suggested that the notion of `implementation' in a 
conventional sense might be problematic. The notion of `implementation' suggests a 
static feature of the technology. It implies that the new technology can be well-defined, 
designed and then implemented. But as Preston et al. (1992) has shown, the new 
technology is initially loosely-defined; it is continually modified throughout the design 
and implementation process. 
Although ANT studies have shed some light on the management accounting change 
process, much attention has focused on the ways through which certain processes of 
organising become institutionalised and stabilised in centres of calculation (Latour, 1987). 
Researchers often stop their investigation when the new accounting technology is used or 
abandoned. The issue of how the translation may continue after the new technology is 
being used remains largely undiscussed. To address the issue, Quattrone and Hopper 
(2001) propose the concept of `drift' to replace the conventional definition of change. 
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Using two cases of ERP implementation8 to illustrate problems in the `modernist 
constitution' of change, they suggest the incompleteness of implementing and enacting 
accounting systems, arguing that change and flux happen all the time. 
Drawing on ANT and the concept of `drift', Andon et al. (2007) examine changes in 
performance measurement systems in a business unit of an Australian telecommunication 
organisation. They extend the concept of `drift' proposed by Quattrone and Hopper 
(2001), suggesting the notion of `relational drift' to emphasise "the relational and 
experimental nature of accounting drift" (p. 274). They argue that the concept of 
relational drift is "framed by spatio-temporal boundaries - the shape and strength of 
extant ties connecting, inter alia, various people, discursive programs/regimes devices and 
inscriptions - with varying capacities to persist and endure" (p. 278). They also argue 
that accounting can be characterised by `multiple ontologies' (Mol, 1999) - "a knowledge 
object sustaining partial and changing variants of perceived identity, whilst maintaining a 
meaningful and sensible coherence across the actor worlds that imbue `it' with meaning" 
(p. 301). 
Empirical research investigating issues relating to changes in MACSs has examined the 
implementation process of various management accounting technologies. Nevertheless, 
relatively little research has focused specifically on the BSC, one of the management 
accounting innovations which has become increasingly popular during the past decade. 
BSC is an integrated performance measurement system which attempts to encompass 
various management areas. It embraces a number of issues that are not considered 
management accounting in a conventional way. The issues of how the BSC has struggled 
8 Details of two cases and the effects of ERP implementation in the two organisations are discussed in 
Quattrone and Hopper (2005). 
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to gain `fact-like' status, and how BSC usage influences organisational practices deserve 
attention. 
2.4.2. Management Accounting Change with a Focus on Balanced Scorecard 
Empirical studies examining issues of change which specifically focus on BSC can be 
broadly classified into two levels - studies which focus on changes at a broad level (e. g. 
why has BSC become popular? How far has BSC been adopted in various contexts? ), and 
studies emphasising the detailed process of BSC implementation within specific 
organisations. 
2.4.2.1. At a Broad Level 
Studies on changes at a macro level tend to focus on a diffusion and application of BSC 
in various contexts. A number of studies have investigated how far BSC has been applied 
in various national contexts (e. g. Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 1998a; Kald and 
Nilsson, 2000; Malmi, 2001; Speckbacher et al., 2003). These studies are usually large- 
scale survey-based .9 Findings 
from these studies have shed some light on how far BSC 
has been disseminated, and have also demonstrated the existence of various versions of 
BSC, illustrating how BSCs might be used in different ways. However, they remain 
largely descriptive. They offer limited understanding of the process of how BSC has 
been diffused and why it has become popular, although Malmi (2001) offers some 
insights into why organisations adopted BSC. 
With limited understanding of the diffusion process of the BSC, several scholars have 
recently adopted more theoretical approaches to examine how BSC has been 
9 Although Malmi (2001) adopts the semi-structured interview method, rather than a survey questionnaire, 
to collect data, the study involves largely descriptive analysis of how BSC is applied in Finnish companies 
which have a similar focus to other survey-based research. 
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disseminated. Focusing their analysis on the supply side of management accounting 
innovations, Ax and Bjernenak (2005) find that in Sweden, the BSC concept has often 
been bundled with one of the management ideas currently fashionable in the country (i. e. 
the non-budget management and intellectual capital model) or with the management idea 
that has long been embedded in the Swedish business culture (i. e. the stakeholder model). 
Ax and Bjornenak (2005) argue that the bundling of the BSC with other management 
ideas can be seen as a fashion-setting process, done to make the BSC more attractive to 
potential BSC adopters in the Swedish market (cf. Abrahamson, 1996). They further 
argue that the bundling process is possibly due to the interpretative viability of the BSC 
(see Benders and Van Veen, 2001). Ax and Bjornenak (2005, p. 17) suggest, 
"Administrative innovations, such as the BSC, are often open to multiple interpretations. 
They do not offer clear-cut recipes for managers, but are often characterized by a clever 
mixture of simplicity and ambiguity (Kieser, 1997). This `interpretative viability' may be 
used opportunistically to increase the size of the potential market. " 
Ax and Bjernenak's (2005) analysis of the `interpretative viability' of the BSC is in line 
with Norreklit (2003), who argues that BSC has attracted considerable attention because 
of its persuasive rhetoric. Nerreklit (2003, p. 612) argues that "using a text open to 
interpretation is the simplest way of spreading a message because, if a certain number of 
people are to be reached, then the sender has to leave a margin of negotiation to each of 
the actors so that each may transform the message as he or she pleases... " Although 
Kaplan and Norton's 1996 book, The Balanced Scorecard, was awarded a prize by the 
American Accounting Association as "the best theoretical contribution in 1997", Norreklit 
(2003) contends that the book is appealing to business communities largely because of the 
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authors' use of convincing rhetorical devices (e. g. extensive use of analogies and 
metaphors which are ambiguous; the use of abstract and imprecise concepts), rather than 
convincing, theoretically-sound argumentation. 
While Nerreklit (2003) focuses her analysis on texts in The Balanced Scorecard, Qu 
(2004) provides a broader analysis of how BSC has become popular and institutionalised 
as a set of taken-for-granted management tools. Drawing on ANT, specifically four 
moments of translation (Callon, 1986), Qu (2004) explores actors involved in the process 
of BSC construction and diffusion, and investigates how these actors engage in 
developing and enrolling in a `network of support' to promote BSC dissemination. Qu 
(2004) argues that the process of BSC construction and dissemination has involved many 
actors, human and non-human, who have their own interests and are surrounded by their 
own institutional networks. These actors include academics, business schools, 
consultants and consulting firms, mass media and business publishing companies. 
Qu (2004) suggests that BSC rose initially from perceived problems in financial 
accounting -performance measures. BSC's two powerful initial actors, Kaplan and 
Norton, engaged in constructing BSC with close interaction with companies that are well- 
known for their innovative performance measurement systems, and then presented a BSC 
as a potential solution to problems of financial measures. The BSC concept was 
appealing to organisations, as the problems of inadequacy of financial measures were 
objects of concern among contemporary organisations. 
Qu (2004) also suggests the `Harvard network' (that is, Harvard Business School, 
Harvard Business School Press, and Harvard Business Review) as one of the major 
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supports for BSC dissemination. She argues that the Harvard Business School is often 
perceived as highly prestigious; it is, thus, not difficult for Kaplan and Norton to win trust 
from the readers and recipients of the BSC idea (cf. Nerreklit, 2003). She further argues 
that the `Harvard network' has led to a creation and expansion of the Balanced Scorecard 
Collaborative, Inc., a consulting firm which has played a pivotal role in supporting a 
dissemination of the BSC. Among actors involved in the BSC diffusion process, Qu 
(2004) argues that it is the management consultants and consulting firms who have played 
a vital role in its rise and dissemination. This is consistent with Jones and Dugdale 
(2002), who also draw upon the actor-network theory to examine the diffusion of another 
management accounting initiative, ABC. 
Whereas Nerreklit (2003) and Qu (2004) focus their analysis on why BSC has become 
popular, Bourguignon et al. (2004) critically examine plausible reasons to explain the 
reluctance of French companies to adopt the BSC. Bourguignon et al. (2004) analyse the 
ideological assumptions1° underlying the BSC and the French Tableau de Bord, and argue 
that the ideology embedded in the BSC is consistent with American ideologies but not 
coherent with French. In their view, differences between the BSC's ideological 
assumptions and the French local ideologies can help explain why BSC has not received a 
warm welcome in France. 
Studies on changes at the macro level have provided an overview of how BSC has been 
applied in various contexts, and have offered explanations as to how and why BSC has 
become popular or not popular. Research in the area has suggested that BSC design and 
usage can be different in different organisations. However, from this line of research, 
10 By ideology, Bourguignon et at. (2004) mean "beliefs, knowledge and ideas serving to maintain social 
order, i. e. to construct hierarchies, to make people obey as well as to cope with uncertainty" (p. 109). 
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limited understanding of the process of how BSC has become what it is in a specific 
organisational setting can be obtained. Research which systematically investigates the 
process of change at a more detailed organisational level can offer some insights to 
complement knowledge obtained from the studies at the macro level. 
2.4.2.2. At a Detailed Process Level 
Studies of changes at a micro level tend to focus on the BSC implementation process 
within a particular organisation. Many of the early studies in this strand are found in 
professionally-orientated journals. These practitioner-orientated studies have tended to 
focus on the technicalities of BSC implementation. The major aim of these studies is 
often to provide a normative prescription for implementing the BSC by presenting 
`successful' cases of implementation. 
For academic research, they tend to adopt a more critical approach to examine the issues. 
A wider context of the implementation process is usually concerned. However, in 
comparison with the number of practitioner-orientated normative studies, relatively little 
academic research has critically examined the process of how the BSC concept has been 
implemented and has become what it is within an organisational setting. 
Kasurinen (2002) is among the few studies which offers an in-depth analysis of the BSC 
implementation process in the organisation. He adopts an intensive case study approach 
to examine the process of BSC implementation in a business unit of one Finnish firm, by 
focusing on factors influencing management accounting change, with particular emphasis 
being placed on barriers to change. He attempts to examine whether the accounting 
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change models that have been developed and employed to explain changes in other 
contexts can be applied to explain BSC implementation. 
Kasurinen's (2002) analysis draws upon Cobb et al. 's (1995) model, which is a refined 
version of Innes and Mitchell's (1990) accounting change framework. In their 
framework, Innes and Mitchell (1990) classify factors associated with change into three 
categories: motivators, catalysts, and facilitators. The framework suggests that 
motivators are related to change in a general manner, whereas catalysts are directly 
associated with the timing of change in particular. Facilitators are necessary but not 
sufficient to cause a change. Cobb et al. (1995) further identify three other factors related 
to accounting change: (1) barriers, which involve factors hindering, delaying, or 
preventing change; (2) leadership, which is related to individuals within the organisation 
who play an influential role in facilitating and driving the process of change; and (3) 
momentum of change, factors that are required to maintain the pace of change. 
Based on his case study, Kasurinen (2002) further classifies `barriers', forces hindering 
changes, into three sub-categories - confusers, frustrators, and delayers (see Figure 2.4 
for Kasurinen's accounting change model). From the case, confusers refer to the 
inadequate education and sponsorship process and an uncertain future of the project after 
the resignation of a manager who was the leader of the project. Different goals of 
different parties involved with the project also created confusion. The frustrators refer to 
the forces that suppress the change, such as organisational culture and the existing 
reporting system in the case unit, while the last sub-category of barriers, the delayers, 
refer to `technical' problems related to the new implementation (in this case, the BSC). 
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Kasurinen (2002) argues that delayers are generally temporary in nature. Examples of 
delayers in the case include a lack of clear strategy and adequate information systems. 
11 
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Figure 2.4: Kasurinen's (2002) accounting change model (p. 338) 
In addition to refining Cobb et al. 's (1995) accounting change model, Kasurinen (2002) 
attempts to compare the BSC building process in his case organisation with that 
suggested by Kaplan and Norton (1996a). He argues that although the BSC construction 
and implementation process in the case organisation deviated from what Kaplan and 
Norton had suggested in several instances, it is difficult to evaluate whether the BSC 
would have been implemented successfully if the organisation had followed the process 
proposed by them. He argues that the process recommended by Kaplan and Norton does 
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not pay sufficient attention to the context of change implementation. In addition, 
structural barriers (e. g. organisational culture) are neglected. Moreover, some of the 
problems occurring during the BSC creation and implementation process were related to 
fundamental characteristics of the BSC, for example, a lack of clear-cut strategy. 
Kasurinen (2002) argues that it is unlikely that these problems would be resolved by 
focusing on the implementation process. 
Kasurinen (2002) sheds some light on the process of BSC implementation and offers a 
number of explanations as to why the BSC project did not materialise in the case 
organisation. It demonstrates the complexity of implementation process. Nevertheless, 
as argued in Section 2.4.1.1, the factor-based approach adopted by Kasurinen keeps his 
analysis largely ahistorical and acontextual, with interrelationships between different 
factors not being captured. Moreover, his analysis suggests a linear process of BSC 
implementation; that is, BSC implementation was planned, designed and then 
implemented. When the project encountered barriers and resistance to a significant level, 
BSC was not implemented and the project `failed' to materialise. 
2.5. Implications of Previous Research and Research Questions 
In this chapter, literature on management accounting and control relevant to the current 
study has been critically reviewed. The chapter has discussed debates on the 
development and `relevance' of MACSs at both theoretical and technical levels. At the 
theoretical level, literature from various social perspectives has been discussed, providing 
alternative views to examine accounting phenomena. At the technical level, a concern 
over the `relevance' of MACSs in today's advanced and fast-changing environment 
among business organisations, consultants and accounting academics has been explored, 
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and the attempts to address technical limitations of conventional MACSs examined. The 
chapter has discussed recent management accounting and control initiatives relevant to 
performance measurement, including integrated performance measurement models which 
form an important part of these initiatives. Although integrated performance 
measurement systems may not be a completely new idea, as reflected in the long-standing 
debate on single versus multiple measures, many integrated performance measurement 
models are perceived as a `new' management tool that may be able to offer solutions to 
some of the problems of conventional MACSs and organisations. 
Among the integrated performance measurement frameworks, BSC is one of the most 
popular versions adopted by organisations worldwide. While BSC is presented as one of 
the possible solutions to the management accounting and control problems, it is not 
without problems. Kaplan and Norton's ambition to encompass the BSC with many 
management areas, from strategic to operations management, has created complexities in 
the design and implementation process. While the early BSC literature tended to be 
practically-orientated, recent BSC research has shown something of a theoretical term, 
developing broader (if often changing) views to examine and analyse the BSC and its 
implementation. Researchers recognise the strengths of the BSC but are also aware of its 
weaknesses, which may be seen as endemic to any management techniques. The 
complexities, conflicts and tensions of adopting and implementing new management 
techniques are recognised. 
Despite growing interest in BSC among scholars, there are still a number of research 
opportunities around the BSC. The issue of what `balance' means, how organisations 
`balance' multiple performance measures, and how the conception of `balance' can 
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promote desired business outcomes, can be further explored (Ittner and Larcker, 1998b). 
In addition, issues around cause-and-effect relationships are worthy of further 
investigation. As discussed in Section 2.3.3, empirical studies investigating the 
relationship between non-financial and financial performance have yielded mixed results. 
The way in which organisations choose their performance indicators and link them in 
causal chains is largely unexplored. Moreover, the impact of the BSC, both in terms of 
economic and organisational consequences, needs to be further investigated. 
Furthermore, only limited amount of research has critically examined the detailed 
implementation process of the BSC. 
In the current research, the issue of how BSC has been constructed and used at a process 
level is examined. Within this strand of research, little is understood of how the BSC has 
been introduced, interpreted, defined, and modified in an organisational context. In 
developing countries in particular, little is known about the way in which the BSC idea 
has travelled to these places and become localised in different cultural settings. In 
addition, the issue of how BSC operates in relation to a wider set of management control 
systems remains largely unexplored. Therefore, this research attempts to fulfil these gaps 
by tracing the process of BSC construction and translation in a Thai financial services 
organisation. The major aim of the research is to achieve an understanding of how a set 
of integrated performance management ideas has become translated into a set of practices 
in a particular organisational setting. 
The major research question and possible sub-questions were set out in Chapter 1, noting 
that not all of the latter could be developed in equal detail or yield equally valuable or 
insightful answers. I would however just reiterate the major question, namely: How is the 
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American performance management concept, the BSC, translated into practices in a Thai 
financial services organisation? My attempt to answer this question and its sub-questions 
is set out in the subsequent chapters. However, in the immediately following chapter, I 
discuss the methodological issues raised by this study, and in particular my choice of an 
intensive field-based research approach as the most appropriate method to approach my 
research question. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology and Theoretical Framework 
3.1. Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, the current literature related to MACSs and performance 
management systems, particularly BSC, was critically reviewed and the background to 
the key research questions addressed here was articulated. One emergent theme was the 
complexity of measuring and managing organisational performance, particularly as 
evidenced by the various critical strands of research in this field. Another concerned the 
process of change management in relation to MACSs. In practice, this is frequently a 
complex, non-linear process, involving a number of actors, human and non-human, both 
inside and outside the organisation. The research to date into the implementation of BSC 
systems indicates that in this respect it is no different from other performance 
measurement tools. Its implementation is seldom problem-free, and both its design and 
use appear to be variable and different in different organisations. The examination of 
theoretical and empirical research in the field undertaken here therefore indicates that 
there is scope for further enquiry into the process of change in performance measurement 
systems and practices within their organisational contexts, in particular into why a given 
new performance measurement tool is adopted and how heterogeneous actors, human and 
non-human, play roles in creating networks of support and resistance to the 
implementation of the new performance measurement tool. 
The literature review above led me to the conclusion that an in-depth, field-based 
qualitative empirical study would be the most appropriate way of investigating these 
problems and questions. The objective of this chapter is to clarify and justify the 
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approach therefore adopted to examine the research issues. This chapter is organised into 
7 sections. Section 3.2 discusses and justifies the philosophical foundations upon which 
the research questions and design are based. In Section 3.3, the research method, an 
intensive single case study, is justified and the research design is presented. Section 3.4 
discusses the actual conducting of the research, including fieldwork preparation, access 
negotiation, data collection and data analysis. Section 3.5 discusses the theoretical 
approach informing the analysis. Section 3.6 raises the issues of credibility of the 
research, which involve validity, reliability and generalisability. Finally, Section 3.7 
summarises the issues discussed in the chapter. 
3.2. Philosophical Assumptions Underpinning the Study 
Every piece of research is based on a set of assumptions. As Hopper and Powell (1985, p. 
429) note, "there is no such thing as a totally objective or value free investigation. " The 
underlying philosophical assumptions about the social world of researchers usually 
influence the way researchers formulate their research questions and the approach they 
adopt to investigate the phenomenon. The research questions and research approach are, 
thus, likely to derive from the researcher's ontological assumptions (i. e. beliefs about the 
nature of human beings and the social world they inhabit) and epistemological 
assumptions (i. e. beliefs about the nature of knowledge and how it can be acquired). 
Therefore, it is important to examine the philosophical foundations underpinning the 
theoretical and methodological approach of the research in order to define and develop 
the boundaries of the research and the approach to knowledge one wishes to develop in 
the research project. 
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Having made the above claim, it is only proper to note that some accounting scholars 
have argued that research methodology should depend on the phenomena under 
investigation, rather than the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the 
researcher (e. g. Abdel-Khalik and Ajinkya, 1983; Seale, 1999). 
" Nevertheless, it is 
important to distinguish the issues of research methodology from the research method 
issues. Methodology and method depict different levels of analysis; the methodology 
level refers to the epistemological framework for the research, whereas the method level 
refers to the techniques adopted for gathering the data and conducting the research 
(Bryman, 1984; Silverman, 1993). Research methodology therefore corresponds 
fundamentally to the beliefs and values of researchers about what is `real' in the social 
world and how the knowledge of the `reality' can be obtained (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979). On the other hand, research methods are concerned with the choices of techniques 
that researchers make in order to best address the research questions and best examine the 
phenomena under investigation (see Ahrens and Chapman, 2006a). While it is useful for 
researchers to select methods that are superior in examining particular research issues, the 
assumption that pragmatic choices between methodologies can be made seems 
inappropriate, as "researchers only rarely cross epistemological divides, hence, although 
they may vary their research methods, researchers are likely to remain committed to the 
methodologies that drive their research" (Giddens, 1982 cited in Llewellyn, 1992, p. 18). 
Maintaining the consistency between ontological and epistemological principles and 
research methodology is one of the ways to promote the production of `valid' findings, 
thus securing the quality of the research (Hughes, 1990). 
" This does not imply that they deny the importance of an understanding of philosophical foundations of 
each research approach. Rather, they argue that the capacity of each research approach to answer the 
research question and phenomena being investigated are more important in determining research 
methodology. 
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The ontological level of analysis is widely seen as being concerned with the nature of 
`reality' in the social world, whereas epistemology is concerned with how one might 
understand the world and communicate this as knowledge to others (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979). Ontological and epistemological issues are closely interconnected because claims 
about what exists in the world almost inevitably lead to questions about how the world 
can be made known to us (Morgan and Smircich, 1980; Hughes, 1990). 
In the present study, the research questions and research design are guided in part by the 
interpretive approach, which entails a constructivist ontological foundation and an 
`inside' epistemological standpoint. It can be classified as an "interpretively grounded 
management accounting" study which attempts to achieve an understanding of accounting 
practices through a study of "accounting in action, as forms of situated practice" (Chua, 
1988, pp. 72-73). The aim of the research is to achieve an understanding of the meanings 
that individuals construct concerning performance measurement systems, and to 
understand the `reasons' for individuals' behaviour within the organisation in terms of 
their interpretations of the world. The approach adopted is different from the 
`mainstream' accounting research, which is grounded in a belief that theory is separated 
from observations, and empirical reality is objective and external to the subject (Chua, 
1986). 
From the interpretive perspective, the subjective nature of the social world is emphasised. 
It is believed that the social world is more complex than the natural world since human 
beings can interpret and construct their own cultural environment, while natural objects 
cannot (Dilthey, 1883, cited in Hughes, 1990). Human beings are not passive receivers; 
they produce a human environment with the integration of its socio-cultural and 
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psychological formations (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Social reality is seen as "the 
product of processes by which social actors together negotiate the meanings for actions 
and situations" (Blaikie, 1993, p. 96). As social actors continuously interpret and 
construct their world, multiple realities may exist. However, this does not imply an 
extreme relativism, which suggests that there is no external world at all. There is a world 
of empirical reality out there, although the way individuals perceive the world may be 
different. Nevertheless, "the world does not tolerate all understandings of it 
equally... there is a long-standing intellectual community for which it seems worthwhile 
to try to figure out collectively how best to talk about the empirical world, by means of 
incremental, partial improvements in understanding" (Kirk and Miller, 1986, p. 11). 
It should be noted that in saying that human beings are different from natural objects, it 
does not imply that natural objects are excluded from the observations and analysis. Non- 
human objects, too, do have actions and play a role in modifying a state of affairs (Latour, 
2005). However, these non-human actors are not identical to human agents as non- 
human objects do not have interest or agency, whereas interests are crucial for human 
actors as, for instance, they make up accounting numbers in specific ways to achieve 
certain purposes (Chua, 1995). 
From the interpretivist and constructivist perspective, an organisation is seen as being 
continuously constructed through interaction and communication among relevant actors. 
These actors could be drawn from within and outside organisational boundaries; the 
organisation is a product of organising which is temporary but has solid effects 
(Czarniawska, 2004). The MACS can be seen as one of the elements in the organisation 
that individuals have continually constructed to accommodate diverse interests within 
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organisations. Any MACS is not "a neutral device that merely documents and reports 
`the facts' of economic activity. "; it is "an attempt to intervene, to act upon individuals, 
entities and processes to transform them and to achieve specific ends" (Miller, 1994, p. 
1). It is used by organisational participants to legitimise particular forms of activity 
(Chua, 1986) and as a source of power for particular groups within the organisation 
(Macintosh and Scapens, 1990; Scapens and Roberts, 1993). 
In order to understand the constructed objects (i. e. MACSs, performance measurement 
systems), researchers cannot separate the objects from the context in which they have 
been constructed (Flyvbjerg, 2001). It is crucial for researchers to understand the 
organisation that both has constructed, and has been constructed by, the objects. 
Furthermore, researchers should be situated inside the objects studied and give credence 
to the personal experience and interpretation of every individual (Alvesson and Willmott, 
1996). It is important to learn from actors what they do, and how and why they do it. It 
is essential for researchers to get close to the subjects being studied and consider the 
historical, economic, social and organisational contexts in which the systems operate, as 
this will enable researchers to understand how the meanings of concepts are formulated 
and interpreted by different organisational members (Alvesson and Willmott, 1996). 12 
This type of study will not provide the kind of predictive theory or supposed universals 
traditionally sought by positivist theorists. Rather, it will construct social theories of 
accounting which help us to understand performance management and accounting 
controls as social practices. 
12 It should be noted that this is by no means suggesting that by getting close to the subjects, researchers 
will produce a description of phenomena that passively reflects what organisational participants 'really' 
think or 'actually' do. Descriptions produced are inevitably influenced by interpretations, interests and 
theoretical choices of the researchers on the issues. 
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In accord with the ontological and epistemological principles underpinning the research 
questions, this research adopts a qualitative field-based naturalistic approach to 
investigate the phenomena. By visiting the field13 in which the performance 
measurement system is being constructed, the researcher can better observe the 
associations between humans and non-humans. "The `making of' ny enterprise... offers 
a view that is sufficiently different from the official one. Not only does it lead you 
backstage and introduce you to the skills and knacks of practitioners, it also provides a 
rare glimpse of what it is for a thing to emerge out of inexistence by adding to any 
existing entity its time dimension" (Latour, 2005, p. 89). Adopting a qualitative field- 
based approach is by no means implying that quantitative data are excluded. Qualitative 
research is "an empirical, socially located phenomenon, defined by its own history, not 
simply a residual grab-bag comprising all things that are `not quantitative' " (Kirk and 
Miller, 1986, p. 10). 
3.3. Research Methods 
As argued in Section 3.2, the ontological and epistemological stance of the researcher has 
led to research questions and a research methodology which require an in-depth 
investigation in the natural setting. At a practical level, an intensive case study approach 
was deemed most appropriate for the research questions, objectives and phenomena under 
investigation. The case study approach can be used in various ways, its precise role 
depending largely on the epistemological stance taken by researchers (Otley and Berry, 
1994). For this research, case study means an in-depth, field-based investigation of 
management accounting and performance management practices within their natural 
setting, involved primarily with qualitative data collection and analysis. 
"The term `field' is used instead of organisation to signify that relevant actors connected to a construction 
of performance measurement system are not expected to be drawn exclusively from within the organisation. 
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3.3.1. The Case Study Approach 
Various scholars have identified conditions in which case study is an appropriate research 
strategy. Yin (2003) argues that case study is suitable when: (1) researchers attempt to 
answer `how' and `why' questions; (2) researchers focus on contemporary events; and (3) 
researchers do not have control over behavioural events. Marshall and Rossman (1995) 
suggest that a qualitative study conducted in a natural setting is preferred if: (1) the 
research conducts an in-depth investigation into complexities and processes; (2) little is 
known of the phenomena under investigation; (3) the research attempts to explore where 
and why policy and local knowledge and practice are in conflict; (4) the research focuses 
on informal, unstructured linkages and processes in organisation; and (5) the research 
focuses on actual, rather than stated, organisational goals. As for accounting scholars, 
Ferreira and Merchant (1992) argue that field-based case study research is powerful for 
investigating issues that: (1) are not well understood; (2) are complex and contextually 
contingent; (3) are highly sensitive in a way that survey response might be seriously 
biased; and (4) draw upon data which is not publicly available. 
The current research attempts to investigate management accounting and performance 
management practices as they are constructed and used within the organisation. The 
major focus is on the complex processes of how BSC has been translated by various 
actors throughout the construction process. It seeks to achieve an understanding of how 
and why BSC has become what it is in the organisation, what BSC means to 
organisational members, and how BSC is used in practice. 
It can be seen that the research is concerned primarily with contemporary events, 
although historical context inevitably has an influence on current practices. The study 
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focuses on the actual uses and meanings of management accounting and performance 
measurement systems, rather than the systems as written in the company's statements. In 
addition, it attempts to understand how management accounting systems play a role in 
monitoring activities of the organisation in relation to a wider set of control systems. 
Management accounting is only one aspect of any management control system, there 
being other controls which do not rely upon accounting information (Hopwood, 1987). It 
is, thus, difficult to fully understand how management accounting systems are used in 
isolation from their organisational context (Otley and Berry, 1994). 
In order to adequately understand how management accounting and performance 
management systems function in practice, it is important to employ a research strategy 
that can capture the richness of the organisational environment and place the systems in a 
wider context. In this situation, intensive case study is deemed appropriate, as it can 
capture the complex issues and processes within an organisational context (Yin, 2003) 
and can also capture a wide range of organisational phenomena (Otley, 2001). In 
addition, it can help the researcher to understand the actual conduct of organisational 
participants, rather than merely studying their "verbally expressed sentiments and 
beliefs", something that is likely to occur if employing the survey method (Van Maanen, 
1979, p. 522). Moreover, intensive case study offers the opportunity for researchers to 
learn more about the conflicting meanings and tensions that are almost always found 
around the uses of accounting control within the organisations (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 
1990). 
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3.3.2. Case Study Design 
In designing case study research, the number of cases and units of analysis are two 
important issues that need to be considered. The current study can be regarded as a single 
longitudinal case study which involves multiple units of analysis. The study involves 
investigation of the process of change in a Thai financial institution. It was conducted 
over a period of almost two years, and the data collection was carried out in more than 
one episode. A longitudinal single case study is adopted, as it can reveal the dynamic 
processes of change in performance management systems and practices with sufficient 
attention to detail within the organisation to generate a rich description of minor as well 
as major developments (Huber and Van de Ven, 1995). Although a major concern of the 
research is primarily contemporary events, extensive research of the historical 
development of the organisation has also been conducted, as the construction of MACSs 
is generally a long-term, gradual process; therefore, a research strategy that focuses on 
building knowledge of a historically and contemporary organisation-societal context is 
necessary (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1990). The observations and analyses are extended 
beyond the boundaries of organisations (Czarniawska, 2004), and the interrelations 
between particular calculative practices and other managerial practices are addressed 
(Miller, 1994). 
This research was carried out primarily in a single organisation. As Dyer and Wilkins 
(1991, p. 614) argue, "[T]he essence of case study research [is] the careful study of a 
single case that leads researchers to see new theoretical relationships and question old 
ones. " Although some scholars have argued for a study of more than one case in order to 
generate constructs that can be generalised (e. g. Eisenhardt, 1989,1991), by paying 
attention to developing general constructs, researchers may lose rich theoretical insights. 
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There is an important trade-off between "the deep understanding of a particular social 
setting and the benefits of comparative insights" (Dyer and Wilkins, 1991, p. 614). 
Intensive single case study research can create an exemplar - "a story against which 
researchers can compare their experiences and gain rich theoretical insights" (Dyer and 
Wilkins, 1991, p. 613). Researchers can get closer to the research subjects and can better 
"provide a rich description of the social scene, ... describe the context in which events 
occur, and ... reveal... the 
deep structure of social behaviours" (Dyer and Wilkins, 1991, 
p. 615). The "theoretical insights are often more powerful and memorable than those 
generated from large-sample field research, because these authors got as close as possible 
to the field and demonstrated theoretical constructs through their application in ongoing 
social settings" (Ahrens and Dent, 1998, p. 7). By conducting a single case study, it does 
not mean that no comparison is carried out; but it is a comparison within the same 
organisational context rather than a comparison across organisational contexts. 
Criticising a single case study for being inferior to multiple case studies can be 
misleading, as a single case study is "multiple in most research efforts because ideas and 
evidence may be linked in many different ways" (Ragin, 1992 quoted in Flyvbj erg, 2001, 
p. 82). 
Although the study is conducted in a single organisation, it is comprised of several mini 
cases and involves multiple levels and units of analysis. In Yin's (2003) terms, it is 
considered an embedded single case study. In the current study, the major unit of 
analysis was the BSC implementation process of the case organisation. It investigates the 
construction and translation of the BSC at both organisational and provincial levels. The 
analysis at multiple levels yields substantial opportunities for extensive analysis, which 
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can enhance the insights into a single case (Yin, 2003). The analysis was done with care 
in order to keep a balance between various levels, and to ensure that the holistic view of 
the organisation is retained (Smith et al., 1988). 
3.4. Research Procedures 
The conducting of the research followed the iterative process. The initial design of the 
study was flexible, allowing for modifications of research, interview questions and 
theoretical framework as new issues and phenomena emerged through the fieldwork. The 
flexibility in research design does not mean that research conduct was not systematic. 
The study was conducted in a way to ensure that the research process was rigorous. Prior 
to going into the field, background knowledge of the Thai financial services sector and 
the case organisation was acquired. The case organisation was chosen based on the issues 
of interest in the potential case organisations and the level of access the researcher could 
gain. Data collection and analysis was done systematically to ensure that data obtained 
was reliable and the interpretations made valid. 
3.4.1. Preparing for the Fieldwork 
Prior to the fieldwork, desk research was carried out. Information relating to the Thai 
banking sector was examined. Over the past decade, there have been significant changes 
in the Thai banking industry, particularly after the 1997 financial crisis. The structure of 
the sector, nature of the competitive environment and regulations were altered. In the 
wake of crisis, local financial services organisations fought for survival. Major 
organisational restructuring was undertaken several times in most, if not all, of the banks. 
Foreign capital was sought. A number of `modem' western management techniques were 
imported, aiming at enhancing efficiency and becoming globally-orientated. With such a 
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radical change, it was important for the researcher to acquire knowledge of the industry 
and organisations' conduct, both historically and at present, in order to fully appreciate 
and understand the rationale behind the current management practices. In addition, it was 
necessary for the researcher to demonstrate her understanding of the industry when 
discussing with organisational members in the field, in order to obtain confidence from 
the organisations' gatekeepers that the organisations would not waste their time 
participating in the study. Therefore, prior to going into the field, the researcher 
examined documents from the Internet, newspapers, magazines, and academic and 
professionally-orientated journals, in order to obtain an overview of the Thai financial 
services sector. 
In addition to research into the Thai financial services sector, case study protocol was 
developed to guide the initial data collection. Case study protocol forces the researcher to 
anticipate problems that may arise, and it can help enhance the reliability of the case 
study research (Yin, 2003). The protocol for the present research consists of the overview 
of the research project, research objectives, data collection procedures, case study 
questions and sources of information. The protocol was revised throughout the research 
process to capture the issues emerging during that process. 
3.4.2. The Early Stage of the Fieldwork - Exploratory and Case Selection 
After acquiring a certain amount of knowledge of the sector, the conducting of the 
fieldwork started. The early stage of the fieldwork was conducted over two periods of 
time - from December 2003 to January 2004, and from July 2004 to September 2004. 
This stage of the fieldwork was largely exploratory. It was concerned primarily with 
open-ended semi-structured interviews with key members of the organisations that had 
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the potential to become the main case organisation for the study. The rationales behind 
this stage were to explore the performance measurement issues of relevance to the 
organisations, and to establish initial relationships with potential case organisations. This 
process helped identify a suitable organisation for the main investigation, both in terms of 
the phenomenon of interest and the level of access that the researcher could obtain. (Key 
research activities which are considered formal data collection can be found in Appendix 
1. ) 
Very little research on MACSs and performance measurement conducted in Thai 
organisations has been published. 14 In the banking sector in particular, most of the 
companies are owned by business families although they are public listed companies; 
thus, much of the information regarding their management control systems is kept secret. 
It was difficult to obtain a broad picture of the current performance management practices 
in Thai organisations from a review of public documents. At this stage, the researcher, 
therefore, developed a set of broad questions to examine the recent changes, current 
performance management practices within Thai banks and issues of concern for these 
banks (see Appendix 2 for the interview guide). This process was intended to ensure that 
the research agenda was not only of interest academically, but also relevant to 
practitioners. 
From December 2003 to January 2004,8 semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
11 senior, middle, and non-management staff of 4 local banks. Most of the interviewees 
14 There are some professionally-orientated books offering prescriptive suggestions on how to design and 
implement BSC. These books discuss BSC design and implementation in some financial services 
organisations as examples to illustrate the authors' point of view. However, the issues covered tend to be 
only a small part of the process. A full picture of current performance management practices cannot be 
obtained. Although there are some MBA dissertations on the design of BSC in some particular banks, these 
dissertations largely focus on the design that the authors (often employees of the banks) would like to see in 
the banks, rather than the actual design of the bank's BSC. 
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were from the accounting, human resources, or planning and strategy department. In 
many banks in Thailand, the human resources or planning and strategy department is 
responsible for adopting and implementing management innovations, including 
performance measurement systems. The interviews were concerned primarily with 
current performance management practices, recent changes in MACSs and performance 
measurement systems. In addition to the interviews, the library of each bank, if one 
existed, was also visited, and documents from the bank's magazines relating to 
performance management issues were reviewed. In addition to the investigation within 
the potential case organisations, interviews were conducted with a member of the cabinet 
and senior official from the Bank of Thailand (the central bank), in order to obtain 
information regarding the policies on financial services sector development. 
Findings from this stage of research suggest that BSC was the performance measurement 
framework that most of the banks in Thailand were implementing or considering to adopt. 
Empirical evidence from this stage, therefore, led to a revision of interview questions, 
with an increasing focus on BSC adoption and implementation. 
The second phase of the fieldwork was conducted over a period of four months, from July 
to September 2004. During this stage, the researcher attempted to identify other local 
financial services organisations which were implementing BSC while maintaining 
relationships with those previously visited. By establishing and maintaining relationships 
with several organisations, the researcher could ensure that the research would be able to 
continue if access to some potential organisations was terminated. In addition to visiting 
potential case organisations, the researcher visited and interviewed the academic 
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consultant referred to by the management staff of several banks as a BSC expert, and who 
had played a significant role in facilitating BSC implementation in their organisations. 
In September 2004, the main case organisation was identified. In the organisation 
selected, the AgroBank, the BSC development project had started several years before the 
fieldwork began. Although the researcher was not in the field when the BSC project 
started, the researcher went in when BSC was still controversial, and being constructed 
and re-constructed in the head office. At the time, the BSC development project was also 
extended to the lower level. Getting into an organisation which had started the BSC 
implementation project several years previously allowed the researcher to observe how 
BSC was used and the changes that it had brought to the organisation. Observation of the 
use of BSC in this way would not have been possible if the selected organisation had only 
recently started developing and implementing it, as it usually takes more than a year 
before organisations start to use the BSC, if indeed, they use it at all. 
3.4.3. Negotiating Access and Maintaining Access in the Case Organisation 
Gaining access is one of the most fundamental issues for field researchers, as an intensive 
case study is conducted primarily within an organisation. In the present study, initial 
access was gained through a personal contact to the director, the president and several 
members of staff of the case organisation. After discussing the proposed research 
informally with the director, the president and some management staff of the 
organisation, the office of the president arranged and facilitated initial meetings with 
senior management staff, who were, at the time, actively involved in the BSC 
development project. From these meetings, members of senior management helped to 
introduce the researcher to other relevant organisational members and to set up meetings 
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with them. Relationships with diverse but relevant organisational members established 
during the early stage of the research helped facilitate further access at a later stage 
(Baxter and Chua, 1998). 
Access to the external consultants was also arranged with the help of senior management 
staff at the organisation. The external consultants who directly and indirectly played roles 
in the BSC development project were interviewed, and they also gave permission for 
some of their reports to be reviewed. 
When negotiating for further access to other organisational members, particularly in the 
provincial offices and branches, wherever possible, the researcher did not reveal any 
personal connection with the executives of the organisation, in order to avoid `party-line' 
talk. However, it was sometimes impossible not to refer to executives in order to 
guarantee full co-operation from organisational members. Some organisational members 
were concerned with the sensitive nature of the information being divulged, and therefore, 
were reluctant to provide certain information, particularly internal documents. However, 
when they were assured that executives of the organisation, including the director and 
president, were aware of the research, they showed greater willingness to provide fuller 
information. This is a delicate but important issue when dealing with Thai organisations, 
particularly in the case organisation, which is a state-owned enterprise, where hierarchical 
structure is crucial and power distance is high. 
15 It was sometimes necessary to mention 
such a connection, in order to obtain greater co-operation from organisational members. 
15 It should be noted that this is based on the observations of the researcher. Although Hofstede (2001) also 
characterises Thai culture as having high power distance, his categories of national culture and scores for 
each category are not used to explain phenomena in the study. 
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3.4.4. Data Collection in the Main Case Organisation 
One of the strengths of case study research is that it allows the researcher to deal with 
diverse sources of evidence, for example, interviews, documents, artefacts and 
observations (Yin, 2003). This research attempted to make use of the evidence sources 
available, and to this end, four sources of evidence were used, namely, interviews, 
documentation, archival data and direct observation. These sources have different 
strengths and weaknesses, as detailed in Table 3.1. It should be noted that by collecting 
and analysing data from different sources, it does not imply that researchers will produce 
more valid explanation of the phenomena; rather, different forms of data provide 
resources for the researcher to draw upon in the production of `interesting' descriptions 
(Hansen, 2006). 
Table 3.1: Strengths and weaknesses of sources of evidence 
Source of Evidence Strengths Weaknesses 
Interviews - Targeted - focuses directly on - Bias due to poorly constructed 
case study topic questions 
- Insightful - provides perceived - Response bias 
causal inferences - Inaccuracies due to poor recall 
- Reflexivity - interviewee gives 
what interviewer wants to hear 
Documentation - Stable - can be reviewed - Retrievability can be low 
repeatedly - Biased selectivity if collection 
- Unobtrusive - not created as a is incomplete 
result of the case study - Reporting bias - reflects 
- Exact - contains exact names, (unknown) bias of author 
references, and details of an - Access may be deliberately 
event blocked 
- Broach coverage - long span 
of time, many events, many 
settings 
Archival records - (same as above for - (same as above for 
documentation) documentation) 
- Precise and quantitative - Accessibility due to privacy 
reasons 
Direct observations - Reality - covers events in real - Time-consuming 
time - Selectivity 
- Contextual - covers context of - Reflexivity - event may 
event proceed differently because it 
is being observed 
- Cost - hours needed by human 
observers 
Source: Yin (2UU3, p. 6b) 
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The data collection was conducted in the main case organisation between July 2004 and 
August 2005 in two phases - the preliminary investigation from July to September 2004, 
and the main investigation from April to August 2005. During the preliminary 
investigation, issues discussed in the interviews were concerned primarily with the 
development of BSC and other management control systems that were recently 
implemented in the case organisation. At a later stage of the research, the interviews 
focused in more detail on the process of BSC development and implementation in the 
head office and provincial offices, as well as the actual use of the BSC. 
3.4.4.1. Preliminary Investigation 
During the preliminary investigation stage, the researcher attempted to obtain historical 
and background knowledge of the organisation, as well as the issues of BSC adoption and 
recent changes in management control systems within the bank. To obtain background 
knowledge of the organisation, the researcher visited the library of the bank as well as the 
library of a university in Bangkok. The organisation's annual reports, five-year corporate 
plans, the bank's journals and magazines, and research papers related to the operations of 
the organisation were reviewed. The researcher also had further informal discussions 
with a member of the board and some management staff of the organisation. 
With regard to formal interviews, 5 open-ended semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with 8 executives and senior management of the organisation. The 
interviewees included the president of the bank, four managers who had been key 
participants in the BSC development project since the project started, and the other three 
managers largely responsible for implementing other recently adopted management 
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control systems -a quality management IS09001: 2000 system and a new performance 
appraisal system. 
In addition to the interviews, the researcher visited the `operation room' - the meeting 
room in which the organisation's key performance indicators are presented and where 
management staff meet on a monthly basis to discuss the performance of the organisation. 
The manager responsible for monitoring organisational performance and updating 
information in the room and his team explained how the room was designed and used. 
They also discussed their opinions about the usefulness and weaknesses of the room 
design and the actual utilisation of the room. 
During this period of the visit, one formal meeting was observed. It was a meeting 
between senior management staff of the bank and external consultants hired by the 
Ministry of Finance, a major shareholder of the organisation. It is a policy of the Ministry 
of Finance to monitor performance of state enterprises on an annual basis. 16 The meeting 
observed largely involved negotiations on the performance criteria and targets between 
the bank's staff and the consultants representing the Ministry of Finance. 
During the visit, various internal documents were obtained and reviewed. These included 
the bank's KPI dictionary (including the strategy map and BSC KPIs), reports on the 
progress of the BSC, performance appraisal development and implementation projects, 
and a report of the provisional performance indicators, weights and targets that the 
Ministry of Finance would use for the fiscal year 2004. 
16 Details about the performance evaluation by the Ministry of Finance are discussed in Chapter 6 (Section 
6.2.2). 
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During all the visits, notes were taken systematically. Observational notes, theoretical 
notes and methodological notes were kept separately (McKinnon, 1988). With the 
exception of one, all interviews were tape-recorded, and were transcribed verbatim at the 
end of the day, or as soon as possible after they were held. The observed meeting was not 
tape-recorded, but notes were taken with the exact words spoken as far as was possible. 
The researcher's interpretation or observations were noted in double parentheses. At the 
end of the day, these notes were reviewed, analysed and categorised into observational 
notes, theoretical notes and methodological notes. A research diary was also kept to 
reflect the researcher's thoughts and feelings about the organisation and issues during 
each visit. 
After the preliminary investigation in the case organisation, data obtained was analysed. 
Findings from this stage suggested that the bank started implementing BSC in the head 
office in 2000, at which time, the bank was attempting to expand the BSC to provincial 
office level. Although BSC might cover many areas of performance, other performance 
measurement tools were being implemented. As several pre-existing performance 
measurement tools still remained in use, many of the tools co-existed with some overlaps 
between each. Different divisions/departments were responsible for different 
performance measurement tools. External parties, particularly the government, had 
significant influence on the way the organisation is managed. From the findings at this 
stage, the interview guide was refined. Further information needed and potential 
interviewees were identified, and another visit to the organisation started in April 2005. 
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3.4.4.2. Main Investigation 
The main investigation into the case organisation covered a period of five months, from 
April to August 2005. During this period, 24 in-depth semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with 32 organisational members. '? The interviewees ranged from top 
executives and management to non-management staff from various departments. Staff 
from regional and provincial offices were interviewed, and four provincial offices were 
visited. The retired ex-president of the bank was also interviewed, as he was the key 
person in initiating the idea of BSC adoption and the construction of the `operation room' 
in the organisation. Some members of staff who had been interviewed or discussed 
informally during the preliminary stage were re-visited. Many of them had changed their 
posts from the first visit. 18 
In addition to the interviews with organisational members, an external consultant who had 
been directly involved in the BSC development and implementation project since the 
beginning of the project was interviewed. External consultants representing the Ministry 
of Finance were also interviewed. 
Interviews during this period focused primarily on the detailed process of BSC 
development and implementation at corporate level, as well as that at provincial levels. It 
also emphasised the actual use of BSC and the way in which individuals interpreted and 
acted upon it. The use of BSC in relation to other control systems, particularly traditional 
management accounting and controls, was also a major issue of concern. (See Appendix 2 
for the interview guide. ) 
"Two of these interviewees were previously interviewed at the early stage of data collection. 
" In the case organisation, job rotations were undertaken many times during the period of study, partly 
because the bank was being restructured. 
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Apart from the interviews, two separate meetings were observed. One of the meetings 
involved the formulation of annual strategic and action plans at corporate and regional 
levels, and another was a monthly performance review meeting at one of the provincial 
offices. `Operation rooms' at two provincial offices were also visited. 
On many occasions, the researcher had opportunities to discuss informally with various 
organisational members, sometimes over lunch or dinner. Some conversations provided 
insightful information about the organisation in general, as well as performance 
measurement issues in particular. This helped to enhance an understanding of the 
working environment in the organisation and relationships among organisational 
members. 
As in the preliminary stage, all interviews, except two, were tape-recorded. All 
interviews were transcribed verbatim on the day of the interview or as soon as possible 
afterwards. Notes were taken systematically, and a research diary was kept. For the 
observed meeting, notes were taken systematically of the exact words spoken as far as 
possible. Soon after the meetings, these notes were reviewed, analysed and categorised 
into observational notes, theoretical notes and methodological notes. 
During this period, further internal documents were obtained and analysed. These 
documents included the bank's corporate KPI dictionary for fiscal year 2004-2005, 
corporate policies and annual business plans and budgets, the BSC and action plans of 
some provincial offices, performance and management accounting reports of provincial 
offices and branches, and performance reports from consultants representing the Ministry 
of Finance. 
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To summarise, within the case organisation, 29 open-ended semi-structured interviews 
with 38 members of staff were carried out. Interviewees consisted of a wide range of 
organisational members, including members of the board, top executives, management 
and non-management staff from various departments, both in the head office and at 
provincial offices and branches. Two interviews with three of the bank's external 
consultants were conducted. On average, each interview lasted approximately 75 
minutes, but ranged from half an hour up to 3 hours. With the exception of three, all 
interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed verbatim. They were all conducted in 
Thai, and transcriptions were made in Thai to preserve the accuracy of the interviewees' 
expressions. In addition to the interviews, related documents were collected, analysed 
and cross-referenced with the interview data. Moreover, three separate meetings were 
observed. Furthermore, whenever possible, the researcher discussed issues informally 
with the bank staff. Altogether, approximately 65 hours were spent on interviewing, 
discussing, observing and attending meetings in the case organisation. 
3.4.5. Data Analysis 
The processes of data collection and data analysis were intertwined, the latter being 
undertaken alongside the data collection in a dynamic way. Patterns and theoretical 
concepts were gradually developed and tested in an iterative process between insights and 
the field material until they explained observed patterns of behaviour. 
Guided by Miles and Huberman (1994), data analysis involved three interwoven flows of 
activity: data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing and verification. The data 
reduction process started in the early stage of fieldwork and was conducted throughout 
the research project. It involved selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting and 
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transforming the data in the field notes and interview transcripts. After transcribing the 
interviews, or at the end of each visit to the field if the purpose of the visit was other than 
interviewing organisational members, fieldnotes and/or interview transcript were studied 
carefully. Reflections and remarks were noted in the margin of the transcript, and a 
contact summary sheet was produced to summarise issues from a particular field contact. 
The contact summary sheets identified people or events involved during the visit, 
summarised main themes or issues discussed during the visit, identified any new issues 
suggested by the contact, and determined further information needed. 
The process was then followed by coding. Initial codes were broad categories developed 
from research questions and data from several first interviews. The codes were 
continuously refined as the research continued. Emergent themes were identified through 
a continual review of fieldnotes and interview data, and supplement codes emerged from 
the data during the fieldwork and subsequent analysis. While searching for patterns and 
similarities, the researcher was also sensitive to inconsistencies, for example, divergent 
views offered by different groups of individuals. Data was organised and displayed in 
charts, graphs, and metrics to aid further analysis. Themes and patterns emerged, guiding 
further data collection, and they were further refined in the process. 
The process of coding and categorising data was conducted manually, with the aid of 
Microsoft Word and Excel. Qualitative data analysis software packages, such as Nud*ist 
or NVivo, were not used. This was primarily because the data analysis computer 
software did not support Thai characters. This study was conducted in a Thai financial 
service organisation, in which the first language of all interviewees was Thai. Therefore, 
all interviews were conducted in Thai, resulting in almost all of the data being in Thai. 
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The researcher could have translated data into English, one of the languages supported by 
the available analysis programmes; however, this would have involved the risk of losing 
the meanings and perspectives of the interviewees in the process of translation. 
With regard to the theory-building process, or what Miles and Huberman's (1994) refer to 
as conclusion drawing and verification activity, there was continual iteration between 
field observations and theory. The analysis process did not start with any specific pre- 
determined theory; rather, empirically-based patterns and themes emerging from the 
fieldwork were compared with a range of theoretical possibilities, and the initial theories 
were revised, reformulated, discarded and supplemented in the light of field observations 
(Humphrey and Scapens, 1996). During the data collection and analysis process, 
narratives of findings were written and presented to several researchers in the field of 
management accounting and control, in order to seek alternative plausible interpretations 
of the data. The theory-building process employed is similar to what Yin (2003) calls 
pattern-matching and explanation-building. Pattern-matching is a comparison between an 
empirically-based pattern and the predicted ones, while explanation-building is a special 
type of pattern-matching dealing with the building of causal relationships. Although Yin 
(2003) distinguishes pattern-matching and explanation-building as two different 
techniques for analysing data, both involve essentially the same process, that is, the 
iteration between observations and theory. 
3.5. Underlying Theoretical Approach for the Research 
Although this research adopts an interpretive approach, this does not mean that the 
researcher started enquiries empty-handed. Researchers inevitably carry their own values 
and worldviews into their research; any approach to a study relies on prior understandings 
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of related or similar phenomena (Smith et al., 1988). A theoretical framework is seen as 
an essential starting-point of case study; nevertheless, researchers should hold such 
framework only loosely, so that it can be challenged and refined as a result of the research 
process (Humphrey and Scapens, 1996). Therefore, rather than imposing an a priori 
theoretical framework, in this study, the researcher engaged with a range of theoretical 
possibilities which were revised, extended, discarded and supplemented in an iterative 
research process. It can be said that the theoretical framework "both informs, and is 
developed by, observation" (Humphrey and Scapens, 1996, p. 100). 
Underpinning the analysis of the study is the ANT approach. The sociology of translation 
or ANT is developed from the discipline of science and technology studies. It has been 
employed to examine the introduction and construction of various management 
accounting and control technologies, as discussed in the previous chapter (Section 
2.4.1.4). The ANT approach brings together human and non-human, social and technical 
factors into the same analytical view (McLean and llassard, 2004). It also bypasses the 
agency-structure debate; instead of taking structure or `macro' actors, such as power or 
social forces, for granted, using them to explain observed phenomena, the ANT approach 
attempts to unfold the negotiations and associations which construct the `macro' actors. 
ANT adopts a `performative' view; that is, "entities achieve their form as a consequence 
of the relations in which they are located.... they are performed in, by, and through those 
relations. " (Law, 1999, p. 4) Society is seen as being performed through the various 
efforts to define it. The focus of the analysis is on "the performative character of 
relations and the objects constituted in those relations" (Law, 1999, p. 7). Under the ANT 
approach, actants (i. e. those which act and are acted upon) are followed through a 
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trajectory until they become actors, acquiring a distinct and relatively stable character 
(Czarniawska and Hernes, 2005, p. 9). 
Central to ANT is the notion of translation, which refers to "displacement, drift, 
invention, mediation, the creation of a link that did not exist before and that to some 
degree modifies the original two" (Latour, 1999, p. 179). As Czarniawska and Sevön 
(2005) argue, what is involved in the translation has an uncertain identity, and each act of 
translation changes the translator as well as what is translated. The concept of translation 
draws attention to the fact that when a thing moves from one place to another, it is rare 
that it will emerge unchanged. Ideas, objects, or artefacts are modified by, and composed 
of, many different actors who slowly turn it into something completely different as they 
seek to achieve their own goals (Latour, 1986). Every translation involves 
transformation. 
Latour (1986) argues that there are three key elements in the translation model. First, the 
spread of anything in time and space is in the hands of people who may act in different 
ways. Faithful transmission without transformation is unusual and needs to be explained 
if it occurs. Second, displacement is the consequence of energy given to the token, 
whether it is idea, object or artefact, by every actor in the chain who does something with 
it. Therefore, forces from actors who come early in the chain are no more important than 
those of actors who come later. Third, and most importantly, each of the actors in the 
chain is not simply resisting a force or transmitting it. Rather, they do something 
essential for the existence and maintenance of the token; that is, they shape it to fit their 
own frame of reference. Instead of the transmission of the same token, which may be 
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deflected or slowed down by friction, as would be depicted by the diffusion model, in the 
translation model, there is a continuous transformation of the token. 
Behind translation, there might be imitation -a desire to become similar (Czarniawska 
and Sevön, 2005). However, imitation is not seen as a passive copying of a static model; 
instead, imitation is non-identity, an act that differs from what is imitated. Therefore, it is 
regarded as a process in which something is created and transformed by chains of 
translators; it is involved as an ongoing translation process, in which the new idea or 
model is modified and integrated with other models and traditions (Sevön, 1996). The 
results of imitation are uncertain, as each act of translation changes the translator, as well 
as what is translated (Czarniawska and Sevön, 2005). 
As an extension of ANT which is both theoretical and practical, Czarniawska (1997, 
2004) has developed the concept of `action net' to emphasise that attention should be paid 
not only to the actor and structure of the network, but also to actions and activities within 
the nets (Pipan and Porsander, 2000). The concept of `action net' attempts to capture the 
way in which certain actions are connected to, or disconnected from, one another. For the 
action net approach, emphasis is placed on connected actions rather than connected 
actors, although it is acknowledged that the actors influence the shape and kind of actions 
performed. The analysis focuses on connections within the entire action nets as action 
nets are being established and re-established. It involves studying organising by 
following chains of events, or unfolding nets of actions, and understanding how these 
may construct actors, or organisations (Czarniawska, 2004). From the action nets, we can 
deduce which actors are involved (Czamiawska, 1997). 
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Through the action net concept, we are reminded that in the analysis, emphasis is placed 
on the process of organising rather than organisation as such. It is the organising in an 
action net and the development of connections between various action nets that creates 
organisations and identities; actors or organisations are products rather than the sources of 
the organising - taking place within, enabled by and constitutive of an action net 
(Czarniawska, 2004). Organisations are temporary reifications because organising never 
ceases. However, in contrast to the conventional ANT approach, Czarniawska (2004, p. 
780) argues that action net also embraces the solid effects of organising, that is, "for a 
moment, things seem unchangeable and `organized-for-good"'. Being aware that things 
can be stabilised for a moment in time is useful for a study of organisations and 
management practices, as organisations are different from the laboratory, a place in which 
the conventional ANT approach emerged (see also Miller and O'Leary, 1994b). 
Organisations are more bounded; one can distinguish who are inside and who are outside 
the organisational boundary, although there are connections between the two, and 
sometimes, local can become global (or vice versa) for a certain period of time (see Briers 
and Chua, 2001). 
The translation model and action net approach have several implications for the analysis 
undertaken in this study. As Law (1999) has emphasised, actors gain their identities 
through relations with others. In order to understand how the BSC has become what it is 
in the organisation, it is important to follow chains of events or nets of actions associated 
with the BSC construction process, to see how these events or actions may construct the 
identities and meanings of BSC. It is essential to get into the construction site to observe 
the connections between actors, in order to see how the BSC emerges out of inexistence 
(Latour, 2005) and struggles to become `matter of fact'. The focus of the analysis is on 
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associations and disassociations in the BSC assemblage. As Latour (1986) argues, actors 
involved in the spread of the idea, object or artefact may act in different ways, for 
example, letting it drop, modifying it, deflecting it, betraying it, adding to it, or 
appropriating it. This suggests that it is important to place emphasis on how relevant 
actors react to the BSC, and how these actions or events may create the identities of BSC. 
It is also crucial to be aware that actions of actors who come early in the chains are no 
less or more important than the actions of those who come later in the process. 
In order to examine `accounting in making', the researcher has to go into the field before 
the `black box' is closed (Latour, 1987). Attention is paid to both human and non-human 
actors; thus, technologies and artefacts, such as computer and information systems, 
inscriptions, system manuals, and other physical objects significant in the process of 
making the BSC operable are captured in the analysis. By following the chains of 
activities connected to BSC construction, sometimes, the researcher has to go beyond the 
boundary of the organisation, as actors connected to the process are not expected to be 
drawn exclusively from within the organisation. The researcher also has to trace some 
historical events/activities/actors that leave traces on the BSC construction, for when 
organisations imitate, they do not only imitate the previous successes of others; they also 
imitate themselves and their own history (Sahlin-Andersson and Sevön, 2003). 
As the `identity' and `value' of the innovations or technologies (in this case, the BSC) 
depends largely on how actors around them enact and enrol the technologies (Latour, 
1987), it is important that the analysis places emphasis on identities and meanings of the 
BSC as constructed by various actors throughout the construction and translation process. 
In the analysis, the BSC is not seen as a fixed object that is taken-for-granted. Rather, it 
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is treated as a boundary object, an object which is "both plastic enough to adapt to local 
needs and the constraints of the several parties employing [it], yet robust enough to 
maintain a common identity across sites" (Star and Griesemer, 1989, p. 393). The way in 
which identities and meanings of the BSC may be changed by heterogeneous actors who 
may slowly turn it into something completely different to make it fit their local conditions 
is one of the major focuses of the analysis. 
3.6. Credibility of the Research 
The value of scientific research is usually ascertained by the degree of validity, reliability 
and generalisability of the research. To ensure that the findings, interpretations and 
conclusions of the research are credible and trustworthy, two interrelated issues - validity 
and reliability - are crucial. The issue of validity is more concerned with the 
interpretation of observations, whereas the issue of reliability is more related to the data 
collected, although the two constructs also interplay, for instance with poor reliability 
necessarily impacting on validity. Kirk and Miller (1986, p. 20) define validity as "the 
degree to which the finding is interpreted in a correct way. " They define reliability as 
"the degree to which the finding is independent of accidental circumstances of the 
research" (p. 20). Any researcher needs to take the two issues into account, both 
separately and together, irrespective of their research methodology. However, meanings 
of validity and reliability, and ways to enhance the validity and reliability of research may 
vary, depending on the philosophical and theoretical standpoints of the researchers (see 
Seale, 1999). Therefore, it is important that one does not impose criteria for evaluating 
the validity and reliability of one research methodology to evaluate research drawing 
upon another methodology. 
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3.6.1. Validity and Reliability for Field-Based Qualitative Research 
With regard to field-based case study research, various scholars have identified different 
types of validity and reliability. One of the definitions of validity and reliability often 
cited by researchers who conduct case study research is offered by Yin (2003), who 
specifies three types of validity and one type of reliability, as follows: 
" Construct validity - establishing correct operational measures for the concepts being studied 
  Internal validity - establishing a causal relationship, whereby certain conditions are shown to lead 
to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships 
  External validity - establishing the domain to which a study's findings can be generalized 
  Reliability - demonstrating that the operations of a study - such as the data collection procedures - 
can be repeated, with the same results 
He also proposes various techniques to enhance the validity and reliability of case study 
research (see Table3.2). 
Table 3.2: Case study tactics to enhance validity and reliability 
Tactics Phase of research in 
which tactic occurs 
Construct validity - Use multiple sources of evidence Data collection 
- Establish chain of evidence Data collection 
- Have key informants review draft case study report Composition 
Internal validity - Do pattern-matching Data analysis 
- Do explanation-building Data analysis 
- Address rival explanations Data analysis 
- Use logic models Data anal sis 
External validity - Use theory in single-case studies Research design 
- Use replication logic in multiple-case studies Research design 
Reliability - Use case study protocol Data collection 
- Develop case study database Data collection 
Source: Yin (ZUUS, p. 34) 
Although the techniques to enhance validity and reliability suggested by Yin seem to be 
practically useful at first glance, his notions of validity and reliability are largely 
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influenced by positivistic assumptions that suggest a single tangible reality (cf. Seale, 
1999, pp. 34-42). His notions of validity implicitly suggest that specific constructs can be 
objectively established and attributed to certain social phenomena (construct validity), 
cause and effect can be distinguished and captured by a small number of key variables 
(internal validity), and contextually independent knowledge can be obtained through a 
logic of replication (external validity). In several respects, Yin's definition of validity 
and reliability and techniques to enhance them may not be appropriate for interpretive 
research, which assumes that "[s]ocial reality is emergent, subjectively created, and 
objectified through human interaction" (Chua, 1986, p. 615). For instance, the 
`constructs' of `construct validity' cannot, within the interpretive frame just outlined, be 
assumed to be already there. They are necessarily a product of the movement between 
what is observed and reflection, so cannot be assumed to emerge purely from the 
`evidence', however widely defined, and/or the views of `informants'' (itself a term 
revealing an unproblematised view of evidence as `information'). `Constructs', as the 
term itself suggests, have to be actively constructed. 
One way of seeing this dilemma is as a problem inherent in `replication logic'. For case 
research in the positivistic tradition, focus is placed on identifying key variables 
underlying a phenomenon, and the attempt is made to build constructs that are applicable 
to other cases (e. g. Eisenhardt, 1989). For positivist researchers, their studies have 
scientific power if they can identify a small number of variables that explain the outcomes 
over a large number of cases (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006a). However, interpretive case 
study research is based on a belief that social reality cannot be easily captured by a few 
key variables. It focuses on "the validity of specific phenomena, an understanding of 
which depends on nuanced descriptions of the phenomena themselves, the processes 
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which define them, and the (changing) contexts in which they are situated. "; the research 
is credible and has scientific value if the researcher can develop "a convincing account of 
the ways in which meanings and purposes relate to patterns of activity" (Ahrens and 
Chapman, 2006a, p. 834). As Becker (1970, p. 20 quoted in Ahrens and Chapman, 
2006a, p. 833) argues, "We should not expect identical results when two observers study 
the same organisation from different points of view, or when they study different 
substructures within a large organisation. What we have a right to expect is that the two 
descriptions be compatible, that the conclusions of one study do not implicitly or 
explicitly contradict those of the other. " 
In addition, Yin's focus on data triangulation (i. e. uses of multiple data sources) as a way 
to achieve validity can be misleading. Although data triangulation may be useful in 
forcing researchers to consider more carefully why there are differences between data 
from different sources, this does not mean that combining different kinds of data will 
ensure validity of the findings (Fielding and Fielding, 1986). As Bloor (1997 in Seale, 
1999) has questioned, "even if all the different methods employed converge on the same 
thing, apparently agreeing with each other, how can we know that they are correct? " 
Moreover, his notion of reliability can be problematic. In qualitative field-based research, 
it is unlikely that researchers will obtain the same results if they repeat the study at a 
different point in time, as the study is conducted in a specific time. This type of 
reliability is only applicable when the phenomena remain unchanged through a period of 
time, which is unlikely in a changing world (Kirk and Miller, 1986), or alternatively is 
symptomatic of an unrealistic view of the world as unchanging. 
136 
The emphasis on reliability, which draws upon the positivist tradition of many 
researchers, has led some qualitative researchers to argue that reliability is not the issue of 
concern of qualitative researchers. For instance, Marshall and Rossman (1989, p. 147) 
have argued that the "positivist notions of reliability assume an underlying universe 
where inquiry could, quite logically, be replicated. " In their view, from the 
interpretive/qualitative stance, the social world is always changing and the concept of 
replication is problematic; thus, the issue of reliability should not be applied to evaluate 
the value of interpretive, qualitative research. Nevertheless, in the current study, 
reliability is one of the major concerns of the researcher. As Silverman (2001, p. 226) 
argues, a belief that the social world is always changing "would rule out any systematic 
research as it implies that we cannot assume any stable properties in the social world". 
Therefore, it is important that the researcher ensures that data obtained are reliable. 
Qualitative field researchers, in my view, cannot ignore the issues of reliability, not least 
because (as indicated above) in the absence of high reliability, the validity of the results 
of the research is necessarily compromised. 
With significant criticisms directed at the use of positivist criteria to evaluate interpretive 
research, various scholars have attempted to develop alternative definitions of validity 
and reliability, and criteria for interpretive research which are different from those 
commonly applied in the positivistic tradition. Among these, Kirk and Miller (1986) 
seem to provide useful definitions. They identify three notions of validity and three types 
of reliability: 
  Construct/theoretical validity - "theoretical paradigm [which] rightly corresponds to observations" 
(p. 22) 
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  Apparent validity -a measuring instrument [that] is so closely linked to the phenomena under 
observation that it is `obviously' providing valid data (p. 22) 
  Instrumental validity -a measurement procedure that "can be shown that observations match those 
generated by an alternative procedure that is itself accepted as valid" (p. 22) 
  Quixotic reliability - "the circumstances in which a single method of observation continually 
yields an unvarying measurement" (p. 41) 
  Diachronic reliability - "the stability of observations through time" (p. 42) 
  Synchronic reliability - "the similarity of observations within the same time period" (p. 42) 
Although Kirk and Miller also suggest construct validity as one of the important aspects 
of validity, their interpretation of such validity differs significantly from that of Yin. 
While Yin focuses on measurement during data collection, Kirk and Miller focus on 
interpretation of the observations. Yin views construct validity as a problem in field- 
based qualitative research; in contrast, Kirk and Miller see it as a strength of field study 
research. Kirk and Miller argue that field researchers continually contrast the 
observations with theoretical concepts at hand. They repeatedly compare new 
observations with their prior understandings and perceptions. The emerging descriptions 
and explanations are tested and retested in an increasingly stronger way, a process that 
helps to ensure that the theoretical concepts will correspond to the observations. 
With regard to reliability, Kirk and Miller note that quixotic reliability is usually trivial 
and misleading. A broken thermometer which always shows 80 degrees Celsius for 
boiling water is an example of a measurement instrument that possesses quixotic 
reliability but produces misleading/invalid results. For ethnographic research, quixotic 
reliability usually demonstrates only that the researcher has managed to observe the 
`party-line' or rehearsed information. As for diachronic reliability, it is also problematic; 
it is only applicable when the phenomena remain unchanged through a period of time 
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which is unlikely in a changing world (although it is arguable, from a more structuralist 
perspective, or using an approach like Foucault's, which posits historically specific or 
provisional epistemic structures, that there is a degree of regularity in how people see, 
think and act which may yield a form of diachronic reliability at a level beneath the 
surface of everyday activity). However, leaving that aside, Kirk and Miller argue that 
synchronic reliability is the most useful for qualitative field researchers, particularly when 
it fails, because it will force researchers to consider how and why different qualitative 
measurements might be simultaneously true. 
In the current study, the major concern regarding validity is `construct validity', as 
defined by Kirk and Miller. The research process involves various activities to ensure 
that the theoretical concepts developed can provide convincing and meaningful accounts 
to explain the empirical observations. With regard to reliability, `synchronic reliability' 
as defined by Kirk and Miller seems to be most relevant. Although Kirk and Miller argue 
that the issue of `quixotic reliability' is trivial, it is also an issue of concern in the study, 
as it is important for the researcher to ensure that data obtained are not `rehearsed' 
information or `party-line' talk. 
There are various threats which may undermine the reliability and validity of research. 
McKinnon (1988) suggests four types of threat - observer-caused effects, observer bias, 
data access limitations, and the complexities and limitations of the human mind. Fielding 
and Fielding (1986) suggest two major sources of bias -a tendency to select data that fit 
an ideal conception or preconception of the phenomenon, and a tendency to select field 
data which are striking, at the expense of less dramatic but possibly indicative data. 
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Various scholars have provided suggestions as to how to achieve reliability and validity 
in conducting qualitative field research. In the current research, throughout the research 
process, various strategies and tactics were employed. During an early stage of the 
research, case study protocol was developed to guide data collection (Yin, 2003). This 
helped the researcher keep track of data, methods and decisions made during a project 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985). An interview guide was formulated and used in other 
organisations during the exploratory stage of the research (Silverman, 2001). It should be 
noted that the interview guide was used flexibly, in order to maintain the open nature of 
the interview, and was continually refined as the research progressed in order to capture 
the new issues that emerged. 
During the data collection process, data were collected systematically. Interviews were 
tape-recorded, whenever possible, and transcribed carefully; notes were also taken 
systematically (see Section 3.4.4) to enhance the reliability of the research (Silverman, 
2001). The researcher spent considerable time in the field, and whilst present, was 
attentive to informal discussions among organisational members. This process helped the 
researcher to better understand both the working environment within the organisation and 
the relationships between various organisational members, which helped the researcher to 
identify `party-line' talk. It also allowed more observations, so that more comparisons 
could be made (McKinnon, 1988). 
At the data collection stage, multiple sources of data or data triangulation were also used. 
However, this was not used to achieve validity, as suggested by Yin. Rather, multiple 
sources of data were combined to make better sense of the other data. The researcher did 
not treat data from any particular source as superior to that from anywhere else. 
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Whenever conflicting information was found from different sources of evidence, the 
researcher further investigated reasons for the conflict. Data triangulation forced the 
researcher to consider "how multiple, but somehow different, qualitative measures might 
simultaneously be true" (Silverman, 2001, p. 42). 
During the analysis process, the researcher continually iterated between theory and 
observations (as discussed in Section 3.4.5). Rival explanations were considered, and 
theories were developed, tested, discarded and refined throughout the process. The 
iterative process helped ensure that the researcher provided a valid account of the 
phenomena observed (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006a). Narratives of the case study 
findings were also written and presented to neutral researchers for criticism and 
challenging interpretations (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
I 
In writing case study reports, extracts of data have been presented where appropriate and 
detailed relevant contexts of observations are noted. It is helpful (and indeed inevitable) 
for readers to formulate their own ideas and feelings about the perspective of the people 
who have been studied (Bryman, 1988), as this will help enhance the reliability of the 
research (Silverman, 2001). It will also help enhance external validity, or in Lincoln and 
Guba's (1985) terms, `transferability', as it allows readers to use their own judgement to 
evaluate whether the findings are applicable to other settings familiar to them. 
Several scholars have suggested respondent validation (i. e. the feeding-back of the 
researcher's interpretation of the phenomenon to the subject of the study, in order to 
confirm the researcher's interpretation) as one of the ways to enhance research validity 
(e. g. Scapens, 1990; Yin, 2003). However, the researcher did not employ this strategy, 
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partly for practical reasons. Furthermore, as Abrams (1984, p. 8) argues, an "overt 
respondent validation is only possible if the results of the analysis are compatible with the 
self-image of the respondents" (quoted in Silverman, 2001, p. 236). This may offer 
interesting paths for further analysis, rather than helping validate the research report 
(Silverman, 2001). 
3.6.2. Generalisability 
In addition to validity and reliability of the research, another important issue of concern 
among researchers with regard to the value of research is generalisability of the research 
findings. Case study, particularly single case, research has often been criticised for its 
inability to generalise beyond specific case(s). The scientific value of case study research 
is usually challenged by the argument that results and conclusions of such studies are 
unconvincing because they cannot be replicated in other settings. It has been argued that 
the depth and insight of case research is gained at the expense of a loss in generality. 
The issue of generalisability is largely related to external validity of the research. The 
argument that research is valuable if its results can be replicated in other contexts is 
influenced by a positivistic approach which assumes an objective reality `out there', the 
properties of which can be discovered (and often then acted upon to `improve' how things 
are done), therefore, focusing on finding replication and reoccurrence of the phenomenon 
in different contexts. However, from the interpretive and constructivist perspective, 
meanings are temporary and changing; realities are being constructed and re-constructed. 
The search for generalisable findings and the application of these to `solve' problems are 
both activities doomed, if not to failure, at least to discover that the findings are limited 
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and the `solutions' temporary, as human action, reaction, thought and insight appropriate, 
distort and transform both into new forms and further mutations. 
As Hansen (2006) argues, the aim of constructivist research is to produce new insight into 
what the phenomenon means, and thus, to illustrate the fluid nature of practice; hence, 
replication as suggested by positivist researchers is not a focus and a `replication logic' is 
refused. In his opinion, from a constructivist point of view, the case study approach is 
powerful precisely because things are presented as being heterogeneous, relational and 
performative. Generality is only one of many ways knowledge can be generated. As 
Flyvbjerg (2001, p. 76) argues, "Formal generalization is only one of many ways by 
which people create and accumulate knowledge. That knowledge cannot be formally 
generalized does not mean that it cannot enter into the collective process of knowledge 
accumulation in a given field or in a society. " 
A number of accounting studies have shown that management accounting practices are 
highly context-specific. The specificity of theorising of qualitative field-based research is 
one of its strengths, rather than weakness (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006a). For this reason, 
in the present study, the researcher is concerned with how the empirical findings from the 
specific case may enhance existing knowledge in the field; generalisation of the findings 
to a wider population is not a major issue of concern. 
3.7. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has attempted to outline and explain the methodological and theoretical 
approach undertaken to investigate the process of change in MACSs and the performance 
measurement systems of the AgroBank. It has attempted to justify how and why the 
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research was carried out in a particular way. It has also explained how the issues of 
credibility and trustworthiness of the research are considered. 
In summary, this research is guided by an interpretive approach, but also engages with the 
constructivist debate about the ontological nature of the world. The research forms a 
qualitatively-orientated enquiry into the process of how an imported performance 
measurement idea, the BSC, is developed, constructed, modified and re-defined within a 
Thai financial services organisation. To trace the BSC construction and translation 
process over a period of time and within different organisational units, an intensive field- 
based research strategy is adopted. The methods employed to collect data include in- 
depth interview, documentation analysis and direct observation. Although data collected 
are largely qualitative in nature, quantitative data are not neglected. 
The analysis of the research is informed by the ANT approach. The focus of the analysis 
is on chains of events or actions associated with the BSC construction and translation 
process. Human and non-human actors or actants connected to the construction and 
translation of the BSC are captured in the analysis. By adopting the ANT approach, the 
present research examines accounting technologies `in the making' rather than studying 
`ready-made' technologies. In the research, the BSC is not taken for granted as a fixed 
object which is diffused into the organisation. Rather, attention is paid to the identities 
and meanings of the BSC as they emerge via relations of the BSC and other actors or 
actants in the tie. 
As argued in this chapter, the process of change in MACSs and the performance 
measurement systems always occurs in a context, and is open to `contingencies, in the 
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sense of interventions, actions and reactions by agents in locally specific nets. In order to 
fully understand how the MACSs are developed and used in practice, it is essential for the 
researcher to understand the historical, economic, social and organisational contexts (both 
general and local) in which the MACSs operate, as they may have a significant influence 
on the process of introduction, construction and translation of the new MACS. For this 
reason, in the next chapter, the development of the Thai economy and the Thai banking 
sector, the context in which the main case organisation is situated, is examined. 
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Chapter 4 
Overview of the Thai Banking Sector 
4.1. Introduction 
The preceding chapter discussed the methodological approach of the research. This 
research is based on a belief that management accounting practices are constructed; they 
are historically and culturally contingent phenomena. In order to fully understand how a 
particular management accounting initiative emerges in a particular organisational setting, 
it is important to understand the context in which the organisation is situated. This 
chapter, therefore, examines the context of the Thai economy and banking sector to 
provide an understanding of the context in which the Thai bank being researched 
operates. 
Financial services is an important industry in many economies. Financial institutions, 
particularly banks, play a vital role in managing and clearing payment systems, which are 
critical to financial systems and economies of the country (Goodhart et al., 1998). The 
performance of financial institutions can have a significant impact on other sectors and 
the economy as a whole, while the health of the economy can greatly affect the operations 
of financial institutions. As financial institutions and society have long been closely 
intertwined, many banks, particularly large banks, are often perceived as social 
institutions rather than business enterprises (Lowell, 1990). 
In today's global capitalism era, financial institutions, like many other businesses, are 
operating in a rapidly changing environment. Advanced technologies have lessened 
boundaries between countries, and as a result, financial systems in different countries 
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have become more closely connected. Inevitably, practices and systems within Thai 
financial services institutions are influenced by international practices and global 
financial systems. Organisational practices and control systems in different markets have 
converged, as firms are confronted by similar constraints in the worldwide market 
(Jensen, 1989). Nevertheless, differences across societies do still exist (Fligstein and 
Freeland, 1995). Organisational systems, practices and governance structures are 
politically and culturally distinctive, emerging from specific historical circumstances and 
conditions (Hamilton and Biggart, 1988; Fligstein, 1990). The institutional environment 
and interdependencies between firms and key institutions vary across societies, and these 
institutional contexts tend to influence the structure and behaviour of firms (Whitley, 
1992). Therefore, in order to fully understand management practices within the Thai 
financial services organisation, it is important to examine the structure and development 
of key institutions of the Thai economy and the Thai financial systems. 
In this chapter, the contextual situation, including an analysis of the Thai economy and 
development of the Thai banking sector, is discussed. The chapter explores the 
development of key institutions and the interactions of these institutions and financial 
services organisations within the Thai financial systems. The chapter is organised into 
four sections. Section 4.2 describes the development and overview of the Thai economy. 
Section 4.3 depicts the development and current situation of the Thai banking sector in 
particular, providing a brief history of the Thai banking sector. The context of financial 
liberalisation during the early 1990s, its impact on Thai financial systems and the 
operations of the Thai banks are discussed. The 1997 financial crisis, the most recent 
major turning point of the sector, and its consequences are analysed, and the current 
structure and situation of the sector is described. Section 4.4 summarises the 
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development of the Thai economy and financial systems, and explores how the 
development of the Thai economy and the Thai banking sector influences the structure 
and management practices of a Thai financial services organisation, the main case 
organisation of the current research. 
4.2. Overview of the Thai Economy 
The Thai economy is credit-based, relying heavily on credit from banks, particularly 
commercial banks. In Thailand, a significant capital market is only a recent phenomenon 
and one that is not yet well established. Capitalism in Thailand has traditionally been and 
in significant respects still is `crony' capitalism, where the patron-client relationship is 
deeply embedded in the relationships between business people and state bureaucrats, who 
often adopt policies in favour of banks in order to obtain a share of wealth to secure their 
political stability (Hewison, 1989). Also, financial institutions have tended to give credit 
based on personal relationships and business networks rather than the feasibility and 
prospects of the projects (Thanapornpun, 2002). In such ways, the development of 
capitalism in Thailand is heavily influenced by the social and political culture of the 
country. 
A further distinctive factor in this culture is the virtual absence of any influence or residue 
of western institutions and practices from a colonial past. Within Southeast Asia, 
Thailand is the only country not to have experienced western rule during the period of 
high imperialism. The maintenance of the formal independence of the country inevitably 
had a major impact on its social, political and economic development. One of the most 
important implications was the survival of the monarchy, which had far-reaching social 
and political implications for the country (Brown, 1988). Although the absolute 
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monarchy came to an end in 1932, when King Prajadhipok (Rama VII) was overthrown 
by a coup and a constitutional monarchy was established, the royal family has remained a 
significant influence in shaping the social and political situation of the country until 
today. As can be seen, Thai political life is more stable than it may seem to outsiders, 
despite the enduring heavy military involvement in the political affairs throughout most 
of Thai modern history; this is widely seen as being because the Thais are united by a 
popular monarchy (Warr and Nidhiprabha, 1996). 
4.2.1. Development of Thai Capitalism 
The development of capitalism in Thailand can be broadly classified into five periods: (1) 
pre-1855; (2) 1855 to 1950s - the Bowring Treaty and the beginning of modem Thai 
capitalism; (3) 1950s to 1980s - import substitution industrialisation; (4) 1980s to 1997 - 
export-oriented industrialisation; and (5) 1997 to present - financial crisis and beyond. 
4.2.1.1. Pre-1855: Sakdina System tem 
Prior to 1855, Thai society was structured under the Sakdina system, in which, according 
to the law, the king had rights over all land in the kingdom but the civil servants could 
also take up the land according to their status rank (Hewison, 1989). The system created 
two classes of society - the ruling class and the commoners. The ruling class consisted of 
royal family and civil servants who were primarily members of the royal family and the 
nobility. The commoners were bound to provide labour services for their masters for a 
certain duration each year. Alternatively, they could pay tax to avoid the required labour 
services. The ruling class earned their living from the collection of rents or from the use 
of land granted by the crown. During this period, Thai economic power was in the hands 
of the king, the royal family and a noble elite. 
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Under the Sakdina system, Chinese merchants were drawn into a subordinate relationship 
with the ruling class. These Chinese merchants had to rely on the Sakdina elite for access 
to surplus production, as the flood of European manufacturers into Thailand during the 
mid-nineteenth century prevented them from establishing their industrial interests 
(Brown, 1988). Despite being in a subordinate relation to the ruling class, Chinese 
immigrants played a major role in international trade. 
The Sakdina system changed significantly after the signing of the Bowring Treaty in 
1855, before eventually being abolished in the 1870s. Nevertheless, it significantly 
influenced the later development of political, social and economic structures and the 
development of modern capitalism in Thailand. 
4.2.1.2.1855 - 1950s: The Bowring Treaty and the Beginning of Modem Thai 
Capitalism 
The signing of the 1855 Bowring Treaty can be considered the beginning of modem 
capitalism in Thailand. It significantly altered the international trade pattern of Thailand, 
as it prompted Thailand to reform its administration in many ways and to open itself up to 
unrestricted foreign trade. This created opportunities for the country to expand its exports 
of rice, timber, rubber and tin, and these commodities became the main exports of 
Thailand until the 1960s (Hewison, 2002). During this period, the ruling class entered 
into alliances with foreign and Chinese businesses, and a supportive but competitive 
business system began to develop (Suehiro, 1989). By the late 1920s, some business 
groups, comprising principally Chinese merchants, had emerged. Their main businesses 
were concerned primarily with rice operations, but also sometimes were linked to other 
150 
businesses, including shipping, insurance, banking, warehousing and general importing 
(Dixon, 1999). 
In the 1920s and 1930s, domestic and international events brought dramatic changes. 
Thailand experienced its first financial crisis in 1919-1922 when there was a significant 
global depression following the end of the First World War. During this period, the 
international price of silver increased dramatically; consequently, the value of the 
country's silver coins rose beyond its face value, leading people to melt down coins for 
export (Warr and Nidhiprabha, 1996). The government was in serious financial trouble, 
which worsened with the Great Depression in 1929. The government's revenue dropped 
from 107 million Baht in 1929-1930, to 79 million Baht in 1931-1932 (Warr and 
Nidhiprabha, 1996). The financial crisis was one of the major reasons leading many 
bureaucratic elites to lose confidence in the monarchy's government. In 1932, a coalition 
of bureaucratic elites and commoners, who were economic nationalists and opposed to 
the monarchy and its state, seized the state and established constitutional rule. Thereafter, 
Thailand has been governed under a constitutional monarchy system. This significant 
change in the Thai political system has also led to substantial changes in the social and 
economic development of the country. 
The new government began to take direct involvement in the development and control of 
the economy. In 1933, a national economic plan was developed, with emphasis on the 
central role of the state in controlling land and developing infrastructure and industry 
(Dixon, 1999). From the mid-1930s to mid-1940s, many state-owned enterprises were 
established, which were involved in various activities, including the railway, power and 
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water supplies, the manufacture of cigarettes, paper, textiles, soap, glass, silk and gunny 
sacks, and the distilling and processing of cassava, rubber and sugar (Dixon, 1999). 
Many economic measures introduced in the 1930s contained strong nationalistic elements 
with attempts to reduce the influence of Chinese business. However, despite the 
dominance of nationalism in the economic debate, Chinese migrant families in Thailand 
were able still to fit into the society and were not subject to social and economic 
discrimination, unlike the Chinese community in many other Southeast Asian countries. 
Phongpaichit and Baker (1996) argue that Chinese merchants were able to continue their 
trading activities without much discrimination partly due to the fact that Thailand had 
never been colonised by western powers. In many other countries, nationalists viewed 
the Chinese migrant merchants as collaborating in colonial exploitation; they, therefore, 
attempted to expel the Chinese community together with the colonial rulers. Since 
Thailand had no colonial rule, they argue that nationalist politicians in Thailand did not 
have the same emotional popular support from local citizens as the nationalists in colonial 
territories. By the 1950s, the nationalistic policies were being gradually abandoned 
(Dixon, 1999). 
From the 1940s, the Chinese migrants began to set up business syndicates, which later 
dominated Thai business over the next half century. The Chinese merchants grew 
wealthier on the new business opportunities. At the same time, their relationships with 
the nationalist politicians became closer as the politicians sought wealth support to build 
up their political power, whilst Chinese entrepreneurs, in turn, received privileges in 
many business opportunities from the politicians (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1996). 
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4.2.1.3.1950s - 1980s: Import Substitution Industrialisation 
In 1957, there was another military coup, which brought significant changes to Thai 
political, social and economic development. The new government, under the lead of 
General Sarit Thanarat, strongly emphasised economic development and promoted 
private investment. The government shifted its role from being directly involved in the 
operations of state enterprises to focusing on developing the infrastructure needed for 
economic development, and concurrently promoting private investments (Hewison, 
2002). Most of the state enterprises established during the 1930s and 1940s, with the 
exception of infrastructure companies, were closed down or sold off during the mid- 
1950s (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1996). 19 To support the development during this period, 
a number of organisations were established, including the Board of Investment and the 
organisation that later became the National Economic and Social Development Board 
(Hewison, 2002). 
Under the Sarit government, the Thai international trade pattern also changed rapidly 
from that of a relatively backward exporter of agricultural products to that of an 
economically progressive state with exports dominated by manufactured goods and 
services (Warr, 1993). The manufacturing sector's contribution to gross domestic 
product (GDP) started to grow (see Figure 4.1). As with other developing countries, 
Thailand favoured product market policies which implied taxation on agriculture and 
subsidised industry. The government also implemented a number of measures to protect 
some parts of the manufacturing sector. 
19 Most of the state enterprises did not operate efficiently. However, it appears that they were closed down 
primarily for non-economic reasons, e. g. due to the strong recommendations of US advisors, who argued 
that state capitalism was dangerously socialist (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1996). 
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Figure 4.1: Share of GDP of agriculture, manufacturing, and service sector, 1951-1994 (Dixon, 1999, p. 10) 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, a growing number of conglomerates, which later 
dominated the Thai urban economy, appeared. These conglomerates were established by 
groups of Chinese entrepreneurs, many of whom also had banking businesses or were 
closely associated with families which owned commercial banks (Hewison, 1989). The 
leading Chinese merchant families cooperated with each other to foster the immigrant 
community. Over the years, the connections between business families became tighter 
and more complex. As Phongpaichit and Baker (1996) observe, by the late 1970s, there 
were approximately 30 groups of conglomerates which had interests in more than 800 
companies. A network of control among these Chinese conglomerates was also tightened 
through `business marriages', as many Chinese families tended to be very large, 
providing plenty of opportunities for `business marriages' (Hewison, 1989). 
4.2.1.4.1980s - 1997: Export-Oriented Industrialisation 
While the strategy of agricultural expansion and import substitution policies worked well 
for three decades, in the 1970s, the conglomerates began to pressure the government to 
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undertake a manufactured-export-led strategy, following the pattern of the Four Tigers - 
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1996). Many 
technocrats also started to worry about the limitations of the agriculture-led strategy. 
However, despite pressures from businessmen and technocrats, the government still 
maintained the import-substitution policies until the economic downturn in the 1980s. 
Economic circumstances began to change from the late 1970s. The prices of agricultural 
commodities started to decline; also, the value of the Thai currency, the Baht, being tied 
to the US dollar, began to increase, making Thailand's exports less attractive (Hewison, 
2002). The government attempted to stabilise the economy through rigid deflation; 
however, the high interest rates, in turn, provoked a major business crisis. As 
Phongpaichit and Baker (1996) observe, in 1984, one bank crashed and three had to be 
bailed out. 22 finance companies went out of business and another 25 had to be rescued 
by a `lifeboat' scheme. Many large conglomerates faced financial difficulties, while 
thousands of smaller companies went bankrupt. 
Triggered by the crisis, the government perceived a need to shift the economic strategy to 
a manufactured-export orientation in order to utilise the advantage of cheap labour to 
produce commodities for the world market (Hewison, 2002). A dual track approach (i. e. 
blocking imports and promoting exports) was pursued (Talerngsri and Vonkhorporn, 
2005). The major exports of the country shifted from rice and other agricultural 
commodities to labour intensive manufactures (see Figure 4.2). 
155 
90 
80 
70 
60 Agriculture 
50 -z. - Fishing 
ä 40 -a - Mining 
30 -3ý Manufacturing 
20 
10 
0 
N°ß'10 Nc) NI)N°)ýbý N°b NQ, 
Year 
Figure 4.2: Composition of export earnings in percentage (Dixon, 1999, p. 5) 
I)Liring the 1980s, significant growth in the number of factories in Thailand can he 
observed. This was not only due to the shift in economic policy, hut also a result of the 
decline of Japan's comparative advantage in manufacturing and the global trend towards 
the `un-bundling' of manufacture processes; many Japanese firms started to un-bundle 
their manufacturing process and offshore labour-intensive stages of' production to nearby 
East Asian nations (Baldwin, 2006). Such a strategy was later I6lIowcd by Taiwan, 
Korea, Singapore and I long Kong. As a consequence, a number of manuticturing plants 
were built in less developed countries in East Asia, including'I'hailaiid. 
During this period, the share of GDP from the manufacturing sector increased 
signiIicantly, and in the mid-1980s, it overtook that from agriculture (Warr, 1993). As tier 
the share of GDP fron services, there was scarcely any change over these years (sec 
Figure 4.1). In terms of' employment structure, the share of* e mploynment in the 
agricultural sector also declined but the share of employment in the service sector 
increased significantly (see Figure 4.3). Despite a decline in (ii)P and employment in the 
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agricultural sector, agriculture still provided the benefits of' employment and self- 
sufficiency in rural areas. In addition, agribusiness, both privately and governnment- 
owned, continued to expand. 
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Figure 4.3: Structure of employment in Thailand, 1960-1994 (Dixon, 1999, p. 12) 
Growth during this period was predominantly driven by the private sector (Ilewison, 
2002). Foreign investment also increased substantially. Between I986 and 1990, 
Thailand stood out as one of the fastest growing economics in the world, with an average 
real GDP growth rate of 11.5 percent (Talcrngsri and Vonkhorporn, 2005). l lowcvcr, tile 
economic situation ofThailand changed significantly in 1997. 
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4.2.1.5.1997 to Present: Financial Crisis and Beyond 
In 1997, a financial crisis struck East Asia, Thailand being the first country to face this 
financial shock. 20 Thailand experienced both currency turmoil and serious banking 
problems. On 2nd of July, the government abolished the fixed exchange rate system21 and 
announced the managed float system, resulting in an immediate drastic decrease in the 
value of the Thai Baht. By the end of December, the Baht, which was traded at 24 to 1 
US dollar under the fixed regime, had dropped to 47 Baht to 1 US dollar (Brimmer, 
1998). From early July to the end of December, the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) 
index also declined dramatically from 125 to 30 (Brimmer, 1998). 
The devaluation of the Baht marked the beginning of a downturn in the economy. Many 
local companies, which borrowed from overseas without hedging for exchange rate 
movements, fell into serious financial trouble. During the crisis, the real GDP growth 
rate went negative, dropping to -1.4 percent in 1997 and -10.5 percent in 1998 (see Figure 
4.4). The Thai government had little choice but to accept the US$17 billion rescue 
package from the IMF. The IMF, and other international organisations, pressured the 
government to undertake a range of policy and institutional reforms, including 
privatisation, increased access for foreign investors, new laws on bankruptcy and 
foreclosure and good governance practices (Hamilton-Hart, 2002). A large number of 
foreign consultants became involved in the reform programmes. 
20 There have been a number of explanations for the 1997 crisis, which are discussed in more detail in 
Section 4.3.2.2. 
21 In 1955, the Bank of Thailand adopted the fixed exchange rate system, and Baht currency was pegged to 
the US dollar. In 1984, the exchange rate system was officially changed to a 'flexible exchange rate 
system', where the Baht was tied to a basket of currencies; the basket was dominated by the US dollar 
(War, 1993). 
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Figure 4.4: Real GDP growth, 1990-2004 (Thailand Development Research Institute, 2005, p. 21) 
Despite the major crisis, the Thai government still continued to implement the market- 
oriented ref nii programmes. The government also adopted various measures to reduce 
or eliminate trade and investment harriers in order to integrate "I hailand more into the 
global economy ("Calerngsri and Vonkhorporn, 2005). 
4.3. Development of the Thai Financial System and Thai Banking Sector 
At a broad level, the Thai financial system comprises Tour major constituents 
commercial banks; capital markets; state-owned specialised financial institutions; and 
non-bank financial intermediaries which include finance companies, credit foncicr" 
companies, life insurance companies and co-operatives. Among these constituents, 
commercial banks are the oldest and largest part in the system, accounting fi)r the largest 
component in terms of total assets, credit extended and savings mobilised (Warr, 1993). 
The development of capital markets is still in its infancy; the Stock Exchange of"I'hailand 
(SET) only started its operation in 1975. Although many large companies have begun to 
22 Credit foncier is a financial institution providing mortgage loans 
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raise their finance through capital markets, commercial banks still remain the major 
source of capital. 
During the previous decade, substantial changes in the Thai financial system can be 
observed. The 1997 financial crisis wiped out most of the finance companies, and the 
banking sector, which was highly protected, became more opened to new entrants. In 
addition, state-owned specialised financial institutions (SFIs) started to play an 
increasingly important role in providing credit for wider groups of customers. Although 
SFIs tend to focus on specific customer groups largely not of major interest to 
commercial banks, some of the SFIs have recently pursued a more pro-active strategy, 
attempting to expand their operations to commercial areas. 
In the Thai banking sector, the major regulators are the Ministry of Finance and the Bank 
of Thailand (the central bank). For commercial banks, finance and credit foncier 
companies, the central bank acts as a sole regulator, whereas state-owned SFIs are 
supervised and regulated by both the Ministry of Finance and the central bank. Other 
ministries are also involved in the supervision of some of the SFIs, such as the Small and 
Medium Enterprise Development Bank of Thailand. 
4.3.1. A Brief History of the Thai Banking Sector Prior to the 1997 Financial 
Crisis 
The modem banking system in Thailand was started by westerners. It began in 1888, 
when the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation established its first branch in 
the country. This was followed by the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China in 
1894, and the Banque de L'Indochine in 1897 (Chaiyasoot, 1993). The first indigenous 
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local bank, the Siam Commercial Bank, was established in 1906 by Prince Mahisra Raj 
Haruetai, the Minister of Finance at the time. His initiative in establishing the local bank 
came primarily from two major concerns - (1) the inadequacy of banking facilities for 
non-European people; and (2) the dominance of British banks in the exchange business in 
Bangkok which threatened to harm Thai political sovereignty (Brown, 1988). Following 
the establishment of the Siam Commercial Bank, other, primarily Chinese, local banks 
were founded to support the Chinese rice milling and export business to China. Despite 
the establishment of local banks, European banks continued to dominate trade finance. 
The European banks tended to employ local people, especially Chinese businessmen, as 
their partners, due to the fact that the European bankers had limited knowledge of local 
business conditions and languages (Chaiyasoot, 1993). The European banks prospered 
under this system until the 1940s. 
In 1942, during the Second World War, Thailand was occupied by Japan, and all foreign 
banks, with the exception of the Japanese, were forced to suspend their operations 
(Phongpaichit and Baker, 1996). This led to the end of the control of the European banks 
in the Thai banking system. In 1944, as the war's tide turned, nine Chinese business 
families set up a partnership to exploit the opportunity to establish new commercial 
banks, and four of these Chinese-owned local commercial banks came to dominate trade 
financing during this period (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1996). 
In 1955, the Thai cabinet passed a decree to restrain the approval of new banks, which 
made it more difficult for local businessmen to acquire a licence. In addition, foreign 
banks were not allowed to open new banks if their countries already had a banking 
business in Thailand. The regulations which protected the industry from the new entrants 
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provided an opportunity for the existing players to expand their businesses without 
serious competition (Chaiyasoot, 1993). The existing large commercial banks enjoyed 
substantial growth. The six largest banks - four Chinese-owned, one state-owned, and 
one controlled by the royal family - were able to increase their market share significantly. 
In 1967, these banks controlled almost 62 percent of the total commercial bank assets, 
and this increased to 68 percent in 1972 and to more than 75 percent in 1983 (Hewison, 
1989). 
Due to the increasing concentration in the market, the government introduced a policy to 
encourage the entry of more finance companies in the early 1970s in order to place 
stronger competitive pressure on the commercial banks. Although the number of 
investment, securities and finance companies increased to 113 in 1977 (Hewison, 1989), 
the policy did not work well, as many of the finance companies were owned by the 
commercial banks (Chaiyasoot, 1993). 
In addition to market concentration, there was ownership concentration within the local 
banks. In most of the major domestic commercial banks, ownership was concentrated 
among a group of people from the same family. In order to diversify bank ownership, the 
government amended the Commercial Banking Act B. E. 2505, making it illegal for a 
shareholder to hold more than 5 percent of the total shares in a particular bank 
(Chaiyasoot, 1993). In addition, the Stock Exchange was used as a means to reduce 
ownership concentration by limiting the number of shares a person may hold 
(Phongpaichit and Baker, 1996). Despite an increase in the number of shareholders 
resulting from the new regulations, little was changed in terms of control within the 
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banks, as former major shareholders were still able to use other people and their affiliated 
companies to buy new shares, enabling them to retain control (Chaiyasoot, 1993). 
The Chinese banking families did not focus only on banking business; they also expanded 
their investments to other businesses. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, banking families 
established a large number of conglomerates. By 1979,295 companies, conducting a 
wide range of businesses including finance, trade and manufacture, were established by 
the four major Chinese-owned local banks (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1996). The 
commercial banks not only provided capital for these conglomerates, but also acted like 
informal chambers of commerce and business consultants for the conglomerates of their 
groups. These commercial banks also facilitated deals, found overseas contacts through 
their networks and managed political relations for their conglomerates (Phongpaichit and 
Baker, 1996). 
In the mid-1970s, tensions between bankers and politicians began to emerge. The general 
public, led by groups of students and academics, started to criticise banks for considering 
profits rather than the best interests of society. Such criticisms led to revisions in 
financial regulations in 1979, including the limitation of commercial bank investments in 
other businesses (Hewison, 1989). As a result of the new regulations and for economic 
reasons, banks started to divest themselves of large, direct holdings in conglomerates. 
Although there was a change in terms of direct ownership between banks and other 
business enterprises, the culture of relying heavily on personal relationships when 
considering loan applications still remained (Wisitsora-at, 2001). 
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During the late 1980s and 1990s, the government continued to fin-thcr break down the 
monopoly of the local commercial banks. The government attempted to widen the capital 
market and legalised offshore banking, so that companies could get access to other 
sources of funds. Although these mechanisms might have helped reduce the market 
concentration, local commercial banks have played a crucial role in the Thai economy, 
and the Thai financial structure has remained in the iörm of' a credit-based system (i. e. 
banks are the major sources of capital for companies) until the present day (Phongpaichit 
and Baker, 1996; see Figure 4.5). 
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Figure 4.5: Percentage of credit extended by various groups of financial institutions, 1992-2002 
(Subhaswasdikul and Nakornthab, 2003, p. 8) 
(Diven this development within the 'l'hai financial services industry, it is understandable 
why the Thai financial services sector was dominated by local commercial hanks. these 
commercial banks operated in a cartel structure, loosely organised under the Thai Rankers 
Association. 23 Important decisions regarding interest rates and other price-setting 
2 The Thai Bankers Association was founded in 1958 by the 15 commercial banks at the tinmc. 
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decisions in the money market were influenced by the four large commercial banks 
through the Thai Bankers Association (Warr and Nidhiprabha, 1996). They collectively 
set the standard rates for service charges and loan rates, prompting interest rates to 
respond slowly to market conditions. Commercial banks also maintained strong linkages 
with politico-bureaucrats, largely through marriage and/or seats on the boards (Hewison, 
1989). As in many other countries in Asia, lending practice concentrated on collateral 
more than on an analysis of cash flows. Personal guarantees from owners and directors of 
the borrowing entities were also common (Wisitsora-At, 2001). 
4.3.2. Financial Liberalisation, Financial Crisis and Reforms 
Thai financial systems were highly protected and remained closed for many years. 
Foreign borrowing was restricted and capital inflows were controlled. However, with the 
rapid economic development and globalisation process during the early 1990s, Thailand 
started to deregulate its financial systems and banking sector. The stated objectives of 
Thai financial liberalisation were to "increase competition in the local financial system in 
order to achieve higher efficiency in savings mobilization, credits allocation, and 
financial service activities expansion, to support rapid growth of the Thai economy as 
well as to develop Thailand to become the financial center of the region" (Chantip et al., 
1995, p. 2). The financial liberalisation and the subsequent financial crisis in 1997 have 
had a major role in triggering the substantial changes that have taken place over the past 
two decades in Thai financial systems and in the banking sector as a whole. 
4.3.2.1. Financial Liberalisation 
Thailand took its first major step towards liberalising its financial systems by accepting 
Article 8 of the IMF's Articles of Agreement in 1990. The acceptance of the Article was 
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followed by a series of deregulatory measures in the financial systems. The central bank 
gradually lifted interest rate ceilings, starting from interest rate ceilings on time deposits 
with a maturity of more than one year, in 1989. In 1990, the relaxation was extended to 
time deposits of one year or less, and in 1992 all interest rate ceilings were abolished 
(Leightner and Lovell, 1998). The government also further opened the financial markets 
in 1993 by establishing Bangkok International Banking Facilities (BIBF) as an offshore 
banking centre to facilitate foreign capital flows. Under the BIBF scheme, qualifying 
banks were allowed to provide international banking services (Siamwalla, 2001). The 
relatively high domestic interest rates, allied to the global trend towards capital flows into 
emerging market economies and the establishment of the BIBF, led to a great flow of 
foreign capital into Thailand (Wattanagase, 2001; see Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1: Thailand's external debt, 1990-2001 
End of year Short-term external debt Total external debt 
Million Baht As % of total 
external debt 
Million Baht As % of GDP 
1990 10.417 35.5432 29.308 
1991 15.391 40.63309 37.878 
1992 18.914 43.35985 43.621 
1993 22.634 43.43754 52.107 41.68726 
1994 29.179 44.98281 64.867 44.95758 
1995 52.398 51.96565 100.832 60.02388 
1996 47.743 43.90484 108.742 59.7847 
1997 38.294 35.04338 109.276 69.37696 
1998 28.44 27.06973 105.062 93.05842 
1999 19.539 20.55633 95.051 77.66377 
2000 14.694 18.43317 79.715 65.18584 
2001 13.37 19.85152 67.35 58.72762 
Source: Charoenseang and Manakit (2002, p. 601) 
While financial liberalisation brought increasing opportunity and freedom to local 
financial institutions, it also created a more competitive environment within the financial 
services sector. Domestic banks had to compete with foreign capital for the financing of 
domestic projects. In addition, the central bank widened the scope of activities that 
166 
finance and security companies could undertake so that they encroached increasingly on 
the traditional terrain of commercial banks' activities. Thus, commercial banks faced 
increasing competition among themselves as well as from almost a hundred finance and 
securities companies. Confronted with new opportunities to make profits but, at the same 
time, increased competition from new entrants, many local banks were pressured to take 
on higher, and sometimes, in retrospect, excessive risks in order to earn as much profit as 
they could whilst they were still able (Leightner and Lovell, 1998). 
During the first period of financial liberalisation, the underlying economic strength and 
infrastructure were not yet well-established, posing threats to the Thai financial markets 
(Watanagase, 2001). The regime of financial regulation and the supervision of the 
regulators were also weak (Charoenseang and Manakit, 2002). Financial liberalisation 
without a sound economic infrastructure and adequate regulatory systems was seen in 
retrospect as one of the major internal factors leading to Thailand's financial crisis in 
1997. 
4.3.2.2. The 1997 Financial Crisis 
As discussed in Section 4.2.1.5, in 1997, Thailand was hit by one of the most serious 
crises in its history. Many factors contributed to the crisis, including weak regulations, a 
mismatch of sources and uses of funds, and the un-hedged foreign currency borrowings of 
local companies. As discussed in Section 4.3.2.1, during the period of financial 
liberalisation, there were strong capital inflows into the Thai financial system, as into 
other emerging markets. However, there was no prudent limit on loan concentration, 
leading to an overinvestment in some risky sectors, such as real estate (Charoenseang and 
Manakit, 2002). Moreover, banks were pressured by shareholders to pay attractive 
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dividends; they therefore tended to invest in high risk projects with the expectation of 
high profits (Watanagase, 2001). In addition, as commonly found in other Asian 
countries, 1Iiai hanks tended to judge borrowers by their connections, particularly 
political connections, rather than rating their creditworthiness (Wisitsora-At, 2001). As 
bank lending practices were mainly collateral-based, cash flow or project feasibility 
analyses received less attention (Watanagase, 2001). Furthermore, during financial 
liberalisation, many companies borrowed money from overseas without hedging for any 
foreign exchange risks, as the exchange rate was fixed at that time. After the government 
announced the abolition of' the fixed exchange rate regime, the value of the Habt fell 
sharply, intensifying the debt problems among many Thal corporations. Foreign 
investors lost confidence and pulled capital out ot'thc country. 
With the sharp decline in the Thai economy, many companies fcll into serious financial 
difficulties. As a consequence, non-pertiorming loans increased substantially (see Figure 
4.6). Banks and other financial institutions faced severe problenms, needing to increase 
their capital to make up for the deteriorating assets (Siamwalla, 2000). In many cases, 
foreign capital was sought, while in other cases, the government had to get involved. 
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Figure 4.6: Non-performing loans in Thai financial institutions as percentage of their outstanding loans 
(Sianialla, 2000, p. 9) 
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4.3.2.3. Financial Reforms 
The financial crisis in 1997 led to substantial changes in Thai financial systems and the 
Thai banking industry. As discussed in Section 4.2.1.5, Thailand accepted the rescue 
programme from the IMF, which required the government to undertake significant 
reforms to restore and strengthen the stability of the financial systems. Reforms relating 
to the financial services and banking sector included the closure of non-viable banks and 
other financial institutions, as well as mergers among financial institutions, and regulatory 
changes. 
During the crisis, the government intervened and took seven struggling banks into state 
ownership; some of them were later sold to foreign investors, while two of them were 
closed permanently in 1998 (Chudasri, 2002). In addition to mergers and closures of 
commercial banks, 16 finance companies had their operations suspended in June 1997, 
with another 42 being suspended in August 1997; later in December 1997,56 out of the 
58 suspended companies were closed permanently (Charoenseang and Manakit, 2002). 
After 1997, consolidations among struggling financial institutions continued. Many 
large, surviving banks also sought foreign partnerships (see Figure 4.7). In these large 
commercial banks, the families still retained management control, although family 
ownership was diluted (Hewison, 2002). 
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Figure 4.7: Re-organisation of the Thai commercial banks (Kubo, 2006, p. 329) 
Since the financial crisis, foreign investors have come to play an important role in the 
Thai banking industry, and have been able to enhance their roles in Thai financial systems 
due to the changes in the regulations on foreign ownership after the crisis. Prior to the 
crisis, foreign investors were allowed to hold no more than 25 percent of the total shares 
of the commercial banks. This was increased to 49 percent under the new regulations. In 
addition, for a period of ten years after the crisis, foreign banks were allowed to take full 
ownership in the existing domestic banks. After ten years, they would not be required to 
divest their shares, but they would not be allowed to acquire more shares if they held 
more than 49 percent of total shares. Such changes in regulations arose out of the need 
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for recapitalisation of the local financial institutions when insufficient domestic capital 
was available. 
Under the new Financial Sector Master Plan, non-bank financial institutions were also 
encouraged to merge to set up restricted-licence banks, which could be further upgraded 
to become full commercial banks at a later stage (Watanagase, 2001). Mergers among 
non-bank financial institutions and the upgrade of non-bank financial institutions have led 
to a number of new entrants into the banking industry as compared to the previous two 
decades when new entrants were rare 24 
It can be seen that since the financial crisis, the competitive environment in the Thai 
banking sector has changed significantly. Changes in ownership and new entrants are 
among the important changes. While foreign banks focused their businesses on the 
wholesale market prior to the crisis, they can now exploit the existing extensive branch 
networks of the acquired domestic banks to expand their businesses in the retail market 
(Watanagase, 2001). With rapid changes in the regulatory and competitive environment, 
many banks have undertaken extensive changes within their organisations. 
Organisational re-structuring and re-engineering have been undertaken with an aim to 
improve efficiency and reduce operating costs. Redundancies have been made by various 
methods; new risk management and internal control systems have been implemented; and 
new technologies and automated machines have been introduced. 
24 From 1967 to 1993, there were only two commercial banks set up (Lawler and Siengthai, 1997). 
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4.3.3. Current Structure of the Thai Banking Sector and Future Challenges 
Through the reforms after the financial crisis, the banking sector has undergone 
substantial changes, both in terms of regulation and structure of the sector. Mergers 
among financial institutions and the upgrade of non-bank financial institutions to become 
commercial banks are still ongoing. At the end of 2005, there were 16 local commercial 
banks, 18 foreign banks, 10 finance companies, 4 credit foncier companies and 5 state- 
owned SFIs (see Table 4.2). 
Table 4.2: Number of financial institutions, 1992-2005 
1992 1996 2000 2004 2005 
Commercial banks 
Local banks 
Foreign banks 
15 
14 
15 
14 
13 
21 
12 
18 
16 
18 
Finance companies 92 91 21 18 10 
Credit foncier companies 18 12 10 5 4 
State-owned SFIs 5 6 6 5 5 
Source: Kubo (2006, p. 328) and the Bank of Thailand Supervision Report (2005, p. 29) 
Despite substantial changes in the structure and ownership of the Thai banking sector 
after the crisis, commercial banks remain major players in the Thai financial services 
sector (see Figures 4.8 and 4.9). The dominant market share of loans still remains 
concentrated among the six large local commercial banks, with their total loans 
accounting for approximately half of the whole financial sector (Kubo, 2006). 
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Figure 4.9: Market share of deposits of financial institutions, as of December 2005 (Source: Bank of 
Thailand supervision report, 2005, p. 29) 
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Although commercial banks remain the largest players in the "Thai banking industry, the 
growing role of'state-owned SFIs has been observable over the past fcw, years (see Figure 
4.5 and 4.10). This is partly a consequence of' the crisis, which led private financial 
institutions to become very cautious in extending new credit (Bank of* Thailand 
supervision report, 2002). It is also partly a result of the government's attempts to use the 
SFIs to serve as vehicles for a number of development policies and guvernmernt fiscal 
initiatives (Disyatat, 2005). The SFIs employ new financial technologies to develop and 
provide products to categories of' customers who are not of major interest to the private 
financial institutions. At the same time, many SI' is have expanded their operations onto 
the terrain of commercial banks. Although SFIs are owned by the government, generally 
the government does not support them through subsidies, except for loans on specific 
policy. Rather, SFIs tend to receive support in the firm of- exemptions from various 
taxes, holdings of more than one-third of government deposits, and receipt of government 
guarantees on their debt instruments and customer deposits (1)isyatat, 2005). 
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Figure 4.10: Outstanding values of' credit extended by financial institutions, stocks and bonds, 1988-2002 
(Subhaswasdikul and Nakornthab, 2003, p. 6) 
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Ever since the 1997 financial crisis, the Thai government and other agencies, such as the 
Bank of Thailand, have undertaken a number of measures and initiatives to restore and 
strengthen the financial system of the country. Various international standards and 
practices, for example, the Basel Capital Accord, are being implemented. The structure 
and competitive environment of the Thai banking sector are still changing substantially, 
something that has posed a number of challenges to Thai financial services organisations. 
Changes in the competitive and regulatory environment have occurred not only at the 
local, national level, but also at a global level. Boundaries between economies and the 
financial systems of different countries have been lessened as a result of globalisation, 
advanced technologies and the increasingly prominent roles of international organisations 
in the global financial systems. The move towards deregulation in many countries has 
also reduced the boundaries of activities between different types of financial institutions, 
leading non-banking financial institutions, which operate under different regulations and 
have different costs, to encroach on some traditional banking activities (Dietrich, 1996). 
Whilst some regulations have been relaxed, a number of new laws and regulations have 
been introduced, to ensure the stability and soundness of financial systems resulting from 
the financial distress in many countries over the past decade. 
Thailand, as a small and open economy with financial linkages to international financial 
markets, is pressured to conform to international standards and practices. Within the 
banking sector, financial crisis, reforms and globalisation have created both opportunities 
and challenges for local financial institutions. Advanced and rapidly changing 
technologies have also changed business practices substantially. Automated machines 
and e-banking have changed the cost structures of the banks. Technological advances 
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enable banks to better meet customers' demands, which tend to be increasingly 
sophisticated. On the other hand, changes in the competitive and regulatory environment 
also expose banks to various types of risk. These opportunities, challenges and pressures 
have forced banks to continually adapt themselves in order to survive. 
4.4. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has provided a historical analysis of the development of the Thai economy 
and financial system. The analysis has shown that the development of the socio-political 
and economic systems in Thailand has until recently been based largely on a patronage 
relationship; that is, politicians, state bureaucrats and businessmen are closely connected 
and tend to act in favour of each other. The Thai economy is a credit-based system where 
banks have long been the major source of capital for businesses. Up into the 1990s, the 
Thai banking sector was dominated by a small number of large local commercial banks, 
most of which are owned by Chinese business families. The sector has been highly 
protected, with the entrance of new players being restricted and competition from global 
competitors limited, due to restrictions on the opening of full branches in the country by 
foreign banks. The major domestic banks, despite competition with each other, co- 
operate in various ways. 
The Thai economy grew substantially during the 1980s and early 1990s. During this 
period, the economy, as well as the financial system, became more integrated into the 
global economy and financial system. However, this economic growth was disrupted by 
the financial crisis which hit Thailand in 1997, as a result of which, a number of reforms 
have been undertaken, leading to substantial changes in the competitive and regulatory 
environment in the financial services sector in Thailand. 
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Socio-political and economic development, as well as the development of the financial 
system in Thailand, have been significant influences on the business systems and 
management practices in Thai organisations. With the strong patronage relationship 
between banks, state bureaucrats and politicians, and tight connections between banks 
and other businesses, Thai banks have many traditional ways of conducting their 
business. However, changes in the financial system and banking sector during the past 
decade, resulting from the financial crisis and reforms, as well as globalisation, have 
inevitably had a significant impact on the structure and practices of financial services 
organisations. A number of western management practices have been brought into the 
local financial services organisations. Nevertheless, the western practices have not 
completely replaced the old traditional practices and systems, many of which remain in 
place alongside the new western management practices and systems. 
The AgroBank, the financial services organisation that is the main case organisation of 
the current research, is one of the organisations which is operating in this rapidly 
changing environment. As with other local financial institutions, the AgroBank has 
attempted to change its organisational structure, management practices and management 
systems. Although the AgroBank does not directly compete with commercial banks, 
changes in management practices and systems of other commercial banks have influenced 
management practices of the AgroBank significantly, due to the fact that it has started to 
expand its operations to the terrain of commercial banks. Also, the AgroBank is 
connected to other commercial banks in various ways, including connections through the 
Thai Bankers Association, the central bank and the Ministry of Finance. The next chapter 
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will go into the specific evolution of this bank in more detail, and consider its current 
situation within the developing world of banking in Thailand. 
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Chapter 5 
The AgroBank - From an Agricultural Lending Institution to a 
Development Bank 
5.1. Introduction 
The preceding chapter depicted the overview of the Thai economy and financial services 
sector in which the AgroBank, the organisation under investigation in the current 
research, is located. This chapter describes the development of the AgroBank, the 
organisation within which the BSC has been developed and disseminated. The AgroBank 
is a Thai state-owned SFI, which was originally set up as an agricultural bank, focusing 
on agricultural lending. Since it was founded, in 1966, the Ministry of Finance has 
remained the major shareholder of the bank with 99.84 percent of the total share (as of 
31st March 2005, Annual Report), while the remaining balance is held by agricultural 
cooperatives. 
Being a state-owned enterprise focusing almost exclusively on agricultural lending in its 
initial phase, the bank has developed many traditional and distinctive ways of doing 
business. At the same time, since the 1990s the bank has been attempting to expand its 
roles and scope of activities into the terrain of other commercial banks which are 
considered more competitive and efficient. In 2001, the bank officially proclaimed its 
intention to become a rural development bank, providing a full range of rural financial 
services. During the past few years, a number of changes have been undertaken, and a 
number of `modem' management tools commonly used in private commercial banks have 
been implemented. 
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Despite the adoption of innovative management tools, a number of traditional business 
and management practices still remain important. Thus, in order to understand how the 
bank operates today, it is important to explore the way in which the bank has evolved 
from a specialised agricultural financial institution to a rural development bank. This 
chapter, therefore, examines the history of the AgroBank, the development of the bank's 
organisational structure, and recent change initiatives implemented within the bank, with 
the aim of achieving an understanding of the organisational contexts within which the 
BSC development project has been carried out. 
This chapter is organised into 5 sections. Section 5.2 describes the historical background 
of the AgroBank, focusing on the bank's three phases of development. Section 5.3 
presents the current profile of the AgroBank. Section 5.4 discusses changes in the bank's 
organisational structure as well as the personnel structure, and Section 5.5 depicts a series 
of change initiatives recently undertaken by the bank. 
5.2. Historical Background 
The bank's history can be broadly classified into 3 periods, the first being from 1966 to 
1975, when the bank focused on channelling funds to the agricultural sector. During this 
period, the operations of the bank were restricted and capital was limited. The major 
products were short- and medium-term loans to farmers and agricultural co-operatives. 
From 1976 to 1992, the bank acquired more capital and substantially expanded its 
operations. The structure of the bank's capital started to shift; savings from customers 
were mobilised and capital from abroad was raised. With regard to its lending operations, 
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long-term loans and credit in kind25 were introduced, with emphasis being placed on retail 
lending to individual farmers. During this period, the bank's activities were still 
restricted to agricultural lending to farmers and their institutions for farming activities 
only. March 1993 could be considered one of the major turning points of the bank, when 
it finally succeeded in amending the Act governing its operations to permit lending for 
agricultural-related activities. From 1993 to the present, the bank has undertaken many 
steps in order to transform itself into a rural development bank that can compete in the 
globalised, competitive financial market. These changes include organisational 
restructuring, several successful attempts to amend the Act to allow more autonomy and 
wider scope of operations, the adoption of more prudent financial regulations to meet 
international standards, and the implementation of a number of `modern' management 
tools. 
5.2.1.1966-1975: Displacing Loans from the Informal to Formal Sector 
The AgroBank was originally set up with the objective of channelling funds to farmers 
and fanner institutions in rural areas. In similar vein to agricultural banks in other 
developing countries, the AgroBank was one of the major instruments for the government 
to implement its agricultural development policies. The bank provided short- and 
medium-term loans to farmers and their institutions with the aim of promoting farmers' 
careers in agriculture, increasing productivity and income. in rural areas, reducing 
farmers' reliance on private moneylenders and helping to alleviate rural poverty. 
In rural areas, people had difficulties getting access to capital from financial institutions; 
as a result, they had traditionally sought credit from informal sources, such as landlords, 
25 Credit in kind is a loan given to farmers in the form of farm inputs rather than cash. It was first 
introduced as one of the bank's products in 1980. 
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farm input suppliers, purchasers and illegal trusts. As these private moneylenders were 
not regulated by the central bank, they usually charged excessively high interest rates. 
The interest rate from informal credit providers was usually around 5 to 6 percent per 
month, in stark contrast to the rate from the formal lending sector, which was 12 percent 
per year (Siamwalla et al., 1990). Heavy debt problems from informal sources worsened 
rural poverty and increased inequalities in rural areas. For this reason, the government 
established the AgroBank with a mission to displace loans from informal sources to the 
formal sector. The major purpose of the bank's credit at this time was for farmers to 
release their debt burden from non-institutional lenders. 
During this period, operations of the AgroBank were restricted. The bank was allowed to 
lend only to farmers and farmer institutions, and only for activities directly related to 
farming. In addition, the bank was required to provide loans at governmentally 
determined interest rates which were set well below those of the commercial lenders. As 
noted in one of the bank's reports, 22 Years of [AgroBank] and Agricultural Development 
Work (p. 83), "the [AgroBank] is a financial institution that provides loans to farmers at 
the lowest interest rate". This was based on the government's belief that lack of capital 
was the reason for rural poverty, and the rural credit market comprised of mainly non- 
institutional lending monopolies, charging high rates of interest. It was essential, 
therefore, that the government helped people by setting up a financial institution to 
provide agriculture credit at interest rates lower than the market rates (Mingmaneenakin, 
1988) 26 
26 Some scholars have argued that sometimes the interest rates were set below those of the commercial ones 
for political reasons rather than out of a sincere desire to help the poor (Von Pischke, 1980 in Fox, 1985). 
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To determine the interest rates, the AgroBank used the average cost-pricing method; that 
is, costs of funds from all sources of its capital were averaged and a small mark-up was 
added to cover other administrative expenses. As the AgroBank obtained subsidised 
funds from various sources, including the central bank and the government, it was still 
able to make a small profit, although it charged customers at lower interest rates than 
those of the market. The interest rates charged to each customer were based on loan size 
rather than risks of the borrower. Higher interest rates were charged to larger loans and 
lower rates were charged to smaller loans under the principle of cross-subsidisation 
between borrower groups. 
As the AgroBank was required to provide loans at low interest rates, leaving it with little 
profit margin, the bank strictly supervised loans to prevent the incurrence of any costs 
from defaulting loans. Before the first loan was given out during the growing season of 
the crop, the bank's officer would go to the borrowers' village to examine their activities. 
For working capital loans, all borrowers were required to repay the principal when the 
loans were due, although in most cases, the loan contracts would be renewed within a 
month of their original due date. Borrowers who failed to repay the principal would be 
put on the `black list', despite the fact that they always paid interest. This requirement 
was for the bank's officers to monitor movement of the customers, even though it 
sometimes created problems for customers, as they needed to find money from other 
sources to pay back the principal if the due date did not accord with their harvest seasons. 
During this period, the bank placed emphasis on wholesale lending to farmer institutions 
and agricultural co-operatives, as farmer institutions usually carried fewer risks than 
individual farmers. However, to ensure that individual farmers, who tended not to have 
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land title documents to use as collateral for their loans, were able to obtain institutional 
loans, the bank initiated a peer monitoring system called a joint liability group for 
working capital loans with a maturity of less than one year. Under the joint liability loan 
concept, farmers formed a group of 5 to 30 people27 among those they knew and trusted, 
and the group was jointly liable for each member's loan. The loan repayment of each 
group member affected future access to loans for the entire group. Late or missed 
payments of individual members would have an impact on the credit rating of the group, 
and could affect the amount of subsequent loans of the group members. If the bank 
believed that the loan of any member of the group could not be recovered, the group as a 
whole would become ineligible for new loans. Through this system, the bank could 
improve the loan repayment rate with low administrative costs. Joint liability lending was 
successful, and has been one of the major lending practices of the bank until the present. 
During the first ten years of its operation, the AgroBank grew only moderately, primarily 
due to its limited funds. It established branches in 58 out of 71 provinces of Thailand. 
The bank did not attempt to raise finance from public savings partly because the costs 
from public deposits would be higher than costs of funds the bank could obtain from the 
government and the central bank. With its limited funds, it was necessary for the bank to 
ration its credit strictly, leaving low-income farmers unable to obtain loans. Therefore, 
there remained excess demand for institutional loans in rural areas. 
27 The average size of the joint liability group was 15 people. 
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5.2.2.1976-1992: Substantial Expansion, Savings Mobilisation, and Retail 
Customer-Focus 
From 1976, there was a rapid expansion in the AgroBank, following the Bank of 
Thailand's requirement for minimum agricultural lending to apply to all commercial 
banks. In 1975, the new government was placed under pressure to transfer resources to 
the rural areas. To this end, in 1976, it enforced, through the central bank, all commercial 
banks to increase their lending to farmers and farm households. Commercial banks were 
required to disburse agricultural loans of not less than 7 percent of the value of their 
deposits at the end of the financial year. If they were not able to lend this amount 
directly, they could deposit an equivalent amount with the AgroBank, which would pay 
them normal interest rates for deposit accounts and use the funds for its farmer lending 
operations. This policy fostered a substantial expansion of the AgroBank's operations. 
By the end of fiscal year 1983, the bank had 66 branches with 545 field offices operating 
in 680 districts throughout the country (Fox, 1985). More than two million farm families 
were registered as the bank's direct and indirect customers. 28 
In addition to higher capital raised through commercial banks, the government injected 
more capital into the bank, raising the bank's registered capital from 1,000 million Baht 
to 4,000 million Baht in 1976. In the same year, for the first time, the bank started to 
raise capital from abroad for its lending operations. Important sources of foreign funds 
included the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank. There was not as yet any significant interaction with conventional 
foreign commercial banks. 
28 Indirect customers are those who registered with the bank through farmer associations and agricultural 
cooperatives. 
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In the late 1970s, the bank recognised that default rates from loans given to agricultural 
co-operatives were high, due to the co-operatives' poor financial management. In 
contrast, performance of retail lending was noticeably better. In 1975, the repayment rate 
of lending stemming from loans to agricultural co-operatives was 48.22 percent, whereas 
the repayment rate of lending to individual farmers was 73.54 percent (Mingmaneenakin, 
1988). As a result, the bank shifted its focus from wholesale lending to retail lending 
through joint liability groups. The proportion of loans to individual farmers to total loans 
increased from 66.95 percent in 1976 to 71.82 percent and 82.16 percent in 1980 and 
1984 respectively (Mingmaneenakin, 1988). 
Despite the repayment rate of individual farmer lending being better than that of 
wholesale lending to agricultural co-operatives, the default rate was considered high. In 
1983, the bank conducted a survey to identify the reasons why customers did not repay 
their loans, and found that one of the major reasons was the customers' false assumption 
that the money was a government grant that they could retain (Mingmaneenakin, 1988). 
Management of the bank believed that this misunderstanding could be rectified if the 
bank encouraged more savings from customers, to make them aware that the money they 
borrowed was from public savings, rather than a government donation. 
At the same time, the bank attempted to rely less on the government's subsidised funds in 
order to have greater autonomy in its operations. Therefore, in 1988, the bank started 
mobilising public savings to adjust its capital structure. All customers applying for loans 
were encouraged to open a savings account with the bank, although it was not 
compulsory. Within a decade, the bank was able significantly to reduce its reliance on 
loans from domestic and foreign sources. The deposit to loan ratio of the bank increased 
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from 31 percent in 1986 to 73 percent in 1996 (Fitchett, 1999). Savings mobilisation has 
continued to be one of the major focuses of the bank to the present day. 29 
During this period, the bank expanded its product line to focus more on assistance to 
improve customers' capability and efficiency. The bank launched long-term loans and 
encouraged farmers to take them for long-term investment, such as purchasing livestock 
and farm machinery, planting perennial crops, and developing small-scale irrigation 
systems. In addition, the bank started to provide assistance to farmers in other forms. For 
example, in 1980, the bank introduced credit in the form of farm inputs, such as crop 
seeds and fertiliser. From the bank's perspective, this credit in kind would help farmers 
obtain high quality farm inputs at a lower price. The bank also began to use mass media 
to provide knowledge on modern farming methods to farmers, in order to promote the use 
of modern technology for farm production. In the bank's view, these additional supports 
would enhance farming production efficiency, which would eventually lead to the bank's 
better performance. 
In addition to providing assistance directly to farmers and farmer institutions, the bank 
started to engage in supporting a number of special government projects, such as the 
crop-pledging scheme, through its lending operations. Although the bank attempted to 
expand its activities to provide other assistance to farm households, its operations were 
still limited due to the Act governing the bank's operations which allowed the bank to 
lend only to farmers and their institutions for farming activities. 
29 At the end of March 2004, the bank had almost ten million savings accounts. The deposit-to-liability 
ratio reached 93 percent, while the deposit-to-loan ratio was more than 100 percent (Annual Report). 
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5.2.3.1993 to Present: Expanding the Scope of Activities and Becoming a 
Rural Development Bank 
1993 marked the bank's first successful step in attempting to amend the Act permitting 
the bank to expand its scope of operations. In March 1993, the AgroBank was authorised 
to provide loans for farming-related activities, such as agro-processing and marketing 
activities. Its operations were further expanded after another amendment to the Bank's 
Act in 1999, when the bank was permitted to provide financial assistance to farmers' 
family members for non-agricultural purposes, such as medical and educational expenses. 
This may be considered an early step taken by the bank to transform itself into a more 
diversified financial institution, providing a wide range of rural financial services, even 
before the Ministry of Finance officially proclaimed its intention to transform the 
AgroBank into a rural development bank in 2001. 
During this period, the bank had greater autonomy resulting from both the amendments to 
the Act and its greater reliance on internally-generated funds. However, at the same time, 
the bank was subject to tighter financial regulations. In 1998, the central bank took on a 
role as a second supervisory and regulatory body governing the bank's operations, in 
addition to the Ministry of Finance, which had long been the bank's only supervisory 
agency. In this new capacity, the central bank required the AgroBank to adopt a number 
of financial regulations that were applied to other commercial banks, in order to 
strengthen the bank's financial stability. One of the major tightened financial regulations 
concerned the provisioning rule. In the past, the bank was able to spread a provision of 
non-performing loans over ten years, in contrast to today, when the bank is required to 
reserve the full amount of non-performing loans within three years, that is, 40 percent in 
the first year, 70 percent in the second year and 100 percent in the third year. 
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Although the bank did not suffer significantly from the financial crisis in 1997 compared 
to other commercial banks, this regulation was important for it, since it needed to enhance 
its financial health and maintain its financial stability, and be seen to be doing so, 
particularly when it needed to make preparations to compete with global competitors that 
had recently started to enter the Thai financial market after the 1997 financial crisis. 
In addition to adopting internationally accepted financial regulations, the bank also 
changed its interest rate structure to be compatible with international practice. The 
progressive interest rate structure and the inherent cross-subsidies, where the interest rate 
increased according to loan size, were abolished and replaced by a minimum lending rate 
irrespective of loan size. The interest rates were now based on relevant risks carried by 
the borrower, rather than loan size. The bank also introduced a performance-related 
interest rate scheme, under which preferential rates were offered to borrowers with a good 
record. 
With regard to customer focus, during this period the bank expanded its client base from 
individual farmers through joint liability groups to enterprises of farmer groups. In 1999, 
the government initiated the One Tambon30 One Product (OTOP) project to promote co- 
operation among people in the local community to set up small enterprises to produce and 
market their agricultural produce and local materials; and in 2001, the Village and Urban 
Community Fund project was introduced to provide financial support for these 
enterprises. The programme has resulted in a development of many small and medium 
enterprises in rural areas. The AgroBank exploited its extensive branch network to 
extend its lending services to these micro-enterprises. The bank provided both financial 
30 Tambon is a local government unit, below district and province, in Thailand 
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assistance to the enterprises and village funds and knowledge on accounting, financial 
management and general management. An initiative to transform village funds into 
community banks with the AgroBank as their consultant has been undertaken. Currently, 
wholesale lending to farmers' enterprises has become the major focus of the bank's 
lending operations, partly due to the lower costs in the loan appraisal process compared to 
those incurred in lending to individual farmers. 
Over the 40 years of its operations, the AgroBank has gradually developed from being a 
small agricultural lending institution to being a large financial institution, providing a 
wide range of financial services to diverse groups of customers. Despite substantial 
changes in the bank's roles and operations, rural people still remain the focus of the bank, 
and the bank still remains a not-for-profit organisation. The corporate vision, value, 
administration principle and missions of the AgroBank can be seen in Figure 5.1, a figure 
which indicates, in addition to the continuance of traditional values such as the focus on 
farming and raising the quality of life in rural contexts, the adoption of more western or 
generic global business concerns. So for instance a focus in internal objectives of being 
`modern and efficient' is combined with an external focus on `clients (and) consumers', 
and wider external concerns such as communities, the environment and government 
policies, while the role of marketing is also now explicitly foregrounded. 
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Vision: 
To be a modem rural development bank concentrating on the uplifting of 
the farmers' and the people's quality of life 
Value 
Standing side-by-side and recognising the value of people 
Within the organisation 
f- Clients, consumers 
Sustainability 
Society, environment 
I Participation Knowledge 
Administration 
Principle 
SPARK 
r 
Accountability Respect 
Missions 
Provide the AgroBank with a new look as a modem and efficient organisation 
Set the organisation to be a constantly growing, stable and sustainable financial institution 
Build up and support the strength of the bank's clients and communities 
Systematically link up production with marketing 
Develop and support a standardised quality of products for clients and the general public 
Promote the production of alternative energy sources to help conserve the environment 
Be one of the key institutions which carries out missions set under government policies 
Figure 5.1: The AgroBank's vision, value, missions and administration principle (Annual Report) 
5.3. The Current Profile of the AgroBank 
Currently, the AgroBank is one of the largest state-owned SFIs. As of 315t of March 
2006, the AgroBank had total assets of 501,932 million Baht, which comprised 
outstanding loans of 421,701 million Baht. The bank also had total deposits of 431,401 
million Baht. For the fiscal year ending 31st March 2006, the bank made a net profit of 
1,765 million Baht from the revenue of 30,905 million Baht, which comprised interest 
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and non-interest revenue of 29,257 and 1,648 million Baht respectively. Over the past 
five years, the bank has had significant growth in terms of net profit, asset size, number of 
customers and deposits (see statistical highlights in Table 5.1). By the end of 2005,5.54 
million farm families or 95.68 percent of all farm families nationwide had access to credit 
services from the bank. Whilst 4.01 million farm families were registered as individual 
customers of the bank, 1.52 million families were members of agricultural cooperatives 
and 0.01 million families were members of farmer associations. Between fiscal years 
2002-2005, the performance of the AgroBank was ranked in the top five among state- 
owned enterprises, and among state-owned financial institutions, the bank was ranked in 
the top three. 31 
Table 5.1: Statistical highlights, Fiscal year 2001-2005 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Number of employees 12,955 13,130 13,267 13,209 12,889 
_ Number of provincial offices, branches and 
sub-branches 
660 664 667 669 923 
Number of field units 888 889 899 907 938 
Number of farmers registered as branch 
clients (Households) 
3,637,739 3,688,673 3,733,784 3,862,558 4,010,560 
Net profit (Million Baht) 554 660 961 1,645 1,765 
Total assets (Million Baht) 342,420 355,283 387,202 422,348 501,932 
Total loan outstanding (Million Baht) 282,469 289,096 322,000 378,853 421,701 
Deposits (Million Baht) 262,423 283,685 321,520 354 306 431,401 
Source: Annual Reports 
With regard to lending operations, the majority of credit services was provided to 
individual farmers. During fiscal year 2005,202,429 million Baht credits were given to 
individual customers, whereas 36,485 million and 177 million Baht credits were granted 
to agricultural cooperatives and farmer associations respectively. At the end of fiscal year 
2005, credits to individual farmers accounted for 81.86% of the total loan outstanding 
31 Details of the `state-owned enterprise performance evaluation programme' are discussed in Chapter 6, 
Section 6.2.2. 
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(see Figure 5.2). Among the credits given to individual farmers, crop farming activities 
represented the major proportion (see figure 5.3). In addition, a significant proportion of' 
the credits were extended under the government-secured loan projects (7.63`%, in fiscal 
year 2005). These extended credits were not given only to farmers and their families, but 
also to non-farmers (i. e. teachers and poor people). Loans classified under the `others' 
category, included those to the sugarcane and sugar indust y, loans to the Village and 
Urban Communities Fund, loans to non-farm micro enterprises and financial services 
provided under Islamic principles. 
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Figure 5.2: Outstanding loans (in million Baht) as of 31" of March 2006, classified by types of credit 
services (Annual Report) 
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production loans 
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Figure 5.3: Credit extended to individual farmers during the fiscal year 2005, classified by type of 
production (Annual Report) 
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As discussed in Section 5.2.2, the AgroBank has since 1988 attempted to mobilise 
savings from farmers. In recent years, the bank has also attempted to extend its deposits 
services to the general public, oflicial agencies and other state enterprises. As can be seen 
from "fable 5.1, the total deposits outstanding increased from 262,423 million Habt at the 
end of' fiscal year 2001, to 431,401 million Baht in fiscal year 2005. Deposits have 
become the bank's major source of operating funds (see Figure 5.4). 
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Figure 5.4: Composition of operating funds (in million Baht), Fiscal year 2005 (Annual Report) 
5.4. The AgroBank's Organisational Structure 
As a state-owned enterprise, public officials represent the majority of'the hank's Board of' 
Directors to ensure that the bank operates in the interest ot'the government. The Finance 
Minister is Chairman of the hoard, while representatives from the Ministry of'Agriculture 
and Cooperatives, the Ministry of Finance and Bank of Thailand are menmbers. 
Representatives from shareholder agricultural cooperatives are also on the hoard to 
represent the interest of the customers. 
As discussed in Section 5.2, the AgroBank has continually changed its roles and 
transformed itself' from an agricultural Icnding institution into a rural development bank. 
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To accommodate the new roles and activities of the organisation, the hank has also 
gradually restructured its organisation. The hank's internal organisational structure can 
be broadly classified into two levels, the corporate level at the head oil-ice in Bangkok, 
and the operational level which is implemented through provincial offices and branches 
reporting into those offices located in 76 provinces throughout the country. At the 
corporate level, the bank has recently restructured its organisation in line with the vision 
articulated in Figure 5.1 above, with an increasing focus on establishing relationships 
with external customers as w ell as developing its internal management and financial 
management systems. At the operational level, the hank has undertaken a re-structuring 
that reflects the same concerns, by decentralising many of its operations in order to 
accommodate the heterogeneous demands of clients in different regions of' the country. 
Management at the operational level has, in this respect, been gradually empowered, with 
both their autonomy and their accountability enhanced. At the same time, in common 
with many other government agencies, the bank uses a grade hierarchy system to 
structure its personnel system. Despite several attempts to abolish this system, it still 
remains at the bank's personnel structure. 
5.4.1. Changes in the Organisational Structure 
5.4.1.1. ('oi orate Level 
At the corporate level, over its forty years oi'the operations, the bank can he seen to have 
restructured its organisation incrementally, in the process increasing across time its 
strategic and external customer focus. A number of divisions and departments have been 
set up to provide financial assistance and knowledge support to customers. At the same 
time, the hank has increasingly emphasised internal management and development. 
Increasing importance has been given to improving its human resources, working 
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processes, information technology, management infornmation systems, and risk and 
financial management systems. 
5.4.1.1.1. Oýganisatioiiu/ Structure during 11w First 7e, r Ycears of Operations 
During the first ten years of AgroBank's operations, the organisation was structured into 
four departments - the loan department-, internal audit office, administrative department, - 
and banking and accounting department. The loan department was organised into two 
major divisions according to the customer groups, namely, the individual farmer loan 
division and institution loan division. The legal division was also under the supervision 
of the loan department. During this period, the operations of' the hank were still limited 
and the bank did not yet have many branches. Thus, branch administrative activities were 
carried out by the branch and representative division within the administrative 
department. 
5.4.1. I.?. Restructuring (luring the Substantial EM)tIlt. siun Phase 
During the second stage of the bank's development, from 1976 to 1992, the hank carried 
out organisational restructuring several times to meet the demands of growth in scale and 
scope, e. g. to accommodate new activities, products and responsibilities. Several new 
departments and divisions were established to oversee strategic and internal management 
issues generated by this growth. These new divisions included a planning division and 
human resources management division, both of which were set up in the fiscal year 1976 
and later upgraded to the planning department and personnel and organisation 
development department in fiscal year 1975 and 1986 respectively. The planning 
department undertook the expanded range of staff office functions required in a large- 
scale line-and-staff organisational structure, with research and evaluation, budgeting and 
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statistics, and work system development divisions being set up in 1978 to develop the 
bank's internal management systems and practices. A Corm of what might now be seen as 
a `strategic marketing' function was added in 1986, when the agricultural business 
promotion division was established under the supervision of the planning department. In 
the same year, the work system development division was transferred to the personnel 
and organisation development department which also supervised two newly established 
divisions the personnel management division and training division. In 1986, the growth 
in the significance of IT and IS functions was marked by the establishment of' an 
information processing centre to collect and analyse information for management 
purposes. 
In addition to departments and divisions established with the aim of improving strategic 
and internal management practices, a for-in of marketing focus appeared in 1976 as 
several departments and divisions were created along traditional marketing lines to 
develop products and services for customers, in addition to the existing loan products. In 
fiscal year 1976, a public relations department was also established to develop audio- 
visual educational materials to impart knowledge on farming developed by the hank to 
farmers in rural areas. Rather than being organised according to customer type, the loan 
department was re-organised according to geographical areas, that is, northern, 
northeastern, central and southern regions. After credit in kind was introduced as another 
product of the bank, the fanning supplies and equipment division was also established, 
under the supervision of the administrative department, to manage Lärm inputs supplied 
by the bank to farmer customers. 
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As the bank expanded its operations substantially during this period of sixteen years, it 
carried out another major restructuring in 1991 to accommodate the considerable growth 
that had followed the previous expansion, and to extend the scope of activities still 
further. Four loan administration divisions in the loan department were upgraded into 
four branch administration departments. As the bank started to engage in a number of 
special governmental projects, a special project department was established to oversee 
them, plus the new customer-facing activities which the bank was developing during this 
period, including savings promotion and agricultural business promotion. 
In addition, importance was not surprisingly placed on improving the hank's internal 
management systems, given the added complexity of its operations. A monitoring and 
evaluation division was established under the supervision of the planning department to 
closely monitor they performance of branches even in remote areas. The division was 
also responsible for monitoring the performance of important special governmental 
projects. The information processing centre was also upgraded from a division to a 
computer department. In addition, the administrative department had its roles reduced 
from providing knowledge and a number of products (e. g. credit in kind) to customers to 
managing general issues, such as premises management and vehicle services. The 
activities of developing and providing knowledge in the area of agricultural production 
and agricultural business were transferred to the planning department. 
5.4.1.1.3. Recent Organisational Restructuring 
During the third and most recent stage of' its development, the hink has undertaken a 
major organisational restructuring three times, in fiscal years 1998,2001 and 2004. The 
1998 restructuring focused primarily on financial management, partly due tu the financial 
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crisis in 1997 and partly because of the demands imposed as the central bank became its 
second regulator, bringing it more into line with the regulation of' commercial banks, as 
noted in section 5.2.3 above. The banking and accounting department was separated into 
two departments. The banking department supervised the banking, cash management, 
and savings promotion divisions, while the accounting department administered the asset 
accounting, accounting information processing and management accounting divisions. 
The treasury department was also established to oversee risk and financial management. 
In addition to increasing its focus on financial management, the hank developed a more 
explicit commitment to the development of its human resources, with the human resource 
development department being set up to be responsible for planning and organising 
training courses for organisational members. Moreover, as the bank began to expand its 
operations to provide credit for farnming-related activities, two new dicpartmcnts the 
personal loan and institutional loan departments - were established with a focus on 
product development. 
in fiscal year 2001, after the bank announced its aim of becoming a development hank, it 
created several departments to carry out development activities. The bank established the 
learning promotion department to replace the human resource development department 
with a dual remit, first to promote learning among people in rural areas and second to 
train banking staff on important issues for rural development. To complement this, a 
marketing promotion department was introduced to help farmer institutions enter into 
effective marketing negotiations. The learning promotion and the marketing promotion 
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departments operated closely with the Developnmcnt Institute, ` a semi-independent unit 
of' the AgroBank, to organise training courses on agricultural and rural development fier 
the hank's staff and its clients. 
Whilst customer and development activities were key strategic concerns for the hank 
during this period, Further improvements in its internal management functions were also 
undertaken. Several departments were established with responsibilities to enhance the 
bank's financial pertormance and internal management systems. For instance, the loan 
quality development department and the information technology department were set up 
to improve the bank's portfolio quality and information technology. I he loan quality 
development department was set up to 110cus on portfolio management, with the aim of 
reducing the number of non-performing loans, which had become increasingly 
problematic, particularly after the Thai financial crisis in 1997. Within the department, 
the Debt Moratorium Program Management Office was established to focus specifically 
on the loans under the Debt Suspension and Debt Reduction Programme, carried out 
according to governmental policy. To raise the strategic ef7cctivcness of' the use of' 
information technology, the hank integrated the organisation and methods development 
department with the computer technology department to term the information technology 
department. This department comprised six divisions: system innovation support, 
computer system, computer work system, information system, communication network, 
and analysis and methods, and was charged with the overall responsibility for improving 
the hank's information technology and management information systems. 
32 The Development Institute is the pseudonym of a non-profit organisation established in I994 by the 
foundation headed by the Agrol3ank's patron and first president. hhe institute acted as the training, research 
and consultancy arm of the Agrot3ank. It also played a significant role in building relationships between 
the AgroBank and other international organisations. It provided training workshops for foreign institutes 
which were interested in the agricultural lending and operations of the AgrolRank. 
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After the major restructuring in 2001, the bank did not undertake any more major 
restructuring until fiscal year 2004, `1 when it re-organised its operations into 7 working 
groups, and established a number of new departments within these groups, which further 
emphasised the development activities as well as financial management functions. This 
most recent development, analysed in more detail in Section 5.4.2 below (see also Figure 
5.5 for the organisation chart as at 31" March 2005), arguably demonstrates a move 
towards a core competence approach to strategy, maintaining an Operation (iroup to 
coordinate regional and branch administration, but turning all other key functions into 
distinct groups each with a core mission, some existing and some new, e. g. Customer and 
Rural Development, but also Income Development, Policy and Strategy, Special 
Activities, Supporting, and Management Support Groups. 
With regard to development activities, the customer and rural development department 
was established, to operate within the customer and rural development group, which was 
a new working group set up to carry out activities specifically related to customer 
development. The marketing support department, established in 2001, was incorporated 
as a division within the new customer and rural development department. The loan 
department was divided into the personal loan department and the institutional loan 
department, the former being organised according to loan type, that is, crop credit, 
livestock and fishery credit and non-lärm credit. This structure allowed bank staff to 
specialise in particular types of credit, as different types of loans required dif'fcrent skills 
and attention. 
13 Several minor restructurings were carried out during fiscal years 2002 and 2003. For example, the 
treasury department was established to replace the financial management department, and the risk 
management office was set up as a division under the department. The loan group was also renamed and 
integrated with the financial management banking services group to become the customer development and 
financial management and banking services group. 
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In addition to new departments established to support the development functions of' the 
organisation, other departments were created to carry out financial management and 
internal development activities. The new departments included the income and banking 
development department, which was established to replace the banking department, to 
focus on deposit services, Ice-based income, electronic banking, customer relations and 
the Islamic Lund. In addition, the risk management office was upgraded from a division 
under the treasury department to a department in its own right. A management 
department was also established to support top management's activities and to co- 
ordinate between the bank's top executives and the Board of Directors. Moreover, the 
learning promotion department, which was set up in the fiscal year 2001, was 
incorporated into the human resources department to locus on developing bank stall'only, 
while the customer and rural development department took over the responsibility of' 
supporting the learning of customers in rural areas. I-inally, the systems analysis and 
development division was transferred from the inti-mation technology department to the 
newly renamed policy and strategy department. 
5.4.1.2. Operational Level 
At the operational level, the bank gradually decentralised its operations and empowered 
the local managers to be more responsive to the heterogeneous demands of customers in 
different parts of the country. From the start of' its operations until 1997, the hank 
operated through a three-tier organisational structure, that is, field office,, branches and 
head office. Field offices operated at a district level and played an important role in 
outreaching clients in rural areas. Their officers represented the Agro{mink's 'front line' 
linkages to the farmers. In each field office, there were eight to nine credit officers 
responsible for screening and selecting borrowers, appraising loans and monitoring loan 
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repayment. As field offices did not have the facilities fier loan disbursement, debt 
collection and deposit services, all cash transactions were carried out by the branch with 
which the respective field office was affiliated. All branch managers reported directly to 
the president at the head office. 
In 1994, the AgroBank had introduced the profit centre concept at its branches, to ensure 
a higher degree of accountability and responsibility among branch managers and their 
stale. From focusing purely on loan disbursements and customer numbers, focussing on 
key accounting concepts such as profitability, particularly delincd as return on assets, 
became an increasing concern of branch managers. 
In 1997, provincial ollices were established as another layer ol' organisational structure. 
Provincial directors had responsibilities to manage, closely monitor and supervise the 
operations of branches and field offices in the area. Directors of provincial offices 
worked under the supervision of four heads of'branch administrative divisions at the head 
office. The bank increasingly empowered its provincial directors and branch managers, 
each position having authority to approve loans of up to three million and one million 
Baht respectively. This marked a major shill in the devolution of decision-making, given 
that ninety-eight percent of' loans extended by the Agrobank were below these ceilings 
(Watchananawat, 2004). 'these provincial offices operated as profit centres where the 
internal interest rates were applied on funds transferred between them and the hears office. 
As well as being used as an instrument tier policy implementation, the transfer price was 
set by the management in the head office in accordance with the market cost of finds. 
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In fiscal year 2004, the bank expanded the service scope oFthe field offices from solely 
providing credit services to being business units which also provided deposit and other 
cash-related services such as Utility bill payment services. At the end of fiscal year 2004, 
the bank further decentralised its operations by introducing another organisational layer 
the regional office - to supervise provincial offices in their respective areas. The 
introduction of regional offices was again designed to increase the hank's responsiveness 
to the heterogeneous demands of' local people in different regions, as the agricultural 
products and lifestyle of people in different regions were difTerent. At the same time, it 
helped the bank ensure that branches operated in the same strategic direction. As of 31" 
March 2006, the bank had 567 branches, and 75 provincial offices operating under a 
supervision of nine regional offices (Annual Report). 
As previously discussed, the AgroBank frequently restructured its organisation. The 
structure at the corporate level arguably became more strategically oriented not (east 
through devolving more functional activities out to existing or new divisions and 
departments. At the same time, rationalisation was pursued through re-arranging 
departments and divisions responsible for similar activities into the same working groups 
to promote more specialist expertise in terms of locus and activity. On the other hand, an 
increasing focus on customer differences shifted the structure at the operational level 
towards being more geographically oriented. Regional offices and provincial offices 
were created to manage branches in their respective areas more closely, to ensure that the 
different needs of local customers in different regions were met. I lowever, this continual 
process ofchange seemed to promote a desire för still more change to improve locus and 
flexibility. At the time when exploratory fieldwork was being carried out, it was apparent 
from initial conversations that several senior management staff believed that the hank 
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might need to further restructure its organisation after another amendment to the Act 
governing the operations of the bank was approved. 
5.4.2. Current Organisational Structure 
As ol'3I" of March 2005, the bank's organisational structure was changed to comprise 23 
departments operating under 7 groups, as can he seen in Figure 5.5. Six operating groups, 
management support, special activities, customer and rural development, income 
development, policy and strategy, and supporting, are based in the head office in 
Bangkok. the operation group, comprising nine branch administration departments 
responsible for the operations of provincial offices and branches nationwide, runs in nine 
different regions of' the country: the upper northern, lower northern, upper northeastern, 
lower northeastern, central, eastern, western, upper southern, and lower southern regions 
of Thailand. The branch administration departments are responsible fier overseeing the 
operations of provincial offices and branches to ensure that the hank's objectives in 
developing rural areas and maintaining financial stability are achieved. Within each 
branch, the operations are further classified into the operations and the business 
development divisions. ' The operations division is responsible liar legal, banking and 
accounting activities, while the business development division is responsible Iür lending 
operations and development activities. 
At the head office, the six working groups have the following functions: the policy and 
strategy group plays a significant role in formulating corporate plans, developing 
management systems, and monitoring and controlling the overall operations of the hank. 
The business development division was formerly known as the agricultural credit division. It was 
renamed in fiscal year 2001 to emphasise the bank's role in providing knowledge and services für 
development purposes, in addition to providing financial assistance through credit services. 
205 
lt has a major responsibility for translating policies into practice, developing business and 
action plans, and monitoring and evaluating the performance of the organisation, 
departments and divisions, with the aim of- increasing the efficiency and quality of the 
services. 
I'o support provincial offices and branches in their activities, the customer and rural 
dcveluhment group and the income development group play important roles. The 
customer and rural development group has a responsibility to systematically integrate the 
production and marketing activities of the customers, strengthen the micro-enterprises in 
the rural areas, and co-ordinate with other organisations to provide knowledge on 
production, marketing and general management to customers. The major tasks of' the 
income development group cover lending operations, other financial-related services and 
financial management. Within the group, the treasury department's major responsibilities 
include financial planning and management, as well as assets and liabilities management. 
The institutional loan, the personal loan and the government secured loan departments 
have the responsibility of formulating policies regarding lending operations and 
supervision of the provincial offices' credit operations. 'Ehe duty of the income and 
banking development department includes improving the bank's other financial services, 
such as deposits, electronic banking, the Islamic fund, and other fee-based income 
services. The institutional loan, personal loan, government secured loan and income and 
banking development departments also share the responsibility of developing new 
products to meet customers' demands. 
The management support group, comprising the audit department, the management 
department and the risk management department, and the supporting group function to 
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provide support to top management and other departments. The management support 
group's main functions include ensuring that appropriate internal control systems are in 
place, improving the bank's internal management systems to meet international standards, 
facilitating the work of the Board of the Directors and the hank's executives, 
communicating the hank's policies, and managing risks. With regard to the supporting 
group, its responsibilities include the provision of financial and accounting information, 
improvement of' internal management systems, development of information technology 
systems and the professional development of the bank's employees. Finally, the special 
activities group has the major responsibility of facilitating and managing special projects 
and missions. 
Changes in the bank's organisational structure have had an impact on the bank's 
personnel. creating more job promotion opportunities for management staff. For 
example, the introduction of provincial offices created a large number of' Provincial 
Director positions, equivalent to the Divisional Director positions in the head office. The 
introduction of regional offices also created nine Senior Vice President positions, nine 
Vice President positions and nineteen Assistant Vice President positions. On the other 
hand, many staff needed to move to areas in which they were not specialised. For 
instance, the Senior Vice President of the human resources department was transferred to 
one of the branch administration departments when regional offices were introduced. 
Nevertheless, this seemed not to be problematic for the bank, as the bank tended to rotate 
their staff to different functions regularly. 
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5.4.3. The Bank's Personnel Structure 
To structure its personnel system, the bank uses a grading system, with 14 grades for its 
officers. The president of the bank is not included in the system, as he or she is not 
considered a member of the banking staff. The current structure of the bank's personnel 
can be seen in Figure 5.6. All banking staff are remunerated according to grade, although 
there are salary overlaps between grades. In 2004, several changes to personnel 
management were made in the areas of staff promotion and salary rise systems, and in 
terms of the system of recruiting the president. The bank has attempted to abolish the 
grading system in its personnel structure, but at the time the fieldwork was conducted, the 
grading structure was still in place. 
Prior to 2004, the promotion for staff at grade 6 and lower was based on seniority and 
salary level; that is, if the salary or years of working with the bank reached the baseline 
for the next grade, individuals would get promoted automatically. On the other hand, to 
be promoted to grades 8,9 and 10, it was necessary for staff to be examined on specific 
issues about the bank's operations as well as issues on general management practices 
prevalent in the business community. As many senior staff did not perform well in the 
exam, compared with young, recently graduated staff, the bank combined the selective 
system with the exam system. Through the selective system, divisional directors and 
provincial directors proposed the names of the staff they wished to promote. The human 
resources department at the head office then made a decision as to who would receive 
promotion, based on each staff member's work experience and educational qualifications. 
Therefore, 80 percent of the staff at grades 7 to 9 were promoted on the basis of their 
exam results, while 20 percent were promoted through the selective process. The 
promotion of staff at grade 10 and above was determined solely through the selective 
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process. Since 2004, the exam system has been abolished and replaced by the selective 
system. For this reason, all promotions of staff from grade 6 and above have to go 
through the selective process. Staff from grade 9 and above are also assessed by the 
bank's assessment centre to determine their competency level and management skills 
before they can be promoted to the next grade. 
With regard to salary increases, employees performing well are allowed to have a rise 
ranging from 0.5 up to 2 salary levels each year, or alternatively they might not be 
entitled to any rise, if performance is not deemed adequate. In the fiscal year 2004, the 
bank changed the salary rise system from increasing at a certain level to increasing as a 
percentage compared to the previous salary. The percentage of increase in the salary of 
individual staff varies according to his or her performance measured by the new 
performance appraisal system introduced in 2003, discussed later in Section 5.5.3. 
In addition to changes in the incentive system, the bank changed the president recruitment 
system from one that was seniority-based to one that was candidate-based. Prior to 2004, 
the senior executive vice president with the most seniority would take over from the 
retiring president. However, since October 2004, the bank has operated a candidate 
system; that is, anyone, including those who are not currently banking staff, who wishes 
to be considered for the position can submit an application, and the decision on who 
should be selected is made by the Board of Directors. Under the new system, the 
president has to sign a performance agreement with the Board of Directors on an annual 
basis. This agreement is then used as a basis to evaluate the president's performance. 
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At Corporate Level At Operational Level 
President 
Senior Executive Vice President 
Grade 14 
Executive Vice President 
Grade 13 
Senior Vice President, Branch 
I Admin. Department 1-9 
Senior Vice President, "'"""""""'"'"....................... . Grade 13 
Department... Grade 13 
Director of the Provincial Office 
Vice President, Grade 12 
Department... Grade 12 
F Assistant Director of the Director of Division Provincial Office 
Grade 12 Grade 11 
Assistant Director of Division II Branch Manager 
Grade 11 Grade 10 
Chief of Section Branch Manager 
Grade 10 Grade 9 
Assistant Branch Manager/ Agribusiness 
Promotion Officer/ Agricultural Central 
Market Assistant Manager 
Operations Officer Grade 9 
Grade 9 
Chief of Field Office/ Chief of 
Operations Officer Finance Unit 
Grade 8 Grade 8 
Operations Officer Business Development Staff/ 
Grade 4-7 Finance Officer/ Clerical Officer 
Grade 4-7 
Operations Officer 
Grade 1-3 Clerical Officer 
Grade 1-3 
Service Officer I 
Grade 1-3 Service Officer 
Grade 1-3 
Figure 5.6: The AgroBank's personnel structure (Internal document) 
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5.5. Recent Change Initiatives 
In the AgroBank's evolution from a specialised agricultural lending institution to a 
diversified rural development bank, it has implemented a number of `modem' 
management systems commonly used in the global business communities. While the 
senior management of the bank believed that the implementation of innovative 
management tools would enhance the bank's efficiency and competitiveness, some 
management staff also believed that it would create a more commercial outlook and help 
enhance its legitimacy. By adopting new management tools that are widely accepted 
among contemporary business communities, the bank can present itself as a more global, 
modem financial institution. 
The recent adoption of innovative management tools in the AgroBank has included (1) 
the implementation of a quality management system, ISO 9001: 2000, (2) the 
improvement in information technology systems, which included the renovation of the 
bank's entire management information system and the implementation of the Automatic 
Teller Machines (ATMs), and (3) the introduction of new performance assessment 
systems at employee level. As part of the recent change initiatives, and in particular in 
order to monitor performance at corporate and operational levels, the BSC approach was 
adopted, along with the development of the `operation room' to help run it effectively, 
details of which are discussed in Chapter 6. 
5.5.1. The Quality Management System: ISO 9001: 2000 
ISO is the latest quality management system implemented by the bank. In fiscal year 
1999, the bank started its pilot project of implementing the ISO 9001: 2000 quality 
management system at the front office of its two branches. These two branches were later 
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certified for their ISO 9001: 2000 by an independent accredited certification institution in 
July 2001. The bank further expanded the ISO implementation to all of its branches in 
fiscal year 2003; and by the end of that year, the finance section of all branches were 
qualified by the internal ISO auditors, who also continued a periodic assessment of the 
services provided by the finance section of the branches. ISO measures have become one 
of the major issues to which the provincial directors pay significant attention in monthly 
performance review meetings. 
Prior to ISO adoption, the bank utilised several quality management systems that were 
popular at the time, for example, 5S. Some of the bank's top management also claimed 
that the bank implemented TQM, but a director of one division suggested that rather than 
fully implementing TQM, the bank employed only particular elements. After the ISO 
implementation, 5S still remained in place, while TQM was less apparent. 
By implementing ISO, management of the bank believed that they could improve the 
bank's efficiency and the quality of services provided to customers, which would, in their 
view, lead to better organisational performance. An assistant director of the human 
resource planning division, and a former director of one of the provincial offices, 
commented that people used to joke, "If you wish to go to the Agro, take a pillow with 
you. " However, after implementing ISO, branches provide quicker service leading to 
greater customer satisfaction. 
Currently, the bank has a plan to expand ISO standards to all departments in the head 
office and business development section in all branches, although it remains uncertain as 
to whether ISO is suitable for credit operations. In addition to implementing ISO in the 
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bank, farmer institutions have been encouraged by the bank to adopt the same ISO 
standards. 
5.5.2. Information Technology 
In fiscal year 2003, the bank undertook the renovation of all of its management 
information systems. From the perspective of the bank's staff, the information 
technology system of the bank was outdated. Many organisational members at all levels 
of the organisation believed it was necessary for the bank to improve its information 
systems in order to compete in today's competitive and advanced financial market. 
Therefore, a new Core Banking System, covering such information systems as the client's 
database, credit, deposits, services, financial management, and automatic branches, was 
implemented. In addition to introducing the new information systems, in fiscal year 
2004, the bank installed 600 ATMs nationwide and became a member of the ATM pool. 
Prior to fiscal year 2004, the bank had a limited number of ATMs, with customers being 
able only to use those ATMs located at their branch, due to the fact that the information 
systems were not linked from one branch to another. However, since February 2005, 
bank customers have been able to make transactions at any ATM belonging either to this 
bank or any other banking members of the ATM pool. 
Many of the banking staff believed that the modernisation of the information systems 
would enhance the efficiency of the bank's operations. They also suggested that it would 
expand the bank's opportunities because it would increase its business channels, such as 
ATMs, online-banking, and credit card services, which would eventually lead to a higher 
fee-based income. The use of electronic channels may change the relationships between 
the bank and its customers to a certain extent. However, bank operations need to remain 
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labour-intensive; the bank cannot merely replace human labour with advanced technology 
because farmers still need personal advice from banking staff. 
5.5.3. Performance Measurement at Employee Level 
In addition to an improvement in quality management and information systems, the bank 
attempted to change its performance management systems at employee level in order to 
create more focus on performance. In 1999, the bank introduced the new performance 
measurement system at employee level, called Performance Management System (PMS). 
The pilot project was undertaken in fiscal year 2000, and the system was further 
implemented in all of the bank's departments, provincial offices and branches in fiscal 
year 2003. The PMS was first implemented in the head office, before being extended to 
other provincial offices and branches. The President of the bank commented, "If we want 
other employees to accept it, we need to show them that we are also evaluated by the 
system. That's why we started applying it to management staff in the head office first. " 
Under the new PMS, at the beginning of each fiscal year, all employees have to identify 
plans and targets they want to achieve during the year, and agree them with their 
immediate superior. Results from the individual performance agreement have an impact 
on the salary rise of individual employees, although individual performance is not the sole 
determinant of salary rise. The performance of the branch or division in which 
employees are located also affects the quota of total salary rise awarded. In addition to 
the impact on salary rise, individual performance results are used to determine promotion 
prospects. 
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It was suggested in the bank's internal documents that the PMS was a result-based 
performance management system which aimed to integrate four important processes of 
human resource management performance planning, performance coaching and 
feedback, performance appraisal, and competency development (see figure 5.7). The 
bank's management claimed that the PMS would encourage participative discussion 
between superiors and their subordinates. Nevertheless, some of the banking stall 
expressed doubt about whether PMS would actually create more discussion, as it is not 
common for Thai people to argue with their superiors. 
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Figure 5.7: Key concepts of Performance Management System (Internal (Iocument) 
The management of the hank explicitly indicated that the PMS vvas not a per116rmance 
assessment system. In their view, the main aim of the system was for employees to learn 
and improve themselves, with performance appraisal being only one aspect. I luwevcr, a 
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number of employees viewed that measuring performance was a fundamental element of 
the system, partly because the system was now linked to the reward system; that is, 
decisions on the salary rise of each member of staff was based on their performance as 
evaluated by the new PMS. As a consequence, the performance appraisal element of the 
PMS has inevitably become the major focus of banking staff. 
While adopting these modem management tools might help enhance the bank's efficiency 
to some extent, employing management tools which are widely accepted among the 
contemporary business communities can help improve the image of the bank. This image 
has become increasingly important, as the bank is now expanding its operations into the 
terrain of commercial banks, which are usually perceived as more modem and efficient. 
In addition, as farmers tend to perceive the bank's staff as money collectors rather than 
experts able to help them with their problems, the bank has been endeavouring to change 
its image to become more efficient and helpful to customers in order to achieve its new 
vision - `to be a modem rural development bank concentrating on the uplifting of the 
farmers' and the people's quality of life'. Adopting these innovative management tools is 
one of the ways for the bank to develop its image as a `modem' development bank. 
The analysis in this chapter has shown how the AgroBank has been developed. It has 
illustrated how the bank, which was initially set up as an agricultural lending institution, 
has developed its business and management practices which, in many ways, are 
distinctive. The analysis has also shown that over the period of 40 years of its operation, 
the AgroBank has expanded its roles and scope of activities substantially, and interactions 
with external parties, such as the central bank, other local commercial banks and foreign 
financial institutions, have become more frequent and important. Along with the 
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expansion of its roles and scope of activities, organisational restructuring has been 
undertaken many times with an increasing focus on strategic and external customers. At 
the same time, important attention has been given to developing its internal management 
systems to accommodate the increasing complexity of its operations. A number of 
`modern' management approaches and tools which are commonly used in global business 
communities have been implemented, particularly during the recent years. Alongside 
with the new, global management tools, a number of traditional management practices 
remain significant and play important role in shaping the way in which organisational 
participants view and react to the new management technologies. As a part of recent 
change initiatives undertaken by the bank, the BSC approach was adopted. The next 
chapter will discuss the detailed process of the way in which the BSC was introduced and 
implemented within the AgroBank. 
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Chapter 6 
Translating the Balanced Scorecard into Practice in the AgroBank 
6.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the development of the AgroBank, the organisation that is 
the focus of this study on how the BSC was introduced and implemented. It summarised 
some of the key steps that the organisation has undertaken to transform itself from an 
agricultural lending institution into a diversified rural development bank. It presented the 
bank's attempts to become more global and modern by introducing a number of change 
initiatives in its internal management systems. These change initiatives reflect the 
increasing external focus (i. e. strategic and customer-facing) of the organisation, and at 
the same time, demonstrate the organisation's attempts to develop its internal resources 
and management practices. 
BSC was introduced by top management as part of the most recent change initiatives. 
The decision to adopt it was driven largely by several key senior and middle managers, in 
particular the president of the bank at the time. In addition, external actors, including the 
government, consultants and other organisations in the industry, played significant roles. 
Given the top-down approach to its implementation, organisational members at different 
levels responded to the BSC differently, leading to several revisions and reformulations 
of it, both planned and emergent. Throughout the design, implementation and utilisation 
process of the BSC, various interests, tensions and conflicts were negotiated, articulated 
and mediated. In order to make the BSC operable, and to accommodate the diverse 
interests of various organisational participants, new meanings and identities of the BSC 
emerged in the ebb and flow of discussion and implementation. 
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This chapter describes the process of how the BSC was introduced, constructed and 
disseminated as a new performance measurement and management system within the 
AgroBank. It describes how various actors - local and global, human and non-human - 
played roles in creating networks to support, resist and transform the BSC within the 
AgroBank. The main objective of the chapter is to describe how what was (as explained 
in Chapter 2) an American performance management concept was translated into practice 
in a Thai financial services organisation. It traces the process of BSC construction and 
translation within the organisation, as well as within different units of the organisation, 
over a period of time. Emphasis is also placed on the interplay of the BSC and other key 
performance management tools, with a view to tracing some of the more general 
implications of BSC adoption within the AgroBank. 
This chapter is organised into 6 sections. The next section discusses the pre-existing 
performance measurement and management systems of the AgroBank. Section 6.3 
introduces the process of BSC development in the AgroBank. The way in which the BSC 
idea came into the organisation and the process of how BSC was constructed at the 
corporate level are explored. The design of the bank's corporate BSC is discussed. The 
issues of the bank's decision on dimensions of performance and KPIs, the development of 
a strategy map and the issues around cause-and-effect relationships among performance 
measures are considered. Also discussed is the way in which the elements of the bank's 
corporate BSC have changed over time. Section 6.4 depicts how the BSC development 
project was extended to the operational level, and examines the reactions of the provincial 
directors to the BSC development project. Section 6.5 considers how the AgroBank's 
organisational members viewed and understood the BSC, while Section 6.6 provides a 
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brief summary of the way in which the BSC was introduced, constructed and used within 
the organisation. 
6.2. Pre-Existing Performance Measurement Practices in the AgroBank 
Over the past decade, substantial changes to management practices in the Thai banking 
industry have been taking place. As discussed in Chapter 4, since the financial crisis in 
1997, most, if not all, of the banks in Thailand have attempted to modernise their 
organisations, in order to survive and compete in an increasingly tense competitive 
market. Large-scale organisational re-engineering and restructuring has been carried out; 
information technology and management information systems have been renovated, and a 
number of innovative management tools have been adopted. Efficiency has become 
increasingly important; as a president of one local commercial bank commented, "Prior to 
the crisis, there was little competition. We were usually profitable. It seemed like we 
could just sit still and gain higher profit. There was no need to be efficient. "35 
Striving for survival, most of the banks in Thailand undertook significant changes in their 
internal management systems, including performance measurement and management 
systems at every level of the organisation. At the corporate level, many banks have 
implemented integrative strategic performance measurement systems, while at the 
employee level, a performance-based appraisal and reward system has often been 
implemented, to replace the subjective performance evaluation and the seniority-based 
reward system commonly found in Thai organisations. 36 
35 Interview with the president of Bank B (August 2004) (see Appendix 1). 
36 Interviews with a first executive vice president of Bank B (December 2003), a senior vice president - 
investor relations of Bank C (December 2003), and a vice president - planning and budgeting of Bank E 
(August 2004) (See Appendix 1). 
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' Among the strategic performance measurement frameworks, BSC is one of the most 
popular among the Thai banks. From a survey conducted in 2002,6 out of 12 
commercial banks reported adopting the BSC (Decharin, 2003). Most of these banks 
announced the adoption of BSC either in their annual reports or on their websites. Some 
banks also presented their strategy map in their annual report. In the banks where BSC 
was adopted, the BSC development project was usually the responsibility of a corporate 
planning and strategy or a human resources management department. Although many 
banks claim to have implemented BSC, the way in which it is used tends to differ across 
organisations. 37 
In similar vein to other local banks in the country, the AgroBank has carried out extensive 
changes in its performance measurement and management systems over the past decade, 
although the bank has suffered less financial loss from the financial crisis compared to 
other commercial banks. Change initiatives were part of the bank's attempt to enhance its 
efficiency and modernise its organisation to become a rural development bank which can 
compete with other commercial banks in a globalised, intensified competitive financial 
market. One aspect of those initiatives was the adoption of BSC. 
Prior to BSC adoption, there were three key performance measurement tools used to 
monitor performance at the corporate level - budgetary control, performance evaluation 
by the Ministry of Finance, and Logframe. 38 Budgeting and performance targets from the 
performance evaluation conducted by the Ministry of Finance were allocated to the 
37 This observation is based on data obtained from the interviews and documentation analysis during the 
pilot and exploratory stage of the research (see Appendix 1). However, the detailed use of BSC within 
other banks is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
38 Logframe or 'Logical Framework' is a performance monitoring tool commonly used by development 
agencies, such as the World Bank. Within the AgroBank, it was used by the monitoring and evaluation 
division to input, process and outputs of the key projects of the organisation. 
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operational level, while Logframe targets were focused on the performance of projects at 
corporate level only. After BSC was implemented, budgetary control and performance 
evaluation by the Ministry of Finance remained significant, while Logframe was 
completely abandoned. The pre-existing performance measurement tools, particularly 
budgetary control and performance evaluation by the Ministry of Finance, play a 
significant role in shaping how organisational members see, interpret and react to the new 
performance management technology, the BSC. 
6.2.1. Budgetary Control 
Budgeting has long been used as a major tool to monitor and manage performance at 
corporate, departmental, provincial and branch levels in the AgroBank. Budgets and 
plans are formulated on an annual basis, with the programme and budget division as a 
central co-ordinator during the process. As with other state-owned enterprises, the 
AgroBank is required, by the Ministry of Finance, to develop an annual plan, policies and 
budgets based on its five-year business plan. 39 The annual budgeting and planning 
process usually starts in July, when the policy and planning committee discusses and 
agrees on the overall direction and policy framework for the bank based on governmental 
policies. The policy and planning committee comprises several members of the Board of 
Directors and some executive members of the bank, in order to ensure that the interests of 
various groups of stakeholders are considered. While members of the board represent the 
interests of customers and the government, which is also the bank's major shareholder, 
the bank's executives represent the interests of the bank and its staff. 
39 Prior to fiscal year 2005, it was called the `corporate plan'. 
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Along with discussion of the policy and planning committee, the programme and budget 
division organises a series of discussions among senior management of all departments, 
including branch administration departments, to formulate a draft of plans and projects to 
support the main policies of the bank. This draft is then proposed to the policy and 
planning committee to review, comment on and revise. After the committee agrees on the 
overall policies, a series of workshops is organised in various regions throughout the 
country, to obtain the local staff's views on the possibility of the plans and projects. In 
September, when the final draft is completed, it is submitted to the Board of Directors for 
approval. 
After the annual business plan at the corporate level is approved, corporate budgeting 
targets are allocated to relevant departments. Departments then develop action plans and 
projects to support the corporate plans and policies. Budgets for each project are 
identified. During this process of plan development at departmental level, the 
organisation holds meetings among members of the policy and planning committee on a 
regular basis to consider departments' budgets and plans. In late November or December, 
final plans are proposed and approved by the Board of Directors and submitted to the 
Ministry of Finance. 
After the corporate annual plans and budgets are finalised, the programme and planning 
division organises a meeting among directors of all divisions in the head office, provincial 
directors and branch managers to communicate the corporate plan to management at 
lower levels, to further formulate action plans to support the corporate plan. Thus, all 
divisions and provincial offices also develop their plans and budgets on an annual basis. 
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Key budgeting targets focus primarily on quantitative financial performance, although 
some of the indicators are concerned with the progress of the projects. Examples of the 
key corporate budgeting targets include loan disbursement, non-performing loan 
reduction, deposit amount, fee-based income, expenses and the progress of some key 
projects, such as the information technology development project. At the provincial 
level, examples of key budgeting measures that are reviewed monthly include loan 
disbursement, loan disbursement on particular projects, non-performing loan reduction, 
deposit and fee-based income. 
Budgeting targets are set primarily from the top level and then cascaded down to lower 
levels; however, bottom-up target setting is also considered. To determine the targets, 
past performance, including average past performance and performance of the previous 
year, is -used as a major basis. This is based on the philosophy of continuous 
improvement; that is, the departments/provincial offices/branches should at least perform 
better than they did in the previous year. To set the targets for provincial offices and 
branches, the bank also considers the average performance of offices and branches 
located in the same areas as another benchmark. Top management of the bank believes 
that using past performance as a benchmark is fair to provincial offices and branches, as 
different offices and branches might have different external and uncontrollable 
environments that impact on their performance. However, a director of one provincial 
office argued that this assumption might not be sensible in some circumstances. In his 
view, it would be more difficult for provincial offices with high performance to improve, 
compared with offices with low performance. He argued, 
We are human, not machines. Sometimes, I can't push my staff any further. Actually, 
when we achieve very high performance, sometimes we despair because we can't do any 
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better. It's as if now we are running 100 metres in 9.9 seconds, they want us to get it 
down to 9.5 or 9 seconds. We can't do that. It is so easy for others who are completing 
100 metres in 20 seconds to improve to 15 seconds, for example. 
In his view, for provincial offices that are already performing at a high level, maintaining 
it at the same level should be sufficient. 
Once the budgets and plans are finalised, the targets are fixed throughout the year. Only 
in exceptional circumstances, such as the chaos in the three southernmost provinces and 
the tsunami which hit the six provinces in the south, might the targets be adjusted. If the 
bank needs to implement any urgent, special projects arising during the year in order to 
accommodate particular interests of ministries and government agencies, the bank does 
not include these projects into any form of performance evaluation. Rather, the 
monitoring and evaluation division will come to play its role in monitoring the projects, 
ensuring that they are carried out to the government's requirements. 
On a monthly basis, the policy and planning committee meet to review performance on 
annual plans and budget. At the operational level, every month, provincial offices and 
branches also review performance measured against budgeting targets. Often, branches 
and provincial offices also review the performance of their branch against the 
performance of other offices and branches. 
Prior to 1996, budget was used as a tool to evaluate branch managers' performance. 0 At 
the beginning of the fiscal year, branch managers had to sign a performance agreement 
40 The provincial office was set up as another layer of organisational structure in 1997 (as discussed in 
Section 5.4.1.2); thus, there was no performance agreement for provincial office directors prior to that 
period. 
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with the president based on the finalised budget and plans of their branches. Performance 
results measured by performance indicators on the agreement would have an impact on 
the allocation for salary rises for employees within the branches. However, after 1996, 
when the Ministry of Finance introduced a new performance evaluation system to state- 
owned enterprises, budgeting targets were no longer used as KPIs in the performance 
agreement. Rather, the performance criteria determined by the Ministry of Finance were 
used to form the performance agreement to evaluate the performance of provincial offices 
and branches. Despite the introduction of many other performance targets to supplement 
budgeting targets during the past few years, achieving the pre-determined budgeting 
targets still remains crucial for managers at all levels, particularly at provincial offices 
and branches. 
In addition to using budget and plans for internal management purposes, the AgroBank is 
required to submit its annual budget and plan to the Ministry of Finance and the National 
Economic and Social Development Board, responsible for the country's macro-economic 
planning. The operations of the AgroBank are of great interest to the government and the 
National Economic and Social Development Board, as its operations have a significant 
impact on farmers, the major population of the country. 
6.2.2. Performance Evaluation by the Ministry of Finance 
As a state-owned enterprise, the AgroBank is subject to an annual performance evaluation 
by the Ministry of Finance, the ministry responsible for overseeing all state enterprises. 
The `state-owned enterprise performance evaluation programme' was introduced in 
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199641 by the State Enterprise Policy Office42 in response to recommendations by the 
World Bank. The key objectives of the programme are to enhance the efficiency and 
performance of state-owned enterprises and to improve co-ordination between the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry directly responsible for each state-owned enterprise. 
In evaluating the performance of state-owned enterprises, the Ministry of Finance hires a 
consulting company to draft a performance agreement, specifying performance indicators, 
weights and targets, and this agreement is then recommended to a committee43 set up by 
the Ministry. The consulting company is also responsible for measuring actual 
performance of the state-owned enterprises at the end of the fiscal year. The consulting 
company hired to evaluate the performance of the AgroBank is the Thai Rating and 
Information Services Company Limited (TRIS). 44 Thus, staff of the AgroBank usually 
refer to the annual performance evaluation by the Ministry of Finance as the `TRIS 
measurement'. 
Currently, there are two types of performance measurement systems under the `state- 
owned enterprise performance evaluation programme' - the Good Enterprise System 
(GES) for enterprises listed on the SET, and the Performance Agreement System (PAS) 
for non-listed state enterprises. Under the GES, there is no negotiation with regard to 
performance indicators and targets between the enterprises and the Ministry. Five key 
areas of performance are determined by the Ministry of Finance, and worldclass targets, 
or at least industry norms, are set as a benchmark. Good corporate governance criteria 
41 The time that state enterprises join the programme may vary depending on their readiness. AgroBank 
joined the programme in 1996. 
42 The State Enterprise Policy Office operates under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance. 
43 Members of the committee include academics from leading universities, retired government officers and 
prominent businessmen. Each committee is responsible for evaluating 4-5 enterprises in the same industry. 
44 In fiscal year 2005, TRIS was hired to evaluate performance of 44 out of 53 state enterprises. 
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determined by the SET are also incorporated into the evaluation criteria. In contrast, 
under the PAS, a series of negotiations between the enterprise and the consultancy firm, 
and between the enterprise and the committee from the Ministry of Finance, will be 
carried out before the performance agreement is finalised. Although the Ministry of 
Finance has attempted to apply the GES to all non-listed enterprises as a non-negotiable 
change, management staff of TRIS argue that this is difficult in practice and to date it has 
not happened. 
In the case of the AgroBank, the PAS is applied, as the bank is a non-listed organisation. 
At the beginning of each fiscal year, the bank has to sign a performance agreement with 
the Ministry of Finance, based on the recommendation of TRIS. The programme and 
budgeting division is responsible for negotiating with TRIS and co-ordinating between 
TRIS, the Ministry of Finance and the bank's executives and directors, whereas the 
monitoring and evaluation division is responsible for monitoring actual performance to 
ensure that the pre-determined targets are eventually achieved at the end of the fiscal 
year. 
The process of negotiation starts with discussions between staff from TRIS and staff from 
the programme and budgeting division of the AgroBank. The bank has to submit a draft 
of its annual plan to TRIS to develop a draft of the strategy map, KPIs, weights and 
targets. Then, KPIs and targets developed by TRIS are compared with those formulated 
by the bank, after which staff from the programme and budgeting division of the bank and 
staff from TRIS discuss adjustments before a draft is proposed to the Ministry of 
Finance's committee. After the draft is proposed, the committee and the bank's 
executives and directors further negotiate before the final performance agreement is 
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formulated. Finally, the bank signs the performance agreement with the Ministry of 
Finance as a commitment that the bank will achieve a certain level of performance in 
particular areas in the fiscal year. 
To develop a framework to evaluate the performance of state enterprises, TRIS combines 
a number of western performance management concepts, including Sink & Tuttle's 
model, the European Foundation for Quality Management approach, the Malcolm 
Baldrige National Quality Award, and the BSC. Performance criteria have changed over 
time. TRIS' director of the performance evaluation division suggested that the 
development of a performance evaluation programme can be classified into three phases. 
During the first phase, performance criteria focused on inputs and processes, in order to 
improve the internal management systems of the enterprises. In the second phase, the 
focus shifted to responsiveness to stakeholders and corporate governance. As corporate 
governance issues received considerable attention from practitioners at that time, the 
evaluation focused primarily on transparency, the role of the board, and information 
disclosure. Strategic performance management was also prominent; thus, state 
enterprises were encouraged to adopt a strategic performance management approach, 
such as the BSC. During this period, some non-financial performance indicators were 
incorporated into the performance criteria. These indicators were classified into 5 main 
categories - (1) effectiveness, including financial performance, physical performance and 
policy responsiveness; (2) efficiency, including financial and physical; (3) stakeholder 
responsiveness, including customer, employee and society; (4) organisational 
management and development; and (5) corporate governance. 
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With regard to the third phase, which is the current stage, the criteria are mainly 
concerned with how well the enterprises perform from the perspective of shareholders. 
The main focus is on wealth creation and value added. Performance indicators are 
classified into three categories - (1) policy responsiveness; (2) financial and non-financial 
performance; and (3) organisational management. 
Main categories for performance evaluation are applied to all state enterprises, but details 
and weights given for each category may vary. Policy responsiveness accounts for 20- 
30% of the total weight, whereas financial and non-financial performance and 
organisational management account for 40-50% and 20-40% respectively. As the 
AgroBank is an important instrument for the government to implement its policies, the 
maximum weight, 30%, is given to the policy responsiveness category. The KPIs and 
weights for AgroBank in fiscal year 2004 can be seen in Table 6.1. 
T ih1e 61 : `TRIS measurement' performance evaluation criteria. fiscal year 2004 
Performance Indicators Weight 
1. Policy responsiveness 
Loans granted under Asset Capitalisation Policy 8 
Loans granted under Public Debt Restructuring Policy 8 
Supports for One Tambon One Product Programme 9 
Public Service Account implementation 5 
Total for Category 1 30 
II. The enterprise's performance 
Financial indicators 
Net profit 3 
Operating expenses to net income ratio 6 
Expenses related to human resources to net income Ratio 6 
Non-financial indicators 
Loans to number of employees 8 
Overdue loans to outstanding loans 8 
Level of success in developing farmer and community enterprises, measured 9 
by number of products that are certified by Thai Industrial Standard Institute 
and number of farmers that passed the production standard criteria 
Total for Category II 40 
III. Management 
Role of the board 6 
Risk management 6 
Internal control and internal audit 6 
Information technology management 6 
Human resource management 6 
Total for Category Ili 30 
Source: Internal document 
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Results from the `TRIS measurement' are used to determine bonuses for directors, 
management and non-management staff of the enterprises. In addition, the State 
Enterprise Policy Office produces a league table, presenting performance results of each 
state enterprise at the end of each fiscal year, to encourage state enterprises to improve 
and compete with each other. Moreover, the Ministry of Finance uses the results to form 
a decision as to the extent to which certain regulations can be relaxed in order to grant a 
greater degree of autonomy to state enterprises. 
Through the `TRIS measurement', important governmental policies pertinent to the bank 
are translated into performance indicators. However, this does not mean that the bank 
waits until the agreement is signed before starting the projects related to the governmental 
policies; it is usual for the bank to already be aware of relevant policies at the time of 
announcement by the government. When formulating its annual plan, the bank also needs 
to take these policies into account. Relevant policies are confirmed again at the 
beginning of the fiscal year, when a meeting between the Finance Minister and 
management of the bank, ranging from president to branch managers, 45 is organised. 
While this meeting can be seen as official confirmation that the bank acknowledges the 
direction the government wishes the bank to take, the `TRIS measurement' system can be 
seen as a further reinforcement for the bank to pay attention to the relevant policies, as the 
results of the evaluation will have an impact on bonuses for all directors and staff. The 
`TRIS measurement' helps to clarify which particular aspects of the policies the bank 
needs to focus upon, and what specific projects or activities the bank should undertake. 
as prior to fiscal year 2005, only management from the level of director of provincial office and above were 
required to attend the meeting, but since then, it has become compulsory also for branch managers to 
participate. 
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Since 1996, when the bank joined the `state-owned performance evaluation programme', 
it has adopted targets from the `TRIS measurement', rather than budgeting targets, as a 
basis for formulating performance agreements at lower levels. Based on the agreement at 
corporate level, the bank allocates the targets down to departmental and divisional levels. 
All heads of the department have to negotiate and sign the agreement with the bank's 
steering management committee, 46 while divisional directors sign the agreement with 
their respective heads of department based on the agreement at departmental level. 
At the operational level, senior vice presidents who are heads of regional offices sign the 
agreement with the steering management committee, and then cascade it down to 
provincial level. As the agreements are based on criteria from the `TRIS measurement', 
performance indicators in the agreement are similar across provincial offices, except for 
only some provincial offices where KPIs are different from those of the other provincial 
offices, to reflect the specific local situation of the offices (see Table 6.2 for a comparison 
of KPIs on the performance agreements of four provincial offices). 
46 The steering management committee consists of the president, senior executive vice presidents and 
executive vice presidents of the bank. 
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Table 6.2: Comparison of provincial offices' performance agreements for fiscal year 2004 
Performance indicators Wei hts g iven to the performance indicator 
Office A Office B Office C Office D 
1. Policy responsiveness 30 30 30 60 
1.1 Marketing support 10 10 10 5 
1.1.1 Agricultural outputs sold through the 
Agricultural Marketing Cooperatives (AMCs) 
3 3 3 5 
1.1.2 Participation from members of the AMCs % 2 2 2 _ 1.1.3 Profit and loss (thousand Baht) 3 3 3 _ 1.1.4 Farm inputs bought by AMCs through Thai 
Agribusiness Co., Ltd. 
2 2 2 - 
1.2 Learning support and community strengthening 10 10 10 5 
1.2.1 Urban and village community funds attending 
the training course provided by the AgroBank (level) 
5 5 5 - 
1.2.2 Infrastructure development and customer group 
strengthening 
1.2.2.1 Development of infrastructure of the 
customer groups (number of groups) 
1 1 1 5 
1.2.2.2 Strengthening of customer groups 
(1) Group activities (number of activities) 2 2 2 - (2) Project to strengthen the groups (number of 
projects) 
2 2 2 - 
1.3 Private debt problem-solving 10 10 10 5 
1.3.1 Non-institutional debt solving 
1.3.1.1 Results from the ne otiation % 3 3 3 5 
1.3.1.2 Number of customers under the project 
which were granted the loans to total eligible 
customers % 
3 3 3 - 
1.3.2 Institutional debt-solving (%) 4 4 4 - 1.4 Urban and village community fund project % - - - 5 1.5 Asset capitalisation project 10 
1.6 Islamic fund - - 30 
1.6.1 Training course (number of Masjid) 6 
1.6.2 Loan disbursement (million Baht) 9 
1.6.3 Deposit (million Baht) 6 
1.6.4 Non-performing loan to total loan (%) 9 
2. Efficiency 45 45 45 25 
2.1 Return on asset % 25 25 25 
2.2 Non-performing loan to total loan % 15 15 15 - 23 Fee-based income (thousand Baht) 5 5 5 5 
2.4 Management of debt suspension project - - - 10 2.4.1 Reduction of interest overdue (%) 10 
2.5 Increase in deposit (%) - - 10 
3. Oranisational management 15 15 15 15 
3.1 Management and teamwork score 10 10 10 10 
3.2 Internal control score 5 5 5 5 
4. Customer satisfaction 10 10 10 
4.1 Customers' knowledge on the bank's products 
(score) 
4 4 4 
4.2 Customer satisfaction (score) 6 6 6 
Total 100 100 100 100 
source: iniernai uucumenLS 
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From Table 6.2, it can be seen that, with the exception of provincial office D, 47 KPIs and 
weights given for provincial offices are the same. This raises the issue of the 
appropriateness of the KPIs in terms of the performance agreement, as the operations of 
provincial offices A, B and C also differ significantly. For example, office A is located in 
Bangkok, which is an urban community with only a small farmer population. It is 
difficult for the office to arrange activities to strengthen customer groups because people 
in urban areas tend to have less time to participate in this kind of activity and, in fact, 
there are very few farming groups in Bangkok. In contrast, office C is located in the 
northeastern part of the country where the majority of the population are farmers who are 
also customers of the bank. As people in rural areas tend to be more group-oriented and 
have more time, it is easier for provincial office C to organise training courses for 
customers to strengthen their groups. 
Many provincial directors argued that it would be more useful if the bank developed a 
performance agreement for each provincial office based on the office's specific 
environment. However, the management at the head office claimed that the bank 
developed similar performance indicators for all provincial offices to ensure that all of 
those offices operated in the same strategic direction, as well as to ensure that the targets 
from the `TRIS measurement' were attained. 
Generally, the negotiation process between the bank and TRIS, and between the bank and 
the Ministry of Finance takes a long time. The agreement is typically not finalised for 
several months after the start of the fiscal year. This means that the agreement at 
47 Provincial office D is located in one of the three southernmost provinces of Thailand. The KPIs of the 
office differ significantly from those of the others, partly due to the chaos in the province which led the 
government to implement several policies, such as the Debt Suspension Programme, which had an impact 
on the operations of the bank. 
235 
provincial level may not be finalised until the second half of the fiscal year. Therefore, at 
the beginning of the year, most provincial directors focus on their annual action plans and 
budgeting targets. However, after the agreement is signed, most of them turn to focus 
more on the performance agreement. Some of the plans are, sometimes, completely 
neglected. 
6.2.3. Logframe 
Logframe, or `Logical Framework', was, as noted at the start of this chapter, another 
major performance monitoring tool in the AgroBank prior to the BSC. It was used by the 
monitoring and evaluation division to monitor key projects under the annual corporate 
plan. As this was the only division to utilise the tool, Logframe was known only among 
staff within the division. 
The Logframe concept is a mix of strategic planning and management by objectives, and 
is commonly used by development agencies, such as the World Bank. To use the 
Logframe, the monitoring and evaluation division identified goals, purposes, inputs, 
processes or activities, and outputs of the key projects they wished to monitor. Then, 
performance indicators and assumptions were determined for the purpose of assessing the 
extent to which the targets were achieved. The performance indicators from the 
Logframe were followed up on a monthly basis. 
The management in the monitoring and evaluation division suggested that Logframe was 
similar to the BSC, as it attempted to establish cause-and-effect relationships between 
inputs, process and outputs. However, unlike the BSC, Logframe could present only the 
performance of a particular project; it could not present the overall performance of the 
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organisation. Therefore, after BSC was implemented, Logframe was completely 
abandoned. 
Although Logframe was abandoned after adoption of the BSC, the other two prevailing 
performance measurement systems - budgetary control and `TRIS measurement' - 
remained significant. They played an important role in shaping the way organisational 
members viewed the BSC, and had a significant impact on how the BSC was designed 
and used within the AgroBank. 
6.3. Translating the BSC at the Corporate Level 
In the AgroBank, BSC adoption was a top management initiative, and the bank employed 
a top-down approach to implement it. That is, the BSC was first developed at the 
corporate level in the head office and then cascaded down to operational level in the 
provincial offices. The introduction of the BSC was part of the bank's attempts to 
modernise its organisation and internal management systems. Management of the bank 
believed that BSC could provide the bank with guidance on how to achieve better 
performance; and at the same time, the bank could gain greater legitimacy through 
adoption of the BSC. 
The BSC development project started in 2000, and the initial BSC was constructed only 
gradually. Key actors supporting BSC construction during the initial stage included the 
president and the director of human resource planning division at the time. The external 
consultant also played a significant role in facilitating the project. Despite strong support 
from top management, the organisation inevitably came across complexities in 
introducing a new management technology. To make BSC operable, BSC had been 
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modified, re-designed and re-defined to accommodate the interests of various actors. 
Attempts to reconcile the BSC with the prevailing performance measurement systems 
also led to a re-fabrication of the BSC. (See Figure 6.1. for overview of the BSC 
construction process. ) 
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6.3.1. BSC as an Attractive Idea - Connecting to the Networks of Support of 
the BSC in the Thai Communities 
The introduction of the BSC concept into the AgroBank can be traced back to 1996, when 
the bank joined the `state-owned enterprise performance evaluation programme'. As 
discussed in the previous section, BSC was one of the concepts that TRIS applied to form 
the performance evaluation criteria for the AgroBank. It was the first time that several 
senior managers had encountered the idea of BSC. 
During the late 1990s, the BSC concept began to spread, and networks of support for it 
started to emerge in Thai business communities. A number of BSC papers and books, 
particularly those written by Kaplan and Norton, were translated into Thai. Academic 
consultants regularly published articles, discussing the BSC concept and experience of 
Thai organisations that had `successfully' implemented the BSC in local leading business 
newspapers. In addition, leading business schools organised executive training courses 
which integrated BSC into their courses and incorporated BSC as a part of the syllabus 
for their MBA courses. Many MBA dissertations on BSC can be found in the schools' 
libraries. Moreover, a number of consultancy companies, including TRIS, promoted BSC 
adoption and offered a service to facilitate the BSC implementation process for 
organisations. 
BSC has become the most popular recent performance measurement and management 
concept in Thailand. In an interview with one particular academic, often regarded by 
practitioners as well as academics as an expert in performance measurement and 
management in Thailand, he suggested, "In Thailand most people know only balanced 
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scorecard. In the UK, you may have the performance pyramid and other models but here, 
nobody knows about those models. " 
Many leading organisations, both in private and public sectors, claimed to have adopted 
BSC. In the banking sector in particular, many large commercial banks published their 
strategy map based on the BSC approach in their annual reports, partly to demonstrate 
their attempts to employ `good' management practices to improve performance, in order 
to gain confidence from shareholders and the public after the 1997 financial crisis. 
With the growing popularity of the BSC in Thailand, the president of the AgroBank at the 
time expressed great interest in applying the BSC concept for banking management 
purposes. Within the AgroBank, an increasing number of managers became aware of the 
BSC. Some of them learned about BSC from MBA or executive training courses, while 
others learned about it from local newspapers. Translated books and articles about the 
BSC and its implementation were also kept in a separate section in the bank's library. 
At the time the BSC began to be disseminated into the Thai business communities, the 
BSC idea was promoted as a strategic management system (see Kaplan and Norton, 
1996a, 1996b, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c), rather than a multidimensional performance 
measurement system. Among Thai organisations, therefore, BSC is often perceived as a 
management tool that will help translate strategy into action, rather than a performance 
measurement tool that integrates non-financial indicators into the system. This is also the 
case for the AgroBank. However, different organisational members had different views 
on what a strategic management system meant. 
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6.3.2. Problematising the BSC at the Initial Stage - BSC for Vertical 
Alignment, Functional Integration, and a `Balanced' Strategic Plan 
At the early stage of the BSC implementation process, there were two key phrases 
suggested by management and organisational members of the AgroBank as to what the 
purposes of BSC were - `to translate strategy into action' and `to create alignment and 
focus'. Although suggesting similar phrases when asked what the BSC was for, 
organisational members had different views of what they expected from the BSC. 
For top management, BSC was seen as a tool that would help communicate strategy to 
lower levels, and therefore, enhance employees' understanding of how their work 
contributed to the corporate goals and create vertical alignment. As the president of the 
bank at the time argued, in his view, BSC would help alleviate 3 critical problems 
commonly found in any organisation - communication, co-ordination and control. He 
suggested, 
We are a big organisation with many branches located in remote areas. If we don't 
communicate well, vision and strategy will become blurred once they get down to lower 
levels. 
A senior executive inspector, another BSC proponent, gave a similar comment. In his 
view, BSC would help staff focus more on strategy and understand how their work 
contributed to the corporate objectives and performance. He argued, 
We have started to decentralise our operations. We need some tools to communicate the 
strategy of the organisation, so that they can perform their jobs without a need to wait for 
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commands from the central office. We also need something to provide them with feedback 
on how well they have done their job and how that contributes to corporate performance. 
While top management perceived communication and alignment between different 
hierarchical levels as the main problem that BSC would help alleviate, another group of 
managers suggested that co-ordination between different functional units was a major 
concern. A manager of the monitoring and evaluation division argued, 
We used a bottom-up approach when planning but it didn't work; plans were not aligned. 
Each department just did their own jobs without thinking about the whole picture. This is 
not right. However, for a balanced scorecard, we need to have workshops together to agree 
on the overall plan first. Every department needs to know what the others will do and how 
our job will affect the others. 
While some managers focused on problems of communication and cross-functional 
integration, another group of managers was concerned with the `balance' between the 
bank's two key objectives - financial and development - in the organisation's strategic 
plan. For them, the value attached to the BSC was its capability to focus and balance the 
interests of the bank's two key stakeholder groups - shareholders and customers - 
concurrently. 
As a state development agency, the AgroBank needs to undertake a number of projects 
which are not profitable but beneficial from a social and economic development 
perspective. On the other hand, as a financial institution, the AgroBank needs to maintain 
strict financial discipline and financial stability, in order to gain trust and confidence from 
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its fund providers and meet the financial regulations set by the central bank. A senior 
executive vice president of the bank argued, 
We are different from commercial banks. Their goal is to maximise profit. They will do 
anything that is profitable for the shareholders and their organisation will grow. But the 
government set us up for developing people and communities in rural areas. We focus on 
the social dimension. But we are also a bank. We are a state enterprise. We must not 
make a loss. So we are hybrid. We need to be balanced for development. It is difficult to 
manage.. . We need to 
balance between financial and development activities, and the 
balanced scorecard does just that. 
Another manager from a human resource planning division commented, 
In the past, we focused too much on numbers; financial numbers. But business is not our 
position. Sometimes our staff are confused about our role, whether we are commercial or a 
development bank. Local staff said we told them to help develop rural areas. They can't 
charge customers too much. But at the same time, we told them we are a bank. We need 
to take care of our shareholders and depositors... the balanced scorecard will help us focus 
on both. We will see how well we balance the two. 
A manager from the monitoring and evaluation division also gave a similar view that the 
BSC could capture both financial and customer performance, the two most important 
aspects of the bank's performance. In his view, although the BSC does not directly 
measure development performance, how well the bank achieves its development 
objectives can be captured by the customer performance indicators. By incorporating the 
BSC concept into the strategic planning process, he believed that the bank would get 
strategic plans which `balance' the interests of shareholders and customers, and 
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organisational members would be able to focus their attention on both financial and 
customer performance. 
In line with the information from the interviews, three key objectives of BSC adoption 
were identified in the bank's internal document. These three objectives are: (1) to 
formulate a corporate strategy map which would enhance management's understanding of 
the bank's strategy and align personal objectives with the corporate strategy; (2) to 
identify corporate KPIs which represent key perspectives of performance of the 
organisation; and (3) to align the work and policies of departments towards the same 
direction. 
While vertical alignment, functional integration, and balances between business and 
development objectives were key issues senior managers expected BSC to achieve, 
throughout the BSC construction process, various actors involved in it acted in different 
ways. In order to make it operable, the BSC was re-designed and re-defined, prompting 
the emergence of new identities and meanings of the BSC. 
6.3.3. Designing the BSC 
When BSC was introduced into the AgroBank, it encountered other prevailing 
performance measurement practices which had long been institutionalised in the 
organisation, one of the most important being budgetary control. Although budgetary 
control and the BSC had different emphases, some areas overlapped. To reconcile the 
BSC with budgetary control, BSC was modified. 
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6.3.3.1. Mediating the BSC with Budgeting Routine - BSC Became 
Disconnected from a Strategic Planning Process 
Within the AgroBank, there has long been a strong emphasis on budgetary control. 
During the budgeting process, corporate strategies and strategic plans are formulated, as 
discussed in Section 6.2.1. This process involves members of the board and several key 
executives of the bank. The president of the bank at the time claimed that a tradition of 
strong emphasis on budgetary control helped reduce disputes over the BSC to some 
extent, as benchmarking had long been institutionalised as practice within the 
organisation. However, it also led to another difficulty in implementing the BSC, that is, 
how to `fit' the BSC in with the budgeting process, and how to draw the attention of 
managers and organisational members to BSC indicators. 
In order to reconcile the BSC with the budgetary control, the bank chose to keep the 
budgeting process and compromise the BSC. That is, to formulate a strategy map, the 
bank extracted strategic objectives and key plans from its annual business plan and 
budget, re-classifying them into four dimensions of performance according to the BSC 
concept and placing them into causal chains. As the strategy map and BSC developed 
from the bank's annual business plan and budget, BSC was simply a highlight of key 
plans and budgeting targets of the bank. 
The approach taken by the bank to reconcile BSC with the budgeting process led some 
organisational members to question whether the bank would get the full benefit from the 
BSC, as the BSC concept was not used in formulating strategic plans. A manager from 
the monitoring and evaluation division observed that BSC came after budgetary control; 
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thus, the bank had to find a place for the BSC. Nevertheless, in his view, this could be 
changed if it were deemed appropriate and important. 
By compromising the BSC design process, the bank could avoid complexities of the 
strategy map formulation (cf. Kasurinen, 2002). With the strategic plans and objectives 
having been already agreed during the budgeting and planning process, the bank could 
simply classify them into four perspectives according to the BSC approach. A manager 
from the monitoring and evaluation division argued, 
At the beginning, we thought about combining BSC with the annual strategic planning 
process, so that everything would be aligned and our plan would not miss any important 
areas. That is certainly a good way. In principle it should be like that. But we didn't have 
any experience. It's complicated. Formulating a strategic plan is a complex process. But 
if we take plans from the normal annual business planning process, it's easy; it's clearer. 
Those plans are already approved by board members and everyone in provincial offices has 
already agreed, so it's easy for us. Nobody can say that they don't agree with it. 
The timing of events in the financial year has proved to be a key issue in making the BSC 
operational, since it has meant that in practice the organisation has been focussing on 
formulating its annual business plan and budgeting targets prior to developing the BSC 
strategy map, indicators and targets for the year. This largely because of having to be 
responsive to external parties, in particular certain government agencies concerned with 
rural and more general political issues. As the bank's operations have an impact on the 
well-being of farmers, who are the major population of the country, such agencies have 
great interest in the bank's operations and plans. These government agencies often 
require the bank to submit its annual plans and budgets early, for example, in late 
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November, for the Ministry of Finance. Meanwhile, the bank does not need BSC 
indicators and targets until April, the beginning of the fiscal year. In this respect, the 
bank in practice finalises its plan and budget earlier, in order to meet the external 
deadlines. 
Moreover, BSC failed to enrol the interests of all the members of the board involved in 
the strategic planning process. As a manager of the system development and analysis 
division argued, the annual business plan and budget was formulated by the committee, 
which comprised members of the board who were primarily representatives of 
government agencies. The major concern of the board members revolved around the 
issue of how the bank could respond to the relevant governmental policies. Implementing 
new management systems was not their major concern. Furthermore, BSC did not 
demonstrate how it would help the bank better respond to government policies. He 
commented, 
If we have [the academic consultant who was a board member of one private commercial 
bank and introduced BSC to that bank] or [another academic consultant who provided a 
service for BSC implementation in another state-owned commercial bank] as our board, we 
might be using BSC for strategic planning now. But our board have their own expertise. 
We have to respect them. We can't put them in a classroom to learn about BSC. 
With the attempt to reconcile the BSC with the budgeting routine, the BSC was 
disconnected from the strategic planning process. It became primarily a tool to monitor 
the performance of strategic plans formulated during the budgeting process. 
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6.3.3.2. Negotiating the BSC Content 
Although the decision to import the strategy and strategic plans formulated during the 
budgeting process to the BSC design process helped reduce complexities in designing the 
BSC in certain respects, the bank encountered other technical difficulties in its design. 
Two major issues, as indicated in Chapter 2, concerned the dimensions of performance 
and cause-and-effect relationships. 
6.3.3.2.1. Should It Be Four Boxes or More? 
The nature of the BSC, which attempts to encompass all operations and customer related 
issues, provoked a debate within the AgroBank, namely, what dimensions of performance 
should be included in the scorecard? This problem arose largely due to the dual, but 
sometime conflicting, roles of the bank. 
As discussed in Section 6.3.2, the AgroBank needed to undertake a number of projects 
that were not profitable financially, but beneficial for society. Examples of these projects 
included the farmer life quality and potential development project, which comprised a 
number of training courses such as `strong community and group creation', `life creation', 
`leader creation' and `truthful principles of life', the creation of a community learning 
centre, and a writing-off of the debts of dead or missing farmers after the tsunami hit the 
six provinces in the south of Thailand in December 2004. In addition, the presence of 
public officials as the majority of the board implied a number of policies that were 
primarily short-term agenda which did not support long-term financial sustainability. For 
instance, the bank was required to provide loans at rates considerably below those of 
commercial lenders, and in many cases, the bank was required to lend, even where an 
investment project had been deemed not viable from a financial point of view. Although 
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the bank received subsidies from the government for some projects, the bank needed to 
rely on its own resources to conduct a number of other activities. 
On the other hand, as a financial institution, the AgroBank needed to maintain strict 
financial discipline. Although the government would inject more capital into the bank in 
the case of financial distress, the bank had to retain its financial viability in order to gain 
confidence from its customers and fund providers, both depositors and lenders. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, the bank had attempted to reduce its reliance on external sources 
of funds. It was, therefore, necessary to assure the depositors that their money was safe 
with the bank. In addition to an attempt to gain the trust of the depositors, the central 
bank had recently imposed tightened rules on the capital reserves of the bank. It became 
imperative for the bank to meet the financial standard required by the Bank for 
International Settlements, which the central bank had adopted and applied to the 
AgroBank as well as to other commercial banks. 
The dual, and sometimes conflicting, roles of the bank provoked a debate on what 
dimension of performance to emphasise - financial or development performance? If the 
development performance should be measured and emphasised, how would the bank 
measure it? Should development performance be another dimension, for example, social 
performance added to the original four perspectives of the BSC, or could it be 
incorporated into the customer performance dimension? Should other aspects of 
performance, such as environment, be added? 
With the main mission of improving the quality of life of farmers and rural people, some 
organisational members believed that the bank should incorporate social and 
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environmental aspects as additional dimensions into the scorecard. However, the other 
group of organisational members argued that the bank's performance from a development 
perspective could be included in the customer aspect because the majority of the 
population in rural areas were farmers who were customers of the bank. From this 
standpoint, customer performance could include not only customer satisfaction, but also 
customers' well-being. As the majority of people in rural areas were customers of the 
bank, it was argued that measuring customers' quality of life would provide a good 
indicator of the quality of life of farmers in rural areas in general. 
Similar arguments were discussed around the issue of environmental performance. 
Promoting replenishment of natural resources and conservation of the environment was 
one of the main missions of the bank, as explicitly indicated in the bank's annual report 
and corporate plan (see Figure 5.1 in Chapter 5, Section 5.2). In addition, the bank 
implemented a number of policies promoting environmentally friendly farming 
production; for example, in considering loan applications, the bank would evaluate 
possible environmental impacts, and would not authorise loans if negative impacts were 
expected. Some management staff argued that the bank should add the environment as 
another dimension in the BSC. 
However, many organisational members disagreed. One provincial director, who was a 
member of management staff in the monitoring and evaluation division and had been 
involved with BSC construction since the early stages, suggested that there were many 
uncontrollable factors that might have an impact on environment performance. For 
instance, the operations of the bank were related to agricultural production, which 
involved the considerable use of fertilisers, but the bank could not force all farmers to 
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replace chemical fertilisers with organic. By having a number of farming customers 
using chemical fertiliser, the bank would lose its score on environment performance. In 
his opinion, inability to control farmers and other agencies was one of the reasons for 
many members of staff not wanting to measure environmental performance. 
In addition to the debate about the dimensions of performance to be included in the 
scorecard, there were also concerns over how to measure development performance. A 
number of questions were raised on appropriate KPIs for representing development 
performance. Many organisational members argued that it was difficult to measure the 
impact of the projects and activities undertaken by the bank on the quality of life of the 
people. Some organisational members expressed doubt about how to identify whether the 
improvement in the quality of life of customers was the result of the bank's projects. The 
question of what was meant by quality of life was also raised; does it pertain to GDP per 
head, or it is happiness in life that better represents a `good' quality of life? 
Many of the banking staff also expressed concern that there could be many other factors 
affecting bank performance beyond the control of the bank; in particular, farming 
activities, which depended substantially on natural environment and climatic conditions. 
Concerns were raised about how to incorporate these risks associated with farming 
activities into the BSC indicators and targets. A senior executive of the bank argued, 
Sometimes, we can't measure it; we have to accept it. We are not God; we can't control 
rain and other things. Agriculture is a risky business. Sometimes, we have to accept that it 
is not fair to measure everything we want. 
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Another senior executive also raised some concerns regarding the length of time needed 
to measure and observe results from the development projects. He argued, 
Some projects take a long time before we can see the results. For example, we once had 
the oil palm tree project at Ao Luek. We provided financial and knowledge support for 
local people in that area to grow oil palm trees; but it took a long time for the trees to grow 
and be cultivated. During the first few years, we couldn't measure the impact of our 
project. We had to wait for some time before we could start measuring how much our 
project helped improve the economic situation of the people there. 
After all the debates and discussions about the dimensions of performance and 
performance indicators to be included in the scorecard, the bank decided to develop its 
corporate BSC with four dimensions of performance, in accord with the original BSC 
concept, namely, organisation and learning, internal process, customer, and financial. 
Performance indicators concerned with development performance were included in the 
customer perspective. No weight was given to any particular dimensions, as, from the 
perspective of a number of staff members, all corporate KPIs chosen were critical. It can 
be seen that while some actors attempted to construct the BSC linkages to cover wider 
areas of performance, others attempted to block them. It was inevitable that the BSC 
could not cover all areas that some actors might have expected. 
6.3.3.2.2. Cause-and-Effect Relationships and Strategy Map - Another Area of 
Controversy 
In addition to dimensions of performance to be included in the BSC, another concept 
crucial to the BSC design which provoked debate within the AgroBank was cause-and- 
effect relationships among dimensions of performance, the most disputed issue being 
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around the relationship between customer and financial performance. Many senior 
managers believed that customer performance, including customers' quality of life, was a 
leading indicator of financial performance. They argued that if the farmers' quality of life 
were enhanced, they would repay their loans, and therefore, the financial performance of 
the bank would be improved. A senior manager of the programme and budget division 
suggested, 
We see money we spend on developing customers as an investment. If our customers are 
stronger and have better abilities, it will reflect in our financial performance. Our loan 
quality will improve. 
However, a manager from the monitoring and evaluation division contended that an 
improvement in customer performance did not necessarily lead to better financial 
performance. On the contrary, it might even impair the bank's financial performance. He 
argued, 
Improved customer quality of life doesn't mean that our financial performance will 
improve. We have to spend a lot of money on development projects. They generate more 
losses than profits. 
A senior executive of the bank also gave an example of the situation when the 
improvement in customers' quality of life did not lead to better financial performance of 
the organisation. He argued, 
The oil palm tree project at Ao Luek I mentioned earlier is our classic example of this. 
Those local people came to us empty-handed. We gave them loans and all the support for 
them to grow the oil palm trees. We granted them loans without any collateral, just personal 
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guarantee. They really had nothing at that time. After few years, it became a very 
developed community. People built houses, and bought cars and televisions. They had 
everything. If you ask whether the project was a success, oh yes, it was a great success. But 
did they pay back any loan? No, they didn't. We incurred a lot of bad debts from this 
project. That worried me a lot. 
This senior executive suggested that the relationship between customer and financial 
performance were complicated and by no means unidirectional. He argued, 
Sometimes, timing is a very important issue. Like the case of the oil palm trees I referred to, 
after several years, these people wanted to expand their plantations. They also needed to 
replace some of the trees that no longer produced anything, or those that had died. At the 
time they needed more money, they started thinking about us. So they came to us and paid 
money back to us in order to get a new loan. So you can't say that if customers' quality of 
life improves, the financial performance of the bank will improve; it is not that simple. I 
think timing is another important dimension that we need to consider. We need to understand 
this. 
Another senior executive also added that the relationship between customer and financial 
performance was two-way. He argued, 
It's not easy to say whether customer performance leads to financial performance, or 
financial performance leads to customer performance. Financial performance is crucial; it's 
like bread and butter. We have to survive before we can help others. If we are not strong, 
how can we help others? However, we can't focus on our financial performance without 
thinking about our customers. Our customers are like our fundamental; if the grassroots 
can't survive, we can't survive either. 
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Despite debate over which dimension was a leading or lagging performance, the bank 
eventually followed the BSC causal chains proposed by Kaplan and Norton (2001a, p. 
135) for non-profit and government agencies. Therefore, the strategic objectives on the 
strategy map were linked in the following causal chain: organisation and learning -i 
internal process 4 financial and customer -i mission (see Figure 6.2 for the AgroBank's 
first strategy map). The external consultant suggested that relationships between strategic 
objectives on the strategy map were established based on logic and the experience of the 
bank's managerial staff. 
After the corporate strategy map had been formulated, corporate KPIs were identified. 
Then, a BSC steering committee was established to develop a detailed definition and to 
set the target of each corporate KPI. The BSC steering committee identified relevant 
departments which should be responsible for each corporate KPI. A series of interviews 
and discussions with the management of relevant departments was organised to discuss 
the detailed definition and performance targets of each KPI. By the end of 2002, the 
bank's first corporate BSC, with a detailed definition of each KPI and target, was 
completed. It consisted of 36 KPIs, including 8 financial indicators, 6 customer 
indicators, 13 internal process indicators and 9 organisation and learning indicators. At 
this stage, some of the KPIs were taken from `TRIS measurement' and budgeting targets. 
The document presenting the strategy map and detailed corporate BSC was called the 
`KPI dictionary'. 
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6.3.4. Initial Networks of Support 
During the initial stage of BSC construction, several actors attempted to create networks 
of support for BSC; several events and activities were organised to direct the attention of 
the AgroBank's staff to BSC. In addition to the president and the director of human 
resource planning division at the time, who provided strong support for BSC 
development, the external consultant played a pivotal role. He led a number of 
workshops and helped settle debates on BSC design. In addition, he played an important 
role in mediating between a senior vice president, policy and planning department48 and 
managers from other departments when negotiating targets. 
Another important actor reinforcing BSC implementation was TRIS. Progress of the 
BSC development project was set as one of the KPIs, accounting for 5 percent of the total 
score in the `TRIS measurement' for fiscal year 2002. As results from the `TRIS 
measurement' would have an impact on bonuses for all the banking staff, it was expected 
that setting the progress of the BSC project as one of the TRIS indicators would motivate 
staff to work hard to make BSC work. 
Academic and professional communities also played a vital role in promoting the learning 
of BSC. In 2002, the Thai Bankers' Association organised a training course for 
management and executives of Thai banks at a business school, and part of the course 
was concerned with BSC. With strong support from the bank's president at the time, the 
AgroBank sent its entire head office senior management staff to attend the course. 
48 The department was renamed as a policy and strategy department in fiscal year 2004. 
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Moreover, in 2003, the human resource management department has integrated questions 
on BSC into the examination for staff promotion, in order to force employees to acquire 
knowledge about BSC. Translated BSC books, along with articles from local journals, 
magazines and newspapers about the implementation and use of BSC in Thai 
organisations, were also kept in the bank's library for staff to review in their own time. 
With the popularity of BSC in the Thai business communities at the time, some senior 
managers and staff involved in the early stage of BSC development recognised the 
legitimation that the bank obtained from adopting the BSC. An executive vice president 
suggested that BSC was a well-known performance management concept; therefore, it 
would be easy for the bank to discuss and present its performance to interested parties, 
including the Ministry of Finance, if the bank used BSC. He argued, 
Although we have already focused on financial and customer dimensions, it has not been 
systematic. When we tell people we do this and that, it's like we just speak to ourselves. 
Nobody understands how we balance between financial and customers. But if we say we 
use BSC, others will understand and accept. 
One manager of the monitoring and evaluation division made a similar comment: 
When you asked me how we monitored performance before using the BSC, I couldn't 
answer. I didn't know how to explain. But now I can tell you and others that we are using 
the BSC. 
Another member of staff from the system analysis and development division claimed that 
the BSC would help the bank improve its image. She argued, 
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People used to see us as a slow, dated, conservative organisation. But now with modem 
management techniques like the BSC, they see us as being more modem. It helps us 
achieve our vision of being a modem development bank. 
A number of the bank's management team were proud that the bank was among the first 
in Thailand to implement the BSC, and various organisations, particularly government 
agencies, have come to visit the bank to learn about its BSC. 
Although top management had positive feelings about technical benefits and legitimacy 
the bank could gain from adopting the BSC, which helped create networks of BSC 
support at the initial stage, BSC did not manage to enrol all relevant actors. The all- 
encompassing nature of the BSC connected it to various groups of actors, some of whom 
inevitably attempted to block various linkages in the assembly. Some organisational 
members questioned benefits the bank would receive, in view of the time needed to be 
spent on the collecting of actual performance data from the bank's dated information 
systems. 
BSC was one of the management control systems that attempted to encompass many 
areas, from strategies to operations. Inevitably, there were some other existing 
management control systems in place that had already played roles in monitoring and 
managing performance in certain areas that BSC was now covering. For example, a 
quality management system ISO 9001: 2000, which the bank implemented in 2001, had 
already measured customer and internal process performance, and financial performance 
was already monitored and managed by the budgetary control system. This led some 
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organisational members, particularly those at operational level, to question why BSC was 
needed while other prevailing systems were adequately performing the job. 
Although some of the organisational members did not perceive the benefits obtained by 
the bank from implementing BSC, they did not express negative responses towards it; 
instead, they simply disregarded the BSC. When the director of the monitoring and 
evaluation division at the time started to collect information on performance measured by 
36 corporate KPIs on the bank's first BSC at the end of fiscal year 2002, a number of 
departments said that they could not provide such information. Many of them claimed 
that they had not been informed about BSC until almost the end of the fiscal year. This 
was partly because the BSC was not completed until the end of 2002, whereas the bank's 
fiscal year 2002 ended on 31S` March 2003. To address this problem, another 
performance monitoring technology - the `operation room' - was introduced as the 
`interessement device'49 (Callon, 1986), to help enrol interests of various actors in the 
BSC. 
6.3.5. Constructing the `Operation Room' -An Interessement Device 
When staff from the monitoring and evaluation division attempted to collect information 
on actual performance based on the BSC's KPIs, relevant departments did not respond 
well. The president of the bank at the time believed that some organisational members 
simply ignored the BSC because they considered it as another report on paper to which 
not many people would pay attention, and the collecting of performance data to feed into 
the BSC was just additional paperwork that they could put off until later. In his view, 
having a meeting room to present the BSC's KPIs and actual performance results on a 
49 The interessement device is a device "which can be placed between [actors] and all other entities who 
want to define their identities otherwise", in order to enrol the interests of the actors (Callon, 1986, p. 208). 
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board would force staff to pay more attention to the BSC, as other departments would see 
how well they were performing. If any targets were not met, responsible departments 
would be ashamed. Therefore, he introduced the idea of building the `operation room' to 
present the BSC. 
The `operation room' idea was based on the Management Cockpit® or War Room concept 
initiated by Patrick M. Georges, a neurosurgeon and professor of management at HEC 
Paris - CRC and Solvay Business School, Brussels. The management of the AgroBank 
first learned about the Management Cockpit® concept from the training course for senior 
management organised by the Thai Bankers' Association at the business school50 
mentioned in the previous section. Some of the AgroBank's management staff also 
visited the room at Krung Thai Bank Public Limited Company, a state-owned listed 
commercial bank, where the Corporate War Room was built in 2000. 
According to the original Management Cockpit® concept, performance indicators are 
presented on three walls in the meeting room. Strategic objectives, which are usually 
related to financial indicators, are presented on a `black wall', whereas external factors 
that may prevent the organisation from achieving its objectives are shown on a `red wall'. 
As for indicators related to internal resources, they are displayed on a `blue wall'; and a 
`white wall' can be used to exhibit big plans or projects. The black, red and blue walls 
each present 6 questions posed by management about financial, external and internal 
performance respectively. Then, under each question, 6 performance indicators that 
would answer the questions are identified and presented (see Figure 6.3). N. E. T. 
50 This business school may be considered a leader in Thailand for the development of Management 
Cockpit®. Within the school, the room was first constructed for educational purpose but later, a number of 
organisations, both public and private, visited and attended the training course in order to implement the 
Management Cockpit®in their organisations. 
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Research, a consulting company established by Patrick M. Georges, claimed that by 
presenting key information of the organisation on four walls as such the risk of making 
wrong decisions would be limited because this would help improve the brain's 
performance (N. E. T. Research website). 
Fascinated by the idea of Management Cockpit®, the president of the bank at the time 
decided to construct the Management Cockpit® at the bank. Nevertheless, every 
translation involves transformation, and this was the case when the bank constructed its 
Management Cockpit®. The president of the bank believed that it was too costly to 
construct the room with full software functions. In his view, it would be more useful and 
economically viable to adapt the room to suit the bank's operations. He argued, "In my 
opinion, substance is more important than form". The Management Cockpit® idea, thus, 
was modified by bundling it with BSC and `TRIS measurement' and was named the 
`operation room'. 
To implement the president's initiative, the monitoring and evaluation division organised 
a series of workshops to review vision, strategies, action plans, activities, projects and 
corporate KPIs for fiscal year 2003. The `operation room' was built with corporate KPIs 
from the BSC presented on one of the walls, called the KPI or BSC wall. 51 On the 
opposite wall, TRIS wall, KPIs from the performance agreement with the Ministry of 
Finance were exhibited. The third wall, the computer wall, presented information by 
using computers with advanced drill-down features to allow staff to see detailed 
information behind each KPI (see Figure 6.4). The construction of the `operation room' 
51 In the AgroBank, the terms `balanced scorecard' and 'KPI' are sometimes used interchangeably. 
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did not finish until several months of fiscal year 2003 had passed; thus, the room and the 
BSC were not fully used until April 2004. 
Internal Wall (Blue) Financial Wall (Black) 
FM FM FM 
FM FM FM 
External Wall (Red) 
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Figure 6.3: Original model of Management Cockpit® 
Stake- Internal 
Effectiveness Efficiency holders Management Financial Customer Process Learning 
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TRIS Wall BSC Wall 
Computer Wall 
Figure 6.4: Plan of the `operation room' in the head office of the AgroBank 
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After the `operation room' was completed, the monitoring and evaluation division 
organised a meeting to review corporate performance in the room on a monthly basis. 
The `operation room' became the centre of discussion and debate about the bank's 
performance of management from various departments. The discussion covered not only 
the aspects of performance measured by the BSC, but also those measured by TRIS. As 
the TRIS's KPIs had an impact on the bonuses of all staff, the `operation room' and 
information presented in the room received great attention from all organisational 
members. 
Some organisational members claimed that co-operation between departments started to 
emerge. They suggested that after having the `operation room', each department could 
see the extent to which the other departments were achieving targets. If any departments 
had problems, other departments could find a way to help before the end of the fiscal 
year. A member of staff from the human resource planning division observed, 
We are now working more as a team. We see how our work has an impact on the others; 
and if anyone has a problem, we can try to see how we can help. 
Another manager from the monitoring and evaluation division added, 
Like yesterday, we just had a meeting here [in the 'operation room']. Management from one 
department said that they couldn't collect the loans to meet the target. Management from 
the other department asked if you can't meet the loan collection target, can you find more 
fee-based income for us and we will take some of your loan collection targets. 
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When the bank started using the BSC to monitor performance, it may have seemed as 
though the BSC had been stabilised. BSC's KPIs were monitored on a monthly basis, 
and actions were undertaken if the bank could not achieve any particular targets. 
However, the BSC was not yet institutionalised. The translation process continued; the 
corporate BSC was further modified. New elements were added by BSC users with 
different interests. 
6.3.6. Translations Continued - Introducing a KPI Map and BSC Became 
More Than Just a Set of KPIs to Monitor 
In fiscal year 2004, the monitoring and evaluation division monitored BSC KPIs on a 
monthly basis, to ascertain the extent to which targets were being achieved. However, by 
measuring each KPI separately, managers of the monitoring and evaluation division 
believed that the BSC did not provide a clear picture of how each KPI affected the others. 
Although the strategy map provided a picture of how each strategic objective may relate 
to the others, the link was not sufficiently clear to be useful for management purposes. 
As a consequence, in fiscal year 2005, the division formulated a KPI map presenting 
corporate KPIs linked in causal chains to supplement the strategy map, which showed 
only causal chains of strategic objectives. Instead of monitoring each KPI individually, 
the monitoring and evaluation division started to identify causes of failure to achieve any 
corporate BSC targets by tracing back through the causal chains on the KPI map. By 
identifying cause-and-effect relationships among corporate KPIs, staff in the monitoring 
and evaluation division claimed that BSC provided a better picture of how each target 
was related, and where to make improvements in order to achieve the final goals. In this 
sense, for them, BSC became more than a set of KPIs to monitor. 
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Although the KPI map was incorporated as a part of the bank's 'KPI dictionary', it did 
not receive much interest from people outside the monitoring and evaluation division. 
Often, they tended to focus only on achieving their own targets. Nevertheless, one 
manager from the risk management office expressed great interest in the financial KPI 
aspect of the KPI map. He argued, 
I don't think there is a link between non-financial and financial performance. But I think for 
the financial part, we should be able to link them. These financial KPIs are calculated from 
mathematical formula, so they should all be linked. We have never tried to link them but 
once we link them, I'll show you some flaws in our financial plan. 
With great interest in the link between financial KPIs, he and another manager from the 
monitoring and evaluation division discussed and drew a map showing the cause-and- 
effect relationships of financial KPIs, and linked the map to various elements of the 
bank's financial statements. In his view, the financial KPI map would help him formulate 
a financial plan and manage financial performance in a more meaningful way. Although 
the financial KPI map he developed may not be qualified as a BSC from other people's 
perspective, as it contained information on financial performance only, it reflected how 
actors could mobilise their own interest to make sense of the part of BSC relevant to 
them. 
While the corporate BSC was still being modified and new elements were being added, 
the bank started to expand its BSC and `operation room' to the operational level. During 
that period, regional offices were not yet established; therefore, BSC expansion was 
carried out at the provincial level. 
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6.4. Translating the BSC at the Operational Level 
The bank started to expand the BSC and `operation room' development project to 
provincial offices in late 2003. According to the original plan, the provincial BSC and 
`operation room' development project would be carried out in three phases - the pilot 
phase in late 2003, the expansion phase in 2004, and the completion phase in 2005. 
Although the BSC and `operation room' development was a directive from the head 
office, it was largely left to the discretion of local managers as to how to design and 
implement it. With different attitudes and actions towards the BSC and `operation room', 
different versions of BSC emerged. 
6.4.1. Imitating the Head Office - BSC with the `Operation Room' as a 
Performance Monitoring Tool 
At the beginning of the project to expand the BSC and `operation room' concepts, six 
provincial offices were chosen as pilot offices. To select the pilot offices, provincial 
directors who had an interest in applying BSC for management purposes at their local 
offices nominated their own offices. Then, senior managers in the head office considered 
the capability of the provincial offices and personal ability of the provincial directors in 
their selection of the six pilot offices. Among the provincial offices chosen, two of them 
had a director who was working in the head office and had been involved in the corporate 
BSC development process since the early stages. 
In these six provincial offices, BSC and `operation room' was developed at one office at a 
time because senior management believed that staff from other provinces would be able 
to learn from the other offices' experience. To convey the importance of having the BSC 
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and `operation room' at every provincial office, the president of the bank at the time 
personally inaugurated the `operation room' as it was completed at each provincial office. 
In the six pilot provincial offices, the way in which BSC was developed was similar to 
that at the corporate level. Although top management in the head office claimed that the 
design of the BSC and `operation room' was left to the discretion of the provincial 
directors, they did not grant total freedom to provincial offices. Teams of staff from the 
head office were sent to advise provincial offices on how BSC should be developed. 
There was some debate around the issue of what dimensions of performance should be 
included. In similar vein to the debate during the BSC development at the corporate 
level, some provincial directors believed that social and environment performance should 
be incorporated as separated dimensions on the scorecard. However, the BSC team 
insisted on the four dimensions according to the original BSC concept. One provincial 
director commented, 
A lot of our work is for local communities. It's about social development. I think social and 
environment performance should be added; at least, social performance should be added. 
But they [the BSC team from the head office] said social performance can be included in 
customer performance, so we didn't add social performance. But I still think we should add 
it. 
After the debates, BSCs for the six pilot provincial offices were developed, with KPIs 
classified into four dimensions of performance - financial, customer, internal process, and 
organisation and learning. The corporate BSC indicators and targets were not allocated to 
provincial offices; rather, provincial offices identified their own indicators and set their 
own targets. One of the reasons for allowing provincial offices to identify their own KPIs 
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was the complex nature of the operations of the organisation. Within the AgroBank, the 
nature of the operations of provincial offices in different areas tended to vary 
significantly, due to the differences in customers and types of crop. Moreover, the 
provincial offices needed to co-ordinate with other local government agencies when 
planning and organising development activities. The AgroBank was only one of the 
organisations playing a particular role in developing communities; other government 
agencies also played a significant role in developing rural areas. As local government 
agencies in different areas tended to have different policies, it was important for 
provincial offices to consider the requirements and needs of these organisations in 
formulating their strategic plan, as well as in identifying KPIs. 
Most of the pilot provincial offices simply imitated the corporate BSC and `operation 
room' of the head office; that is, the strategic plans and strategic objectives formulated 
during the annual strategic planning process were classified into four dimensions 
according to the BSC concept, after which BSC KPIs were developed. KPIs from BSC, 
budgeting and performance agreements were then monitored separately. However, in one 
provincial office, local managers reconciled the BSC with the prevailing performance 
measurement systems in a different way. Instead of developing a new set of KPIs based 
on the BSC concept, the provincial office took KPIs from the performance agreement, 
signed by the provincial director with the branch administration department, and re- 
classified them into four perspectives according to the BSC concept. Thus, for this 
provincial office, there were only two sets of KPIs - budgeting KPIs and BSC KPIs - the 
latter being the same set as those found in the performance agreement. An example of 
KPIs on the BSC of three pilot provincial offices can be seen in Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.3: KPIs on the BSC of three pilot provincial offices. fiscal year 2004 
Office A Office B 52 Office C 
Financial Financial Financial 
1. Return on assets 1. Return on assets 1. Return on assets 
2. Net profit 2. Fee-based income 2. Net profit 
3. Revenue - interest and non- 3. Income growth 3. Profitability ratio 
interest 4. Loan interest rate margin 4. Total income 
4. Expenses - interest, bad 5. Deposit interest rate margin 5. Income structure 
debt, non-interest 6. Structure of deposits 6. Income growth 
5. Revenue to expense ratio 7. Operating expenses 7. Operation expenses to total expenses 
6. Loan to deposit ratio 8. Income per employee 8. Expense structure 
9. Operating expenses to total income 9. Asset structure 
10. Loan to deposit ratio 
11. Spread 
12. Loan repayment rate 
Customer Customer Customer 
1. Fee-based income 1. Deposit growth 1. Deposit structure 
2. Deposit amount 2. Loan disbursed to micro enterprises 2. Loan structure 
3. Loan disbursement for compared to target 3. Loan growth rate 
village funds 3. Growth of wholesales loans 4. Debtor classification 
4. Loan growth rate 4. Percentage of village funds in the 5. Customer groups attending training 
5. Strengthening of AMCs province that have transactions with the courses 
6. Customer satisfaction office 6. Loan disbursed to micro enterprises 
5. Growth in disbursing loans through 7. Number of village funds conducting 
buying discounted cheques business with the office 
6. Loan repayment rate excluding policy 8. Volume of AMCs' business 
loans 9. Percentage of customers conducting 
7. Loan repayment rate - policy loans business with the AMCs 
8. Number of customer groups attending 10. Customer satisfaction 
meeting about the bank's products and 11. Percentage of customers conducting 
activities business with the office to total 
customers 
Internal process Internal process Internal process 
1. Repayment rate of due 1. Loan to deposit ratio 1. Loan repayment rate 
loans 2. Overdue loan to total loan ratio 2. Performing loan to total loan ratio 
2. Repayment rate of overdue 3. Loan growth rate 3. Non-performing loan reduction 
interest 4. Deposit per employee 4. Overdue interest reduction 
3. Overdue loan to total loan 5. Repayment rate of loans under Debt 5. Repayment rate of loan under Debt 
ratio Restructuring Project Restructuring Project 
4. Overdue interest to total 6. Repayment rate of loans under Debt 
loan Suspension Project 
5. Repayment rate of overdue 7. Performance of people sector debt 
principal solving project 
6. Repayment rate of loan 8. Active customer groups 
under Debt Restructuring 9. Number of village funds attending 
project training courses organised by the office 
10. Purchasing and selling amount of 
AMCs compared to target 
Organisation and learning Organisation and learning Organisation and learning 
1. Progress of ISO I. Progress of PMS implementation 1. Employee satisfaction 
implementation 2. Number of branches that have updated 2. Training courses provided for 
2. Progress of PMS database employees 
implementation 3. Number of training courses for 3. Number of districts attending training 
3. Number of meetings - employees undertaken compared with target course on `Truthful principle of life' 
management, ALCO, staff 4. Expenses for employee development to 4. Percentage of customers who are 
4. Number of training courses total personnel expenses members of Funeral Aid Association 
5. Activities to promote ethics 5. Number of employees attending at least 5. Number of villages attending training 
6. Employee satisfaction one training course to total employees course on recovery and expansion of 
6. Number of employees attending training farmers' families' occupations 
courses provided through Thailand Training 6. Number of activities organised under 
Network the Pecr Assist Programme 
7. Percentage of employees undertaking 
further stud 
Source: KPI dictionary of provincial offices 
$2 Office B is the office which re-classified KPIs from the performance agreement. 
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To present the BSC indicators in the `operation room', with the exception of one, all pilot 
provincial offices mimicked what was done in the head office. That is, KPIs from the 
office's BSC were presented on one of the walls, and another wall exhibited KPIs from 
the performance agreement, which was equivalent to the TRIS wall at the head office. 
However, in the office that re-classified KPIs from the performance agreement into four 
dimensions, these KPIs were presented on two of the walls in the `operation room'. In 
these offices, maps showing agricultural products in areas of the province were also 
presented. Although the way to identify KPIs for BSC and present the KPIs in the 
`operation room' in the six pilot provincial offices might have been slightly different, for 
them, BSC was a performance monitoring tool which was part of the `operation room'. 
While the BSC and `operation room' was constructed in the six provincial offices, 
management in - other provincial offices started to discuss the costs and benefits of 
developing the BSC and building the `operation room'. These debates focused around the 
`operation room' rather than on the BSC. 
6.4.2. As Controversies Emerged, Construction Continued 
The `operation room' construction drew great attention from managers at the provincial 
level. `Operation room' is an object that can be seen physically; while it attracted more 
attention compared to the BSC, it also attracted more criticism. A number of staff at the 
operational level suggested that updating information in the `operation room' every 
month was time-consuming, particularly when the bank's information systems were still 
poor. They argued that provincial offices already had other performance measurement 
tools that were more effective and efficient. 
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One of the provincial directors argued, 
I am not sure whether building an operation room is beneficial. A number of branches have 
complained that it is time-consuming to update information manually every month. We 
already have other tools which can help us manage. 
A vice president of one regional office also gave a similar comment, 
When I was working with the loan department, we also had graphs to show a trend of 
performance and actual performance against targets. We drew charts to show staff how 
well we did, and encouraged them to achieve the targets. The operation room does the 
same thing, but just in a more appealing format. It would be great if the IT system could 
link actual performance to present in the operation room automatically. But with our IT 
systems, every month after receiving information on actual performance, it takes a week 
to change information into a graphic format, cut papers and put them in the room. It is 
really time-consuming. 
A senior vice president of another regional office observed, 
From discussing with management at provincial and branch levels, I think it is not 
necessary to set up the operation room at the operational level because we have all the 
information in paper format for management already. It is not necessary to present it in the 
room because we don't look at the data presented in the room, even though we have it. We 
still need to look at the paper reports anyway. It is more convenient. 
Despite controversies over the costs and benefits of the provincial BSC and `operation 
room', the BSC and `operation room' construction in provincial offices continued in 
many offices, with strong support from some top managers in the head office. In 2004, 
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an additional 21 provincial offices developed BSC and constructed their own `operation 
room'. For these provincial offices, prior to developing their BSC and `operation room', 
their management staff visited the `operation room' at one or more of the six pilot offices. 
Most of them chose to go to the offices located in the same region out of convenience. At 
the same time, however, they also learned about the BSC and `operation room' in other 
offices they did not visit when they met and discussed ideas with the management of 
other provincial offices in meetings. In addition, as in the pilot stage, teams of staff from 
the head office were sent to facilitate the BSC and `operation room' construction in these 
provincial offices, the teams imparting their experience from the head office and other 
provincial offices to the 21 provincial offices. Therefore, the BSC and `operation room' 
constructed at this stage remained, by and large, similar to that at the corporate level in 
the head office, and BSC was regarded as a performance monitoring tool. 
At this stage, BSC development at the provincial level was always bundled with the 
`operation room' construction. However, following the retirement of the president, who 
had strongly advocated the BSC and `operation room', in October 2004, the BSC 
development and `operation room' construction became separate issues. The `operation 
room' expansion project was suspended, while the BSC development continued. 
6.4.3. Re-fabricating the BSC - BSC was Disconnected from the `Operation 
Room' and Became a Planning Device 
As discussed earlier, among management staff at the operational level, the `operation 
room' attracted greater attention as well as more criticism than the BSC. A number of 
complaints about resources and time needed by provincial offices to spend on building 
and maintaining the `operation room' were sent to the new president, who, therefore, 
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reconsidered and introduced a new `operation room' policy at the operational level. The 
`operation room' would now be constructed at regional offices instead of provincial 
offices. With regard to further expansion (i. e. to provincial offices and branches), this 
decision was left to regional office management. In view of the fact that at the time the 
fieldwork was conducted, none of the regional offices had constructed their `operation 
room', there is no discussion of the `operation room' at regional offices in this study. 
Despite the suspension of `operation room' expansion, the BSC development at 
provincial level continued. The new president believed that BSC development was less 
costly, and that BSC would help employees at provincial and branch levels to focus their 
attention on both financial and non-financial performance. Therefore, in fiscal year 2005, 
all provincial offices were required to adopt the BSC approach to draw a strategy map 
and identify KPIs when formulating their annual action plans. Provincial directors who 
attempted to have minimal engagement with the `operation room' construction at the 
early stage could no longer avoid the BSC. They had to incorporate BSC into their action 
plans and submit it to their respective branch administration departments on an annual 
basis. Nevertheless, these provincial offices tended not to pay much attention to BSC 
targets. Rather, they focused on achieving targets from the performance agreement and 
budgeting. For them, BSC was merely a concept driving them to consider four 
perspectives of performance when formulating their annual plan. 
6.4.4. Further Translation - Adding a KPI Map and Making BSC More 
Than a Performance Monitoring Tool 
While many provincial directors used BSC only in the planning process, as required by 
the head office, and continued to use performance agreement and budgeting as major 
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tools to monitor performance, some provincial directors still attempted to construct an 
`operation room' and develop BSC. 
In one of the provincial offices visited, the provincial director attempted to develop BSC 
further. He suggested, 
Other provincial offices just copied it [the format of the `operation room'] from the head 
office. To do that they have to draw a graph or diagram which is complicated. I think we 
can just link the KPIs into causal chains, present numbers [actual performance compared 
with target] in boxes and use the colours red, yellow, green. Then, we can see why this 
one is green, and why this one is red... 
In this provincial office, a KPI map was formulated as a trial. The director of the office 
suggested that he was considering presenting a KPI map, rather than just a set of BSC 
KPIs, in the provincial office's `operation room' under construction. He claimed that he 
had learned about the KPI map from the external consultant while he was working with 
the monitoring and evaluation division in the head office, but the idea of such a map had 
not yet been picked up and developed for actual use by any other organisational members 
that he was aware of. 53 
He also showed the provincial KPI map and explained, 
53 At the time of discussion, a KPI map at corporate level was already formulated and incorporated in the 
corporate 'KPI dictionary'. However, the provincial director was not aware of it. As discussed earlier, the 
corporate KPI map received only scant attention from managers outside the monitoring and evaluation 
division. 
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We'll see that if we manage bad debts well and can control loan quality, costs will be low. 
And if we can also find a deposit to meet our target, our costs will also be low. If we can 
reduce costs and meet revenue targets, then our profit will improve. 
In his view, it would be more useful if his staff could see how one KPI might have an 
impact on the other(s). Nevertheless, he also found it difficult to develop a KPI map 
because it was hard to identify the cause-and-effect relationship among KPIs. Thus, 
instead of classifying KPIs into four dimensions, he suggested that he would classify 
KPIs into only 2 dimensions, financial and non-financial indicators, so that it would not 
be too complex. 
For this particular provincial director, it can be seen that BSC was more than just a 
planning tool and a set of KPIs to monitor. Rather, it was a tool that helped him identify 
where to make improvements to achieve the return on asset target, which was the ultimate 
KPI in the KPI map and also the KPI with the greatest weight in the performance 
agreement of the provincial office. 
6.5. Different Views and Understandings of BSC 
After the BSC had been developed and used for several years, organisational members 
developed different views and understandings of it. Some organisational members in the 
head office believed that BSC helped create shared accountability. As discussed in 
Section 6.3.5, staff from different departments met in the `operation room' to discuss their 
performance more often and attempted to help other departments that were unable to not 
meet the targets. 
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Although BSC may have brought more inter-departmental coordination, it has also 
brought to light a number of complexities. With the attempt to quantify non-financial 
performance, difficulties of identifying quantitative measures that could reflect some 
aspects of non-financial performance emerged. A number of managers argued that the 
bank's performance indicators reflected business performance rather than development 
performance. As a vice president of one regional office commented, 
I don't think performance indicators reflect how well we help farmers. If we look from the 
business perspective, the bank can reduce non-performing loans and get higher profit. But 
to repay their debt, farmers might need to create more debt with private moneylenders to 
repay the bank. So if we look from a development perspective, it is not reflected. 
The ex-president of the bank also commented that it was difficult to identify performance 
indicators that could reflect the impact of projects undertaken by the bank on farmers' 
quality of life, as there were many other factors involved. Difficulties in identifying and 
measuring non-financial performance also led to the exclusion of some aspects of 
performance. A vice president of one regional office observed that the current internal 
process indicators were concerned with customer performance rather than process 
performance. Indicators capable of reflecting internal process performance, such as 
reducing steps and time of work process and new product launches, were not measured. 
This view is consistent with that of a manager of the risk management office who argued 
that the indicators in the customer category were concerned with the bank's financial 
performance, while indicators in the internal process category were related to customer 
performance. In his view, there was no indicator on the bank's BSC that could capture 
the extent to which the bank had improved its work process. 
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Whereas some managers were concerned with the representativeness and 
comprehensiveness of the performance indicators, others expressed doubt about the 
method used by the bank to measure some aspects of performance. For example, the 
validity of customer satisfaction survey results was questioned. A vice president 
suggested that the bank might not obtain a true view of customers, as it was easy to 
manipulate the questionnaires, particularly when the majority of the respondents tended to 
be poorly-educated. "Many respondents tended just to say what they are told to say", he 
commented. This comment was in line with the opinion of TRIS, which believed that it 
was highly possible that the results from the customer satisfaction survey were biased. 
One branch manager stated that he did not rely on the survey results. Rather, he regularly 
observed how his staff dealt with customers, to ensure that customers were happy. 
Although BSC, and other performance measurement systems, may not comprehensively 
represent aspects of performance critical to the operations of the bank, organisational 
participants employed other methods to ensure that these aspects of performance were 
achieved. As a branch manager commented, 
Most of our indicators focus on financial performance. I think the current performance 
measurement systems adequately reflect financial performance but they do not 
comprehensively measure all crucial areas. For example, strengthening customers and 
customer groups receives only little attention. In the performance agreement, it carries 
only little weight. In some branches, they might pay more attention to achieve other 
targets which carry more weight. But for us, we can't neglect this issue. I have to try to 
communicate with my staff that our vision is to develop local communities. I always 
emphasise that strengthening customers is at the heart of our job. If our customers are 
strong, we will be strong. 
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She also commented, 
We measure how many customers attend our training courses. But from such indicator, 
we can't tell how well the customers apply knowledge they learn from our courses in 
their day-to-day life. So I have to follow up. For example, we provided training course 
on how to make organic fertiliser. Few months after the course, I went to ask suppliers 
which supply effective microorganisms [which is one of the key raw materials for 
making organic fertiliser] how much our customers had ordered effective microorganisms 
from them. 
Another branch manager made a similar comment, 
We taught them how to make soap, shampoo, washing liquid and detergent at home so 
that they can save some money. To follow up whether they actually use this knowledge, 
we check how much chemical agent they have bought from us. If they buy more of the 
agent, it means that they use it to make soap, shampoo, washing liquid and detergent as 
we taught them. This shows that they apply what we taught in their day-to-day life. So 
we can tell that the course is a success. 
While representativeness and comprehensiveness of the BSC, as well as other 
performance measurement systems, is one of the issues of concern, another area of 
complexity lay in the issue of cause-and-effect relationships and strategy map. 
Organisational members expressed different perceptions of the causal chains and the 
bank's strategy map. As discussed in Section 6.3.3.2.2, the bank put customer and 
financial performance at the same level on the strategy map. Management staff involved 
in the early stage of BSC development believed that the strategy map was designed as 
such because customer and financial performance were equally important for the bank. 
However, others suggested different views. 
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When discussing a strategy map of the organisation, a director from one division simply 
drew financial performance as an effect of customer performance. He argued that an 
improvement in organisation and learning performance would lead to better internal 
process performance; and better internal process performance would enhance customer 
performance, which, in turn, would lead to better financial performance; and finally, the 
bank would achieve its missions and vision. 
Another manager from the monitoring and evaluation division suggested a different view. 
He argued, 
We put the strategy map this way just because there is not enough space on a single A4 
sheet. It does not mean anything. Actually, it should be a continuous chain from 
organisation and learning to internal process to customer and eventually to financial, but 
the space on the paper does not permit it. 
He further argued, 
Actually, if you look carefully, everything is connected. It depends on where you want to 
start. We put it this way but we are not trying to say what will lead to what or what is 
more important than what. 
Since the bank started using the BSC, the bank had not examined statistically whether the 
cause-and-effect assumptions established were valid. Some staff claimed that the bank 
tested the existence of cause-and-effect relationships on the strategy map, but when being 
asked for examples of how the bank ensured that the causal chains formulated were valid, 
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the answers were unclear. For example, a member of managerial staff from the 
monitoring and evaluation division replied, 
We revise the strategy map every year. We revise our mission and vision every year, see 
the highlights of our policies this year, and see what plans that will support those policies. 
Then, we choose those plans to put in the strategy map in the internal process dimension. 
Another member of management from the same division argued that the bank revised and 
adjusted its KPIs annually but never tested the cause-and-effect relationships they 
believed to be valid. Nevertheless, he argued that after the KPI map was added in fiscal 
year 2005, the division started to pay attention to the validity of the causal chains and 
attempted to validate them. The external consultant commented that, from his view and 
experience, relationships among strategic objectives determined by most organisations 
were correct. When the actual results did not confirm the assumed linkage (e. g. the cause 
KPI is green but the effect KPI is red), it was usually from the result of a mistake when 
setting the targets. Although the consultant claimed that the causal chains established 
were largely valid, some staff of the bank started to question the existence of causal 
relationships between non-financial and financial performance. The debate on the 
question of the validity of cause-and-effect relationships led some management staff, who 
were initially convinced by BSC advocates' claims, to cast doubt on BSC after it had 
been used for certain periods. 
6.6. Concluding Remarks 
From the process of constructing the BSC discussed in this chapter, it can be seen that the 
BSC networks were slowly constructed. BSC received initial support from top 
management and some external- actors who had different interests and concerns. 
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Managers involved in the early stage of BSC interpreted the concept in different ways 
and expected BSC to serve different purposes. Throughout the design and 
implementation process, BSC was further translated. As one would expect to find in the 
introduction of any new management system, the process was complex and non-linear, 
and resistance from some organisational members arose. Nevertheless, despite the 
resistance, BSC survived; resistance led to re-fabrications of the BSC rather than a total 
abandonment. The all-encompassing nature of the BSC mean that it encountered other 
competing management control systems, and the attempt to reconcile the BSC with the 
prevailing management control practices led to re-fabrications of the BSC. Although the 
organisation started to use the BSC and BSC inscriptions were produced, it was still 
challenged. In other words, BSC had not yet become institutionalised as a set of taken- 
for-granted management practices; the translation of the BSC was still ongoing. 
After BSC adoption, the AgroBank continued to implement new performance 
measurement tools. A similar performance management philosophy at the employee 
level was adopted. As discussed in Chapter 5 Section 5.5.3, the subjective performance 
appraisal system based on `trust' was replaced by a new system focusing on objective and 
quantitative KPIs. Although some managers believed that BSC helped direct the 
attention of employees towards non-financial performance, an increase in emphasis on 
financial performance within the AgroBank was observed. At corporate level, the assets 
and liabilities management committee was established to focus on financial management. 
At the operational level, the assets and liabilities management committees were also 
created in every provincial office. The bank also introduced the Branch Management 
Information System (BMIS), a performance measurement system focusing exclusively on 
the financial performance of provincial offices and branches. 
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Chapter 7 
Discussion 
7.1. Introduction 
The preceding chapter presented the introduction and construction process of the BSC 
within the AgroBank. It demonstrated the way in which the BSC idea was brought into 
the organisation and how it was made operable. The way in which various actors/actants 
made allies to support, resist, and transform the BSC was described, and the means by 
which BSC was disseminated and localised in various parts of the organisation was 
presented. The chapter illustrated the events/actions associated with the process of BSC 
construction and translation within the organisation, and described the emerging and 
changing characteristics and meanings of the BSC. 
The empirical findings described in the previous chapter have shown that different actors 
mobilised their interests and concerns to translate the BSC in different ways. At the early 
stage of implementation, it was less than clear what the organisation expected to achieve 
from the BSC. While rhetorical claims and discourses around the BSC in the business 
communities influenced organisational members' perceptions of the BSC, the 
organisational members interpreted these claims in various ways. Throughout the 
implementation and utilisation process, various attempts to make BSC operable and align 
it with existing routines led to different combinations of diverse measurement practices. 
Various versions of the BSC emerged. The narrative, complemented by direct quotations 
from employees at different levels, demonstrated that during the expansion of the BSC 
and `operation room' to the lower levels, actors did not passively copy the head office 
model. Rather, they modified the BSC to make it suit their local conditions. In the `case 
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organisation', the BSC has not yet become institutionalised as a set of taken-for-granted 
management practices; neither has it disappeared. BSC is used in many parts of the 
organisation, although with variations in its usage, leading to possible differences 
between actual BSC adoption and initial expectations. 
From the evidence presented, it is apparent that a range of interpretations and reflections 
arise, concerning the underlying status and nature of the BSC, the impact of local and 
cultural factors on its implementation, and more generally about the growing use of 
management accounting and control systems in both operational and strategic contexts. 
In this chapter, some of these issues are analysed and discussed, and consideration is also 
given to how the findings from the study are related to the wider management control 
literature, and how far these findings support, complement or diverge from the extant 
research in the area. 
This chapter is organised into 8 sections. Section 7.2 analyses how the BSC idea came 
into the organisation and reasons for changes in performance measurement systems. The 
issue of what the organisation expected from the BSC is considered. Section 7.3 
discusses issues relating to the design of the BSC. It analyses how the performance 
indicators and cause-and-effect relationships were constructed, and how the open and 
ambiguous nature of the BSC concept has an impact on BSC design. Section 7.4 
considers ongoing translations during the BSC implementation and utilisation process. In 
Section 7.5, the issue of the relationship between the BSC and incentive systems is 
discussed. Section 7.6 discusses the notion of the `success' and `failure' of accounting 
system implementation. Section 7.7 provides some reflections on the issues of identities 
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and meanings of the BSC. Finally, Section 7.8 summarises the key issues discussed in 
the chapter. 
Organising the chapter discussion in this way is in no way intended to suggest that 
accounting change is a linear process, whose result is a new system that is well-defined, 
designed, and implemented. As will be discussed in this chapter, the design, 
implementation and utilisation of the BSC are ongoing and intertwined processes, in 
which the actions of networks of human and non-human actors play key roles. This can 
be seen in the way that the BSC at AgroBank was developed initially, and then modified 
and re-designed during implementation and use. 
7.2. Introducing the BSC and Fabricating Its Objectives - Dynamic Associations 
of Global and Local Actors 
Empirical findings presented in Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 show that changes in the bank's 
performance measurement systems were driven by dynamic associations of local and 
global actors or actants. The organisation did not adopt BSC because there was any 
reliable and objective knowledge of economic benefits deriving from its adoption. 
Neither did the organisation adopt the BSC because it was forced to by external factors. I 
shall argue that change was, rather, a result of diverse actions wherein actors, both local 
and global, attempted to build actor-networks of associations to support their own agenda 
and beliefs (Chua, 1995; Briers and Chua, 2001). While global actors played a significant 
role in disseminating the BSC idea, BSC adoption was initiated by local actors who 
perceived BSC as one of the possible solutions to the organisation's problems. 
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As discussed in Section 6.3.1, consultants, business media and business schools have 
played a significant role in constructing networks of support for BSC diffusion in Thai 
business communities (cf. Qu, 2004). These actors have engaged in discussions on 
strategic performance management and the BSC and in publication activity as well. 
These practices had a significant and widespread impact within AgroBank, as it was 
largely through books, practitioner journals, newspapers, seminars and conferences 
presenting and discussing the BSC idea and its `successful' implementation, that the BSC 
concept penetrated the organisation. This wave of positive reinforcement seemingly 
dominated perceptions, overcoming considerations such as the fact that in some 
organisations that were seen as `successful' BSC implementation cases, BSC was not yet 
used to measure or manage performance, and it was still uncertain even as to whether 
BSC would be adopted. Regardless of that, the AgroBank's organisational members 
frequently regarded such organisations as cases of `successful' BSC implementation 
primarily because the consultants presented them as such. This is in line with a more 
general perception that actors associated with the BSC network have created a reputation 
for the BSC in business communities, so that the BSC has become an object which has 
the image of a `modern' management tool that is very difficult to resist (Hansen and 
Mouritsen, 2005). 
From reviewing books, articles from journals and newspapers, reports and presentations 
made by academics and consultants in Thailand, it was possible to conclude that 
academics and consultants in Thailand have tended to present the BSC concept via a close 
translation Kaplan and Norton's version of it. They have apparently not sought to bundle 
the BSC with other local management practices in order to make the BSC more attractive 
(cf. Ax and Bjornenak, 2005). Nevertheless, BSC was seen as attractive for many Thai 
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organisations, including the AgroBank, partly because the notions of `balance', 
`alignment', `focus' and `translate strategy into action' discussed and presented by the 
BSC proponents were pertinent to the current concerns of many organisations. At the 
same time, these notions were broad and open enough to allow organisations to interpret 
them in different ways that gave the BSC the appearance of being able to solve, or at least 
sa alleviate the specific problems they confronted. 
Widespread adoption of BSC among Thai organisations attracted the interest of key local 
actors within the AgroBank, which may help to explain why BSC was the specific 
performance management model adopted by the bank. However, this does not explain 
why the AgroBank sought a new performance management system in the first place. 
Why did the AgroBank imitate other organisations, and why was BSC seen as superior to 
the existing performance management systems? As Sahlin-Andersson (1996) argues, 
changes are usually problem-driven; organisations will seek to adopt new management 
trends if local actors perceive problems in their organisation. From the empirical findings 
discussed in Section 6.3.2, different groups of organisational members were concerned 
with different problems. While some of them were primarily concerned with 
communication and co-ordination across hierarchical levels, others were more concerned 
with cross-functional integration or the financial emphasis of the existing strategic plans 
and performance measurement systems. In other words, it was the specific problems that 
organisational members were having to confront at the time which seem to have had a 
major influence on their perceptions and expectations of the BSC (Hansen and Mouritsen, 
2005). The local problems drove the construction of the formal objectives attached to 
BSC adoption. 
sa Briers and Chua (2001) describe these types of concepts as visionary boundary objects, "conceptual 
objects that have high levels of legitimacy within a particular community... possessing a sacred quality that 
makes it difficult for a `rational' person tobe against" (p. 242). 
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Beyond that, it is not easy to identify whether the organisation, in confronting problems 
and thus looking for solutions, regarded BSC as a potential solution to the problems, or 
whether on the other hand the BSC proponents within the organisation decided first to 
adopt the BSC and then were able to identify organisational problems justifying the 
decision. But in either case, the BSC was a broad enough concept to enable local 
problems to be addressed by it, and this in itself made the BSC attractive. 
Whilst there are some technical justifications for BSC adoption in the AgroBank, the 
specific choice of BSC is also largely influenced by the legitimacy of the BSC established 
by the global BSC network. As discussed in Section 6.3.4, many organisational members 
believed that BSC could help the bank create a `modern' image and gain legitimacy from 
government agencies. However, this is not to suggest that the organisation was simply 
forced by external institutional pressures to adopt the BSC for legitimacy purpose. 
Again, it is not possible to reach a clear decision as to whether the adoption of a particular 
management model was for technical or legitimacy reasons. In saying this, it is 
recognised that some accounting scholars have attempted to identify whether the motive 
for the adoption or imitation of a new management model is based on technical, rational 
considerations of efficiency, or driven by the desire for legitimacy and based on fad and 
fashion (e. g. Malmi, 1999; Hussain and Hoque, 2002). However, findings from this study 
suggest that efficiency and legitimacy forces were intertwined (see Powell, 1991), and it 
is difficult, if not impossible, to identify which force was stronger (see Section 6.3.2 and 
6.3.4, where a discussion of organisational members' expectations of the BSC is 
presented). 
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Thus, instead of attempting to identify whether changes in performance measurement 
systems (in this case, BSC adoption) were the result of economic or institutional force, 
this study traces activities/actions of actors or actants connected to the BSC, and 
examines how these actors played roles in constructing and translating the BSC. The 
study argues that changes in performance measurement systems of the organisation are 
seen as being influenced by both internal and external actors who may have different 
interests, motives and agendas. 
When a new management accounting idea or instrument is introduced to an organisation, 
it is usually done so with a degree of ambiguity, vagueness and openness. In the case of 
BSC in particular, a number of concepts around it are vague and ambiguous, being 
supported by convincing rhetorical devices, rather than strong theoretically-sound 
argumentation (Norreklit, 2003). Although the openness of the concepts around the BSC 
can sometimes lead to complexities in the designing and implementing of it, in some 
situations it can make the BSC more powerful. As discussed in this section, it makes the 
BSC attractive as it can accommodate different meanings and interpretations. The open 
nature of the BSC also has a significant impact on its design, implementation and 
utilisation. 
7.3. Constructing the BSC - Negotiations, Mediations and Articulations around 
the BSC Design 
Empirical findings discussed in Chapter 6 demonstrate that when the global BSC idea 
was introduced into the organisation, the process of constructing and translating it into 
practice involved ongoing negotiations, articulations and mediations of interests, tensions 
and conflicts (Hansen and Mouritsen, 2005). In the process of designing the BSC, 
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discussed in Section 6.3.3, debates within the organisation focused on the two key issues 
- identifying dimensions of performance and KPIs, and establishing cause-and-effect 
relationships. 
Complexities during the design of the BSC arose primarily from the open and ambiguous 
nature of some of the BSC concepts, which allowed different actors to interpret the 
concepts in different ways. As Nerreklit (2003, p. 610) has argued, the BSC concept as 
presented by Kaplan and Norton (1996a) is "an indirect text, which is open to 
interpretation, intuition and emotions. As a result, the readers' subjective interpretations 
of the text determine how they understand it. The effect of this is that, given the broad 
and imprecise concepts which make it difficult to talk in detail about the model, it is 
impossible to have a real discussion on the logic of the model.. . When readers read their 
own intentionality into the theory, the result is likely to be their own theories rather than 
that of Kaplan and Norton. " Although the generic forms of the BSC, such as the four 
dimensions and cause-and-effect logic, seem to be `empty' and capable of causing 
complexities in its design and implementation, as Norreklit (2003) has argued, empirical 
findings from the study suggest that the open nature of these concepts can, on the other 
hand, be powerful. Such openness prompted some of the organisational problems to 
become more visible and generated discussions within the organisation focussed on their 
resolution. 
7.3.1. Measuring Non-Financial Performance 
Empirical evidence presented in Section 6.3.3.2 has shown that one of the important 
issues of debate when designing the BSC was related to what dimensions of performance 
should be included in the scorecard. Debates and discussions around this issue were 
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driven largely by organisational problems. Within the AgroBank, the problem of how to 
monitor the extent to which the organisation achieved its development objectives has long 
been a major concern among many organisational members (see Section 6.3.2). 
However, the pre-existing performance measurement systems did not allow this problem 
to be negotiated. Budgetary control focused primarily on financial performance, whereas 
`TRIS measurement' indicators were imposed by the Ministry of Finance, through TRIS, 
leaving little room for organisational participants to negotiate. However, with the open- 
endedness of the BSC, the possibility of engaging with this problem was made real and 
negotiation became a real option. 
As Kaplan and Norton (1996a) argue, the four perspectives proposed should be 
considered as a template, rather than a rigid framework, and the choice of perspectives to 
measure should depend on the industry's circumstances and the strategy of business units. 
By leaving it open to the organisation to decide what should be included in the scorecard, 
some of the organisational members of the AgroBank attempted to add social and 
environment performance as additional dimensions in the scorecard. In their view, these 
dimensions represented key strategic objectives of the organisation. However, the 
ambition to cover all strategic issues in the scorecard is difficult, if not impossible, to 
achieve. With the attempt to extend the linkages to cover wider areas, the BSC inevitably 
starts to bring in and connects wider groups of actors who may have different interests, 
some of whom may attempt to block linkages in the assemblage. As shown in Section 
6.3.3.2.1, the attempts to include environmental performance in the BSC were blocked by 
organisational members who were concerned with uncontrollable issues that may impact 
the score. 
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Although the open nature of the BSC allowed debate on what dimensions of performance 
to include in the scorecard, the AgroBank decided to keep the original four dimensions of 
performance, in line with Kaplan and Norton's suggestion. By so doing, the organisation 
was able to maintain a certain level of comfort. These four boxes of performance have 
gained their validity and legitimacy through networks of support from various actors, 
including Kaplan and Norton, consultants, media, and other organisations which attempt 
to promote the use of BSC. Although these original four dimensions of performance may 
not comprehensively represent strategic objectives of the organisation, many 
organisational members had confidence that it would work for the organisation, as it had 
been seen to work elsewhere. 
Although the AgroBank decided to keep the original four dimensions of performance 
according to Kaplan and Norton's suggestion, a debate when choosing KPIs to be 
integrated into the customer and internal process dimensions were largely concerned with 
social dimensions and issues. Performance indicators which, in the organisational 
members' view, would monitor the well-being of customers were incorporated into the 
customer and internal process dimensions on the scorecard. This again reflects the open 
yet robust nature of the BSC, which allows local problems and concerns to be added, 
while at the same time, maintaining its identity within the four boxes of performance 
(Hansen and Mouritsen, 2005). 
Whilst Kaplan and Norton (1992) propose a supplement of non-financial performance 
indicators as one of the solutions to the problem of over-emphasis of the financial 
performance of many companies, the inclusion of non-financial performance measures in 
the BSC introduced another problem to organisations adopting it, including the 
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AgroBank. As discussed in Section 6.3.3.2.1 and Section 6.5, the organisation was 
confronted with problems of how to measure non-financial performance and how to 
establish the `appropriate' KPIs. The issue of when and how to measure results from 
development activities was also controversial; some activities and projects being 
undertaken may take time before any results are observable, and some aspects of 
performance may not be quantifiable or measurable. 
These problems are not unique to the AgroBank. They are common to many other 
organisations and have been well-documented in performance measurement literature 
(see Neely, 2005; Ahrens and Chapman, 2006b). Within the AgroBank, to deal with 
these problems, the organisation used various financial indicators related to customers as 
proxies for some customer performance. The bank also borrowed some KPIs from other 
performance measurement tools (e. g. budgeting targets, TRIS KPIs) to put in the 
scorecard. These KPIs may not `faithfully' represent development, internal process, and 
learning and growth performance, and may not comprehensively represent all key 
strategic issues of the organisation. Nevertheless, these numbers can hold together 
diverse interests, and can gain legitimacy and validity through ties of support from 
various actors (Briers and Chua, 2001). 
Empirical findings discussed in Section 6.5 show that the AgroBank's organisational 
members were aware that their BSC (and other performance measurement systems) may 
not comprehensively and faithfully represent all key areas of performance critical for the 
organisation. In order to ensure that such critical performance areas are taken care of, 
they did not attempt to `improve' the performance indicators or performance 
measurement systems. Rather, they undertook other actions which they believed would 
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help them monitor and improve such aspects of performance. Results from the BSC and 
other performance measurement systems were used in combination with other methods. 
This finding is consistent with Johnston et al. (2002), and Ahrens and Chapman (2007), 
who found that managers in the organisations they studied recognised that their 
management accounting and performance measurement systems were imperfect, failing 
comprehensively and faithfully to represent organisational performance. Nevertheless, 
enhancing the representational faithfulness of the management accounting and 
performance measurement systems was not their major concern, as long as the systems 
were "adequate for the task of rendering visible organisational members' daily activity" 
(Ahrens and Chapman, 2007, p. 22). To drive activities and actions, the managers drew 
upon, but were not limited by, the performance metrics (cf. Vaivio, 1999a). 
By. not including performance indicators representing interests of some key stakeholders 
of the organisation, a concern about the `balanced' nature of the BSC could be raised. In 
the BSC literature, the meaning of `balanced' has been much discussed and debated (see 
Section 2.3.2), the debate tending to focus on technical elements of the BSC, for example, 
focusing on what dimensions of performance are included in the BSC (e. g. Kaplan and 
Norton, 1996a; Atkinson et al., 1997; Norreklit, 2000; Brignall, 2002), or how different 
aspects of performance are presented and captured in the BSC (e. g. Otley, 1999). 
Nevertheless, findings from the study suggest that the notion of `balance' could be seen 
as part of the ideological management tools, "something to influence the language and 
thinking of organizational members" (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006b, p. 11). 
As presented in Section 6.3.3.2.1, the notion of `balance' and the four boxes of 
performance measures of the BSC approach have provoked debate on the financial and 
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non-financial goals of the organisation. BSC differs from other pre-existing performance 
measurement systems in the organisation, as it clearly presents financial and customer 
objectives in separate boxes, while, at the same time, integrating and linking them in the 
same report. The tensions between financial and customer aspects of performance 
become more visible to organisational members. This has stimulated discussion and 
consideration of the issues of how to `balance' the potentially conflicting interests of the 
two key stakeholders (i. e. shareholders and customers). Workshops and seminars 
organised to discuss how to design the BSC have provided a forum for organisational 
members to explore the issue. Findings from the study suggest the notion of `balance' of 
the BSC is not necessarily concerned with technical properties of the scorecard. The 
notion could be mobilised as part of a managerial agenda, encouraging organisational 
participants to debate and discuss what actions or activities need to be undertaken in order 
to achieve a `balanced' performance in line with organisation expectations (Mouritsen, 
2005). Thus, to understand what `balance' means, it is important to examine how the 
notion of `balance' is mobilised, and to examine activities that are connected to the 
process of constructing and using the scorecard in the particular circumstances. 
7.3.2. Mobilising Cause-and-Effect Relationships 
In similar vein to the notion of `balance' and the four boxes of performance concept, 
causal chain logic is another concept in the BSC approach that is open and ambiguous, 
creating complexities around the BSC design. As discussed in Section 6.3.3.2.2, there 
was debate about the nature of leading and lagging indicators, particularly between 
financial and customer performance. There was also debate about the time dimension 
(i. e. the time lag between cause and effect) which the BSC may not be able to encapsulate 
(see Norreklit, 2000 for discussion of the time dimension of the cause-and-effect logic). 
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Although organisational members did not reach a consensus view on the issue, the 
organisation still developed causal chains to link strategic objectives based primarily on 
the experience and logic of organisational members, with advice from an external 
consultant. 
Difficulties in developing the chains have been well-documented in the performance 
measurement literature. Otley (1999) suggests that little detail is given as to how to map 
the means-end relationship onto the BSC boxes. Empirical studies have also shown that 
it is difficult to establish causal chains in practice. Managers tend not to understand the 
causal relationships between financial and non-financial performance (Ittner and Larcker, 
1998b; Malmi, 2001), and only a small number of companies rely on cause-and-effect 
relationships in their scorecard (Ittner, Larcker, Randall, 2003; Speckbacher et al., 2003). 
Empirical findings from the present study are consistent with findings from the above- 
mentioned studies, namely, that if cause-and-effect relationships were taken as statistical 
relations in a traditional sense (i. e. correlations between input and output that can be 
proved empirically by using statistical tools), organisational participants would find it 
difficult, if not impossible, to establish and verify such relationships. In addition, most of 
the organisational participants did not attempt to statistically verify the validity of the 
cause-and-effect relationships on the strategy map, a finding similar to that of Ittner, 
Larcker and Randall (2003). Nevertheless, findings from the current study also suggest 
that the cause-and-effect logic of the BSC approach is not necessarily mobilised as 
statistical relations in a conventional sense. Rather, as Mouritsen (2005) has argued, what 
is mobilised could be seen as the logical relationships and/or managerial agendas. 
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As discussed in Section 6.3.3.2.2, a debate on cause-and-effect relationships between 
customer and financial performance reflects how different organisational members view 
the operations of the organisation. Discussions among the organisation's management 
were not based on statistical evidence of the relationships between the two dimensions of 
performance. Rather, they were based on each organisational member's personal logic 
and view of how the organisation operates. The causal chains established on the 
corporate strategy map reflect management's attempt to convey a message that both 
customer and financial performance are important in driving the organisation to achieve 
its missions and goals. By attempting to establish causal chains which reflect how the 
organisation functions, the idea of causality can be interpreted as "logical constructions 
and possibly ambitions rather than realised relations" (Mouritsen, 2005, p. 107). It can be 
seen as a means to conceptualise and communicate the business models of the 
organisation to organisational members, providing a view of what the firm is 
endeavouring to be. 
While much of the BSC literature has criticised the ambiguity of the causal chain logic, 
findings from this study suggest that such a vague and ambiguous concept can still be a 
powerful tool both in mobilising commitment and facilitating implementation. The 
attempt to establish causal chains among strategic objectives has motivated organisational 
members to think about different stakeholders of the organisation as well as about the 
relation between the various objectives. It has provoked debate about the kind of 
activities or projects needed to be undertaken by the organisation in order to achieve both 
financial and customer goals concurrently. It is a managerial agenda, stimulating 
organisational members to act to ensure that the relation will look as predicted 
(Mouritsen, 2005). 
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Moreover, with the ambiguity of the causal chain concept, the causality idea remained 
live and active, through being picked up later and interpreted in different ways. 
Organisational members connected to the BSC mobilised their interests and problems to 
make sense of the causality, prompting new management tools to emerge. As described 
in Section 6.3.6 and Section 6.4.4, managers in the monitoring and evaluation division 
along with one of the provincial directors attempted to develop causal chains to a more 
detailed level (that is, linking KPIs rather than strategic objectives), with the hope that 
these links could be tested statistically. Proving the relationships among KPIs as the 
provincial director had demonstrated was later shown to be difficult. Nevertheless, the 
attempt to develop a KPI map can reflect the way actors continued to mobilise their 
interests and modify the design of the BSC. 
Another example of how the open nature of the cause-and-effect logic allows actors to 
mobilise their interests and problems and to modify the concept to suit their purposes was 
provided when the manager of the risk management office attempted to formulate a 
financial KPI map, as depicted in Section 6.3.6. Although this resulted in a loss of the 
integrative character of the BSC, it demonstrated how actors are able to choose part of the 
BSC and modify it to make it relevant to them. 
From the discussion in this section, it can be seen that BSC construction generated a 
debate that was important for the organisation but had not been much debated before. 
The BSC rendered some of the problems more visible and created a number of forums for 
discussion. With the ambiguous, vague and abstract nature of its concepts, the BSC 
allowed actors scope for interpretation and modification of those concepts to make them 
relevant to the specific circumstances of their organisation. This does not mean that there 
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was no negative impact of the openness of these concepts on BSC design and 
implementation. Indeed, the ambiguity and vagueness of the concepts did lead to some 
difficulties in designing the BSC. Some of the BSC concepts which Kaplan and Norton 
proposed as solutions to some of the organisational problems, in turn, introduced other 
problems for the organisation. Nevertheless, the open nature of the BSC also had some 
positive aspects that are usually neglected in the extant literature. 
7.4. Constructions and Translations as an Ongoing Process 
As discussed in the previous section, BSC design involved negotiations, mediations and 
articulations of conflicts, tensions and interests. The negotiations, mediations and 
articulations continued when the BSC was being implemented and used. As Hansen and 
Mouritsen (2005, p. 143) have argued, "[T]he implementation of the BSC is itself a 
process that involves complements, overlaps, and conflicts between various articulations 
of what its purpose is to be. " The BSC was not introduced into the organisation in a 
vacuum; other performance measurement tools were already in place. Therefore, the 
BSC had to struggle to find its place within the organisation. Although the BSC became 
a set of practices in many parts of the organisation, the translations did not stop. BSC 
was challenged, and various actors continued to mobilise their interests, re-fabricating the 
BSC throughout its implementation and utilisation. 
7.4.1. Mediating the BSC with Budgeting Routines 
Empirical findings presented in Section 6.3.3.1 have shown that one of the major issues 
that arose when the BSC was introduced into the AgroBank was how to `fit' the BSC in 
with the budgeting process. Kaplan and Norton (1996a, p. 224) argue that "Managers 
should use their Balanced Scorecard to implement an integrated strategy and budgeting 
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process. " In their view, budgets, including long-term capital budget, strategic initiatives 
and annual discretionary expenses, should be directed at achieving targets for objectives 
and measures on the BSC. However, as described in Section 6.3.3.1, the AgroBank did 
not integrate the BSC approach into their strategic formulation and budgeting process. 
For the AgroBank, the budgeting process has strong ties to various actors both within and 
outside the organisation. Most, if not all, organisational members placed considerable 
emphasis on achieving budgeting targets, particularly prior to the introduction of the 
`TRIS measurement' in 1996. Some of the board members were involved significantly in 
the budgeting process. Moreover, products of the budgeting process (i. e. annual business 
plan and budgeting targets) were of great interest among many government agencies. 
Despite strong support of the BSC from the top management of the organisation, the BSC 
failed to enrol board members into the network. Together with the requirement from 
external parties to submit the annual plan and budget early, the BSC became disconnected 
from the strategic formulation and budgeting process. 
The AgroBank's organisational members acknowledged that not using the BSC approach 
for strategic formulation and as a basis for resource allocation was different from the 
'BSC theory' proposed by Kaplan and Norton. Nevertheless, by differing in this respect, 
the BSC design and implementation process became easier, as the bank could avoid 
complexities in reaching consensus on strategy, which has been found to be one of the 
difficulties in implementing the BSC in the existing literature (Epstein and Manzoni, 
1997; Kasurinen, 2002). 
301 
Not applying the BSC concept during the strategic formulation and planning process may 
not be what the organisation expected at the initial stage of the BSC adoption. 
Nevertheless, this should not be seen as an unintended consequence, leading to less than 
full implementation of the BSC, as conventional management control literature may 
describe. As Latour (1987) has argued, the fate of technology does not lie in the hands of 
its innovator or in the technology itself. Rather, it depends largely on those who come 
after. Actors who come later in the chain of association "may act in many different ways, 
letting the token drop, or modifying it, or deflecting it, or betraying it, or adding to it, or 
appropriating it" (Latour, 1986, p. 267). Therefore, transformations of the BSC which 
make the BSC in practice different from what Kaplan and Norton propose should be 
expected. Disconnection of the BSC from the strategic formulation and budgeting 
process was a result of the attempt of actors to make the BSC work in their local 
conditions. 
7.4.2. Different Actions towards the BSC 
From the empirical findings presented in Chapter 6, it can be seen that BSC construction 
involved a number of complex issues and processes. Organisational members did not 
passively copy Kaplan and Norton's BSC model. Rather, relevant actors translated and 
modified the model and integrated it with other models and traditions in a way that suited 
their local conditions and circumstances (Sevön, 1996; Czarniawska, 2002). Whilst 
Section 7.3 discusses the translations relating to the design of the BSC, the translations of 
the BSC model were also observed during the implementation process at corporate level 
as well as at provincial level. As can be expected in the introduction of any new 
management accounting technology, not all relevant actors agreed with adoption of the 
new system. Some actors attempted to build networks to support BSC implementation 
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(see Section 6.3.4), whereas others constructed networks to resist it. In the AgroBank, 
during the early stage of implementation, much of the resistance to the BSC came in the 
form of ignorance, rather than negative responses. 
There are several plausible explanations as to why not much negative response was 
observed. One explanation is that in the AgroBank, BSC was not directly linked to any 
kind of reward or punishment. Neither was the BSC directly associated with any cost 
control or cost-cutting exercise. A lack of clear link between BSC and 
rewards/punishment or cost control may help employees feel less threatened by the new 
system. As Granlund (2001) has argued, changes that create visibility and accountability 
in financial terms will create more resistance (see also Soin et al., 2002). By not seeing 
any direct negative impact that the BSC might have on them, organisational members 
who were not convinced that BSC would benefit them did not express overt criticism of 
BSC adoption and implementation. 
In addition, the BSC has a reputation in Thai communities, both in business and public 
sectors. Kaplan and Norton have employed rhetorical devices to develop convincing 
arguments to support the BSC (Nerreklit, 2003). Many actors in Thailand, including 
consultants, business schools, media and various business organisations, have also created 
networks of support for BSC dissemination, as described in Section 6.3.1. Although no 
cost-benefit analysis of the BSC adoption was conducted, BSC has tended to be presented 
as a `modern' management tool which is beneficial for any type of organisation with low 
implementation costs. The BSC has become "an institutionalized object that is very 
difficult to be against" (Hansen and Mouritsen, 2005, p. 144). With the reputation of the 
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BSC, it became more difficult for organisational members to argue against it, as those 
who did so would appear irrational. 
Moreover, the introduction of the BSC within the AgroBank was difficult to reject 
because it was the initiative of the president of the bank. Although process issues such as 
top management support were not sufficient to make the change occur (Malmi, 1997; 
Kasurinen, 2002), strong support from the president at the time had a significant influence 
on the BSC construction process within the AgroBank. Within the AgroBank, the 
organisational distance between employees at different hierarchical levels is high. As 
was observed, organisational members address staff in management positions with their 
positions rather than with their names; and the position of the management staff is used 
instead of the word `you'. When referring to any member of management in the third 
person, 'organisational members almost always put the position of such management staff 
in front of his or her name. A strong tradition of high power distance between different 
hierarchical levels within the organisation55 can be one of the plausible reasons why overt 
resistance was not much observed (Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005). 
As the result of translations during the design and implementation process, the corporate 
BSC of the AgroBank differed from that of Kaplan and Norton. BSC was disconnected 
from the strategic planning and budgeting process, and was bundled with another 
technology, `operation room'. When the BSC and `operation room' were further 
disseminated to provincial offices, the BSC, as well as `operation room', were further 
translated. As shown in Section 6.4, some provincial offices modified the BSC to 
integrate it with the local pre-existing performance measurement systems, whereas other 
ss This organisational norm and value may be influenced partly by national culture. However, to make such 
a claim, the issue should be explored in more detail, which lies beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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offices attempted to imitate the BSC and `operation room' model of the head office. In 
some cases, organisational members attempted to have minimal engagement until they 
were required to engage with the BSC construction. 
While overt criticisms of the BSC were not much observed during the early stage of its 
implementation, at the expansion stage more scepticism and resistance emerged. As 
discussed in Section 6.4.2, many organisational members at operational level developed 
overt criticisms of the BSC and `operation room'. After the BSC and `operation room' 
had been constructed at the provincial level at the pilot stage, the time and money needed 
to be spent in constructing and maintaining the `operation room' became clearer for 
managers at other provincial offices. The organisation's inadequate information 
technology was an additional important factor. Although problems relating to data 
collection and inadequate information technology may be seen as temporary in nature 
(Kasurinen, 2002), information technology can have a significant impact on the 
construction of performance measurement systems, as it is one of the actors playing a 
crucial role in rendering performance measurement systems operable (see Cavalluzzo and 
Ittner, 2004). During this stage of the implementation, although the criticisms focused 
around the `operation room' rather than the BSC, construction of the BSC was inevitably 
affected because at this stage, BSC was seen as a part of the `operation room' 
construction. Although the objections to the BSC and `operation room' may have slowed 
down the process of BSC implementation, it did not halt the construction process; rather, 
it led to re-fabrications of the BSC. 
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7.4.3. Resistance Leads to Re-Fabrications 
In the management accounting change literature, resistance is usually depicted as a 
negative force inhibiting the development and implementation of the new management 
accounting and control, which sometimes leads to implementation failure (see Scapens 
and Roberts, 1993; Malmi, 1997; Kasurinen, 2002). However, as other ANT studies (e. g. 
Preston et al., 1992; Briers and Chua, 2001; Andon et al., 2007) have shown, resistance 
does not necessarily lead to failure of the system. Rather, resistance can be a positive 
force, providing opportunities for relevant actors to modify and appropriate the new 
management accounting and control technology to overcome scepticism. 
Findings from this study support those of the ANT studies, namely, that resistance does 
not necessarily lead to system implementation failure, but could rather lead to system re- 
fabrications. For example, as described in Section 6.3.5, when facing resistance in the 
form of ignorance during the early stage of BSC implementation, the AgroBank 
supplemented the BSC with a second performance monitoring technology, the `operation 
room'. Again, as discussed in Section 6.4.3, when the organisation attempted to expand 
the BSC and `operation room' construction to the provincial level but faced challenges 
from local staff who did not agree with the BSC, senior management in support of BSC 
implementation re-defined the BSC and un-bundled it from the `operation room', making 
BSC construction and utilisation less costly and less time-consuming. 
Empirical findings from the present study also show that in some cases, the re- 
fabrications of the BSC, in order to overcome resistance, can make BSC assemblage more 
concrete. As discussed in Section 6.3.5, the `operation room' was introduced as an 
`interessement device', and TRIS KPIs were integrated into the room in order to enrol the 
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interest of the relevant actors in the BSC networks. The `operation room' provided 
physical space for organisational members to discuss performance measured by the BSC 
KPIs. It created a sense of pride (or disgrace) for members of departments if the 
performance target(s) responsible were achieved (or not achieved), as the actual 
performance was presented in the room and became visible to other organisational 
members. In addition, by integrating TRIS KPIs into the `operation room', where they 
were presented, the AgroBank was able to attract more attention from organisational 
members to the room as well as the BSC, as performance from the `TRIS measurement' 
would have an impact on bonuses for all organisational members. The introduction of the 
`operation room' and the integration of TRIS KPIs into the room helped create stronger 
ties and stabilise the BSC networks. However, this would not have happened if the BSC 
had not failed at the outset to enrol the interests of some key relevant actors. 
7.4.4. Continuing Translations after BSC Came into Existence 
As empirical findings of the study have shown, the BSC construction was not a linear 
process. The BSC was not clearly defined, designed, implemented and used. Rather, 
throughout the design, implementation and utilisation process, the BSC was re-fabricated, 
re-defined and re-designed. In the existing literature, discussion of the re-design, re- 
definition and re-fabrication of the new accounting model usually focuses upon the time 
when the model faces resistance or fails to work (see Preston et al., 1992; Briers and 
Chua, 2001; Andon et al., 2007, for example). Although `failure' to make the system 
operable is an important element which can lead to a re-fabrication of the model, as 
discussed in the previous section, findings from this study have shown that re-fabrications 
also occurred, even after the new technology under implementation had come into 
existence and seemed to be working. 
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As described in Section 6.3.6, after the BSC had been used, staff in the monitoring and 
evaluation division still attempted to translate the BSC further by supplementing the 
corporate strategy map and BSC KPIs with a KPI map. These organisational members 
believed that the BSC would be more useful if cause-and-effect relationships could be 
identified at a more detailed level than they had been on the strategy map. 
Another example is when one of the six pilot provincial offices re-classified KPIs from 
the performance agreement to develop the BSC, rather than identifying another set of 
BSC KPIs, as had been the case in the head office and other provincial offices, as 
presented in Section 6.4.1. Management of this particular provincial office believed that 
the office already had many sets of KPIs to monitor. Identifying another set of KPIs 
would be time-consuming and might not be very useful, as there would be some overlap 
among the different sets. They, therefore, integrated the BSC approach with the 
performance agreement. 
The attempt to formulate a KPI map and integrate it into the `operation room of one 
provincial director, as described in Section 6.4.4, provides another example of re- 
fabrication of the BSC after it had been used elsewhere in the organisation. Although it is 
not clear whether this re-fabrication was a result of the attempt to improve the efficacy of 
the BSC, or the attempt to impress top management at the head office for legitimacy 
purposes, or both, it represents an example of re-fabrication, even when the BSC 
implementation was already considered a `success'. The example of the managers from 
the risk management office and the monitoring and evaluation division who mobilised the 
causality idea to formulate the financial KPI map for financial planning and management 
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also represents the further translation of the BSC after it had come into existence. In these 
particular situations, the translations led to innovations. 
Discussion in this section has shown that translations are ongoing throughout the BSC 
construction process. Translations may involve various types of action, including 
adopting, imitating, resisting (in the form of negative responses as well as ignorance), 
adapting, modifying, supplementing and innovating. Empirical findings of the study 
support Mouritsen's (2005, p. 99) argument that "designs always produce effects that 
human actors do not like, and therefore human actors have to respond to the propositions 
made by the management control systems" (cf. Quattrone and Hopper, 2001). "No 
particular translation was stabilized or institutionalized. Things were in the process of 
becoming. " (Hansen and Mouritsen 2005, p. 130) 
7.5. Relationships of BSC and Incentive Systems 
The empirical findings discussed in Section 6.4.1 show that within the AgroBank, the 
corporate BSC targets were not allocated down to lower levels. Furthermore, the BSC 
targets were not linked to any kind of personal evaluation or incentive system. Although 
the bank had recently adopted a performance measurement philosophy similar to that of 
the BSC at the employee level (i. e. the bank replaced the subjective performance 
appraisal system based on `trust' with a new system focusing on objective and 
quantitative KPIs), the bank did not use BSC as a basis for organisational members to 
develop personal scorecards. Rather, they used the `TRIS measurement' and 
performance agreement as a basis to allocate targets at the team and personal levels (see 
Section 6.2.2). 
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One of the plausible explanations for the AgroBank's use of the `TRIS measurement' and 
performance agreement, rather than the BSC, as a basis for formulating personal 
scorecards, is that targets from `TRIS measurement' were used to determine bonuses for 
all organisational members and the Board of Directors. This incentive system was 
imposed by the Ministry of Finance, the major shareholder of the bank, and it was 
difficult, if not impossible, for the bank to negotiate a change. With a monetary reward 
directly linked to the `TRIS measurement', `TRIS measurement' KPIs attracted greater 
interest from organisational members and the Board of Directors compared to the BSC. 
Top management and the Board of Directors, thus, chose `TRIS measurement' KPIs and 
targets as a basis for personal scorecards and the incentive compensation system, rather 
than the BSC, to ensure that the `TRIS measurement' targets were met and large bonuses 
obtained. 
In the AgroBank, although the BSC was not directly linked to any kind of financial 
reward, many organisational members paid significant attention to the BSC, its KPIs and 
targets. BSC also generated discussions on important issues which had not been much 
debated within the organisation (as already discussed in Section 7.3). As presented in 
Section 6.3.5, the introduction of the BSC, along with the `operation room', prompted 
more discussions and co-ordination between departments within the organisation. Whilst 
linkages to the reward system can be an important element compelling organisational 
participants to focus on achieving particular targets on the performance measurement 
systems, this finding suggests that to make the performance measurement systems work 
in some particular settings, linking it to a reward system may not be as critical as some 
scholars have argued (cf. Otley, 1999; Kaplan and Norton, 1996b). A performance 
measurement system can be mobilised in different ways and have other value than 
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serving as a basis for reward or punishment. The system can work even when the 
performance targets are not tied to rewards. 
However, the absence of a connection between the BSC, performance evaluation at the 
individual level and the reward system, together with the disconnection between the BSC, 
strategic planning and the budgeting process discussed in Section 7.4.1, also demonstrate 
that Kaplan and Norton's ambition to integrate a wide range of management activities 
into the BSC is difficult (if not in principle impossible) to achieve. It is inevitable that the 
BSC would encounter other actor-networks which may have stronger ties, therefore 
causing various linkages in the BSC assemblage to become blocked. Whilst some of the 
attempts to block the linkages may be the result of deliberate actions, some resulted from 
random events, and others were influenced by institutional norms (Czarniawska and 
Sevön, 1996). When the linkages are blocked and BSC differs from expectations or from 
the claims of Kaplan and Norton, a question one may raise is whether this is considered a 
failure of the BSC implementation. Findings from the study suggest that it does not 
necessarily mean that the BSC has failed. Rather, it is re-fabricated, leading to changes in 
identities and meanings for the BSC. 
7.6. The Notion of `Success' and 'Failure' in the Implementation Process 
Empirical findings from the study suggest that to date, the BSC has not yet become 
institutionalised as a set of taken-for-granted management practices within the 
organisation. It has not yet become an established fact that organisational members do 
not question. Neither has it disappeared, or at least, not yet. In other words, the `black 
box' (Latour, 1987) still remains open. The contents and meanings of the BSC still 
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change. One of the questions raised is whether the BSC implementation may be 
considered a `success' or `failure'. 
The notions of `success' and `failure' have been defined in different ways in management 
accounting and control implementation literature. Malmi (1997) suggests that in the 
traditional implementation literature, dominated by the decision-making perspective, 
scholars often tend to describe the implementation as a `failure' if no decision is made or 
no action is undertaken based on results obtained from the analysis by the new system. 
Nevertheless, he argues that if the management accounting system implemented serves 
the purpose intended for it by senior management, then it is a success. He argues that the 
success and failure of accounting systems should be assessed against their diversity of 
use, as accounting may be used for various purposes and in various ways. In his view, if 
the new system is introduced to support strategic decision-making, the success of the new 
system should be assessed in terms of its ability to provide a correct diagnosis of the 
situation, regardless of whether any actions are taken based on the results. Similarly, 
Kasurinen (2002) suggests that success should be considered against the explicit or 
implicit goals of the project. 
In the case of AgroBank, if using goals or intended purposes of the senior management as 
criteria to assess the success of the BSC implementation, it could be considered as a 
partial success. As discussed in Section 6.3.2, three major purposes of BSC adoption 
could be identified at the initial stage, namely, to create vertical alignment, functional 
integration, and a balanced strategic plan. In terms of the vertical alignment objective, 
the AgroBank did not allocate corporate BSC targets down to the personal level; neither 
were the provincial BSCs cascaded down from the corporate BSC (see Section 6.2.2 and 
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Section 6.4.1). Thus, BSC does not play a significant, if any, role in creating alignment 
between corporate strategy and personal goals. 
As for functional integration, BSC has helped create discussion and co-ordination among 
different departments, as discussed in Section 6.3.5. Although an increase in co- 
ordination among departments was achieved not solely because of the BSC, but also as a 
result of having built the `operation room' as a place for discussion, the bank might not 
have built the `operation room' if it had not implemented the BSC. Thus, BSC played a 
role, albeit an indirect one, in generating co-ordination among departments. 
With regard to obtaining a `balanced' strategic plan, the BSC does not play a role, as it 
has been to date disconnected from the strategic formulation process. Nevertheless, the 
BSC concept is used during the planning process at provincial offices. Although this was 
not the intention of senior management at the initial stage, the BSC may be considered as 
being a tool for formulating a `balance' plan in a particular way. 
It can be seen that in the AgroBank, BSC has achieved some of the purposes expected by 
senior management. If assessing the BSC in terms of the suggestions of Malmi (1997) 
and Kasurinen (2002), it may be considered as a partially successful implementation. 
Nevertheless, using the intended purposes of the senior management as criteria can be 
problematic. As shown in Section 6.3.2, it is less than clear-cut as to what senior 
management expected to achieve from the BSC. Managers problematised the BSC in 
different ways and expected it to perform different functions. In this situation, which 
goals/purposes should be used as criteria? Should it be those of the top management, who 
expected the BSC to communicate strategy and create vertical alignment, or should it 
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those of middle managers, who were in the BSC team at the early stage and expected it to 
create functional integration? Alternatively, should `success' be assessed against the 
formal objectives specified in the organisation's documents? What if, through the use of 
the BSC, the organisation obtained some unexpected benefits? Should this be considered 
`success' or `failure'? 
Findings from this study suggest that it may not be fair to describe the situation when the 
new system does not serve the intended purposes of the senior management as a `failure' 
or `not a total success', as the formal objectives of the BSC adoption were also a 
fabrication (see Ahrens and Chapman, 2007). In the case organisation, BSC continues to 
exist, although in different forms; BSC inscriptions are still produced in many parts of the 
organisation, and many organisational members still discuss the BSC, attempting to make 
it work in their own way. If we see change in accounting technology as a result of 
diverse actors attempting to build actor-networks of associations to support their own 
agenda and beliefs, change in the identities and meanings of the new accounting system is 
something that should be expected. It is inevitable that some actors will block linkages in 
the assemblage, while others will attempt to construct the linkages to make the model 
operable. Furthermore, as different actors have different interests and agenda they wish 
to pursue, it is likely that they will interpret and translate the model differently. For those 
models like the BSC with abstract, ambiguous and vague concepts in particular, which 
allow many interpretations, it is highly possible that new meanings and identities will 
emerge throughout the process. 
Findings from the study suggest that `success' or `failure' in implementing a new 
management accounting and control system is fragile and temporary; it is time- and 
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space-specific, and depends on the strength of the diverse ties of heterogeneous elements 
(Briers and Chua, 2001; Andon et al., 2007). Describing the implementation as a `failure' 
when the new system has not yet disappeared or still leaves some traces could be 
misleading; at that specific period of time, the system may be under a re-fabrication 
process and it might be made to work again (Preston et al., 1992). As can be seen from 
the findings of the study, when the corporate BSC failed to materialise at the early stage, 
BSC was bundled with the `operation room' and became more concrete and stabilised. 
BSC inscriptions were produced and organisational members discussed performance from 
the BSC reports. Nevertheless, the BSC networks were stabilised only momentarily. The 
BSC and `operation room' were challenged and the linkage became disconnected in many 
other parts of the organisation. However, this was not the end of the BSC. In places 
where the linkage between the BSC and `operation room' was disconnected, the BSC was 
re-translated to become a planning device; the BSC still existed, although in a different 
form. Therefore, this study supports Briers and Chua's (2001, p. 267) argument, "To the 
extent that new accounting technologies can be made to hold together traces that make 
managerial action from a distance possible, it would be seen to work. " 
7.7. Emerging Identities and Meanings of the BSC 
Empirical findings presented in Section 6.3 and 6.4 suggest that the contents, meanings 
and identities of the BSC were constructed via the relations of the BSC with other actors 
or actants connected to the ties. As Law (1999, p. 3) argues, "[E]ntities take their form 
and acquire their attributes as a result of their relations with other entities. " Findings 
from this study have shown that over time, and in different organisational units, different 
problems, tensions and conflicts were negotiated and mediated, giving rise to the new 
contents, identities and meanings of the BSC. Throughout the design, implementation 
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and utilisation of the BSC, different actors mobilised their interests and agendas to 
translate the BSC and make it relevant to them. This is consistent with Hansen and 
Mouritsen (2005), who found that in the four organisations they studied, BSC had 
different value and meanings for different organisations, the value being related to the 
specific organisational problems informing the design and mobilisation of the BSC. 
However, this study also extends Hansen and Mouritsen's (2005) findings, arguing that 
the value and meanings of the BSC also changed over time. Moreover, BSC could take 
on different forms and different meanings, even within the same organisation. 
As discussed in Section 6.3.2, at the initial stage of BSC implementation, the AgroBank's 
organisational members viewed a BSC as a strategic management device. This was 
largely influenced by the rhetorical claims and discourses around the BSC in the business 
and academic communities. However, the meaning of a strategic management system 
differed among organisational members, this being influenced heavily by internal 
problems encountered at the time. While Kaplan and Norton have recognised BSC's 
possibility as a strategic management system through a causal model, empirical findings 
from the present study suggest that at the early stage of BSC adoption, management of the 
AgroBank did not expect many benefits from the cause-and-effect logic. Rather, they 
expected that the BSC would create vertical alignment, functional integration and 
strategic plans focusing on financial and customer performance. The attempts to establish 
and meaningfully utilise the cause-and-effect relationships came at a later stage, after the 
BSC had been used for a certain period; nevertheless, not all versions of BSC in the 
organisation focused on such relationships. 
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Through the implementation process, value attached to the BSC changed. While 
expecting the BSC to play a role in formulating a `balance' of strategic plans, the BSC 
was disconnected from the strategic planning process when it encountered the existing 
budgeting and planning routines that had stronger ties. BSC was re-defined and became a 
tool to monitor performance. Through the utilisation of the BSC, the cause-and-effect 
relationship idea was picked up by some organisational members. Again, the causal 
chain idea was interpreted and articulated differently. As presented in Section 6.3.6, staff 
in the monitoring and evaluation division picked up the idea of the KPI map which 
emphasised the linkages of non-financial KPIs and financial KPIs. In contrast, a manager 
from the risk management office disregarded the relationships between non-financial and 
financial indicators. Instead, he translated the idea to construct linkages among financial 
indicators. Although interpreting the causal chain idea differently, for this group of 
organisational members, BSC had a value beyond being simply a tool to monitor 
performance. BSC became a performance management tool, helping them to identify 
where to improve in order to achieve the ultimate goal of the organisation. For the 
manager of the risk management office in particular, BSC was also a tool for financial 
planning and management. 
While the elements in the corporate BSC were changed over time by actors who 
attempted to make the BSC more relevant to them, the identities and meanings of the 
BSC also changed when the BSC was translated and localised at provincial offices. As 
discussed in Section 6.4, provincial directors and local staff played a significant role in 
shaping the BSC. In the provincial offices where the provincial directors perceived 
benefits in implementing the BSC, whether for efficiency or legitimacy reasons, they 
largely imitated what was done in the head office. For them, BSC was another tool for 
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monitoring performance. While some provincial offices imitated the BSC of the head 
office with some adjustments, a number of provincial directors attempted to modify and 
construct a new meaning for the BSC. As discussed in Section 6.4.4, one provincial 
director picked up the idea of a KPI map, which had been neglected by most of the other 
organisational members, and modified it to make it work in his office. For this provincial 
office, BSC was a performance monitoring as well as a performance management tool. 
Although many local staff modified the BSC to suit their own operations, another group 
of local staff attempted to block the BSC construction (see Section 6.4.3). However, this 
did not lead to implementation failure. Rather, BSC was further re-fabricated, prompting 
the emergence of a new identity for the BSC. In other words, the BSC became a planning 
device in these offices. 
Changes in meanings and identities of the BSC are possible, largely due to the open 
nature of the BSC. The extant literature usually presents the ambiguity and vagueness of 
the BSC concept as one of its weaknesses, as previously discussed in Section 7.3. 
Kasurinen (2002, p. 341) argues that "the forthcoming role of the scorecard in the 
organization should be carefully defined at the early stages of the implementation 
process. At this stage, it should also be decided whether the focus of the project should 
be on the measurement system characteristics or on the management system 
characteristics of the balanced scorecard. " In contrast, findings from this study suggest 
that the open nature of the BSC could facilitate the process of making the BSC operable. 
Furthermore, by allowing different meanings and identities to be associated with it, the 
BSC can become more powerful. 
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As discussed, the BSC could be moulded to accommodate the various interests of 
different actors connected to the BSC networks during its implementation and use. It 
allowed organisational members to translate the BSC idea to fit the specific problems 
they encountered at the time. When tensions arose, for example, when the BSC 
encountered organisational members who did not agree with its adoption, or when the 
BSC encountered other overlapping pre-existing performance measurement systems, it 
could be re-fabricated to make it operable in specific situations. If the BSC allowed only 
one specific meaning and identity and the linkages in the BSC assemblage were undone 
in the process of designing, implementing or using the BSC, then the undoing of the 
linkage might represent the end for the BSC because there would be no other meanings or 
identities available. If, however, the linkage were not so strong, i. e. if there were other 
possible/existing meanings that went beyond, then the BSC might continue to exist in a 
different form, as was found in the present study. 
It can be seen from the study that the contents, value, meanings and identities of the BSC 
were not pre-determined; neither did they remain fixed. Rather, they emerged through 
the BSC's design, implementation and utilisation process. The ongoing translations of 
the BSC changed identities and led the BSC to become something not initially planned. 
In some situations, for example, in the case of the financial KPI map, the integrative 
characteristics of the BSC were also lost. The emergent nature of the BSC may help 
explain why there is little agreement in the BSC literature on what BSC is and what is 
necessary for the system to qualify as a BSC (see Hoque and James, 2000; Nerreklit, 
2000; Mami, 2001; Speckbacher et al., 2003). 
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Many scholars have tended to focus on a set of techniques within the BSC concept in 
order to define what it is. However, findings from this study illustrate that the identities 
of BSC are not fixed; rather, they are constructed and situated in time and space. The 
identities and meanings of the BSC are made in relation to actors and actants in the BSC 
tie and their activities around the BSC in a specific time at a particular place. BSC is an 
open concept with various elements which people can choose and translate to make them 
relevant to them. Furthermore, a set of techniques integrated in the BSC of any 
organisation can be changed by various actors involved in the process of constructing and 
using the BSC. The changing in meanings and identities of the BSC suggests the ability 
of the BSC to be shaped in different ways to make it work in specific situations. 
7.8. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has provided a discussion of key themes emerging from the field study, and 
has analysed how empirical findings of the present study support, complement or 
contradict the existing literature in the area. The chapter has shown how the ANT 
approach adopted in the analysis of the study helps enhance our understandings of 
performance measurement and management accounting practices as well as the issues of 
change in MACSs. The analysis in this chapter has shown that MACSs are constructed 
by heterogeneous networks of humans and non-humans. Changes in MACSs are driven 
by the dynamic associations between global and local actors or actants. Unlike many 
studies based on diffusion of innovation or NIS theory, which often describe changes as 
determined by external pressures, and sometimes attempt to distinguish whether changes 
are determined by competitive or institutional environment, this study argues that changes 
result from global and local actors building actor-networks of associations to support their 
own interests and agenda. 
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The analysis has also shown that making the BSC operable is a dynamic and complex 
process, involving various actors who may have diverse interests and concerns. Non- 
human actors (e. g. the `operation room', the budgetary control system and process, 
information technology) also play their roles in shaping the construction process of the 
accounting technology, although they may not have interest or intention. As one could 
expect, not all actors associated with the BSC network supported its construction. Many 
of them blocked linkages in the BSC assemblage in various ways. To overcome the 
resistance or tensions emanating from various actors, in many situations, BSC was re- 
fabricated. 
The present study has shown that the process of constructing the BSC involves ongoing 
translations, which could mean adopting, imitating, adapting, modifying, supplementing 
or, in some cases, innovating. Moreover, the translations do not stop after the technology 
comes into existence; the BSC is challenged by various actors associated with its 
network, leading it to be further translated. 
The ongoing translations of the BSC discussed in this chapter suggest that the meanings 
and identities of the BSC are highly contextual and time-specific. In many of the existing 
BSC studies which attempt to examine the nature of BSC and the way it is used, the 
emphasis of the analysis is usually placed on technical properties of the BSC. Many 
researchers often tend to capture only a snapshot picture of the BSC design. Furthermore, 
in many cases, researchers attempt to take the BSC out of the context in which it operates 
to obtain a generalisable view of what it is. However, as argued in this chapter, meanings 
and identities of the BSC emerge via its relations to other actors and actants in the ties. 
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By observing how the BSC is introduced, constructed, translated and used in a particular 
setting for a long period of time, the present study helps enhance understanding of how 
and why BSC has become what it is in the specific setting for a particular period of time. 
Discussion in this chapter has shown that in many ways, the empirical findings of the 
present study are complementary to the existing research which attempts to examine 
issues related to management accounting change by adopting a processual approach to 
investigate the change process at the detailed level in a particular organisational setting 
(e. g. Malmi, 1997; Vaivio, 1999a, 1999b; Bums, 2000; Kasurinen, 2002; Soin et al., 
2002, Major and Hopper, 2005; Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005). Consistent with the 
existing literature, the present study has shown that change is a complex, non-linear 
process, involving a number of technical, behavioural, organisational and institutional 
issues. However, the ANT approach adopted in the analysis of the present study allows 
the researcher to simultaneously capture human and non-human, global and local actors 
in the analysis. In addition, the approach enables the researcher to capture not only the 
detailed process of change, but also the characteristics, value and meanings of the 
accounting technology (in this case, BSC) itself. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
8.1. Overview of the Research 
This study has attempted to advance our understanding of the process of how innovative 
management accounting is developed and used in an organisational setting. The research 
has involved an intensive field investigation examining the introduction and translation of 
a strategic performance measurement technology, BSC, into practice within the Thai 
financial services organisation. It has traced how the BSC idea was introduced, 
constructed, modified and re-defined over a period of time and in different organisational 
units. The research demonstrates how a global management idea becomes localised in a 
different social and cultural context. 
Drawing on actor-network theory, the research describes the way in which various actors 
mobilised their interests and concerns to construct the BSC. The study describes how 
discourses on strategy and BSC in Thailand, particularly in the banking sector, were 
connected to some important concerns of the organisation, in particular, problems relating 
to communication with branches in remote areas, co-ordination between departments, and 
financial emphasis on strategic plans formulated from budgeting process. The study 
demonstrates that through the associations of global and local actors which attempted to 
pursue their agenda, the BSC was brought into the organisation. BSC was seen as one of 
the solutions to several problems confronting organisational participants, and the adoption 
of BSC was seen to be consistent with the strategic direction of the organisation - to 
become a modern, global, strategically- and customer-focused bank. Although the BSC 
was introduced as one of the solutions to existing organisational problems, the BSC was 
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not without problems itself. So while it helped in addressing such problems, the BSC 
also created other issues and problems. 
Since the decision to adopt the BSC was made, the BSC has struggled to find its place in 
the organisation. Echoing the findings of existing literature on management accounting 
system implementation, this study has found that the process of making the BSC operable 
is complex and non-linear, involving a number of technical, economic, behavioural, 
organisational and institutional issues. It also takes time and resources to construct the 
BSC. However, the all-encompassing nature of the BSC renders the process of its 
construction distinctive. The BSC encountered other networks of performance 
measurement and management control, and so to find its place in the organisation, the 
BSC had to compromise in some situations (for example, when it encountered budgetary 
control), in contrast to other situations, where other performance measurement practices 
had to compromise (for example, when it encountered Logframe). 
When designing the BSC, different organisational problems were articulated and 
negotiated. One of the important issues pertained to the measuring and managing of 
development performance. With the attempt to incorporate non-financial performance 
measures, issues concerning the meaning of development performance, how to measure it 
to ensure that it can be managed, and how to improve it were brought into discussions. 
With the attempt to link different dimensions of performance into causal chains, the BSC 
brought to light tensions between the financial and development objectives of the 
organisation. 
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Throughout the BSC construction process, various actors mobilised their interests and 
concerns and translated it. The BSC was associated with different groups of 
organisational participants who had diverse interests. Whilst some of the actors helped 
support and extend linkages in the BSC assemblage, others attempted to block the 
linkages. To overcome challenges from some actors, interessement devices (e. g. the 
`operation room') were introduced to cultivate the interest of these actors. When the 
organisation attempted to expand the BSC construction to other organisational units, 
members of different units responded to the construction in different ways. Some of the 
participants attempted to use the model used in the head office, while others attempted to 
modify and develop it. The way in which the BSC was reconciled with the existing 
performance measurement systems and practices also varied in different organisational 
units; for instance, in one of the provincial offices, KPIs from the performance agreement 
were re-classified into four dimensions according to the BSC concept instead of 
developing another set of BSC KPIs as was done in many other offices. Some of the 
organisational participants endeavoured to have minimal engagement, thus to overcome 
their resistance, the BSC was re-defined to become a planning device, and its construction 
became a requirement imposed by top managers on those at lower levels. 
In addition to highlighting translations when the BSC idea travelled to different places, 
the research has shown that the BSC was also further translated over time. The 
translation continued even after the BSC had become established. The BSC design 
created new challenges to the organisation and its members, and these challenges, in turn, 
led to further modifications, re-interpretation and re-design of the BSC. In some cases, 
additional elements were supplemented. The development of a KPI map can be one of 
the examples illustrating this issue. The ongoing translations have evolved the BSC into 
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something that was not initially expected. The BSC has taken on different designs, 
meanings and forms. It has been connected and disconnected with other performance 
measurement practices and technologies, including the `operation room', budgetary 
control, and `TRIS measurement', in various ways. BSC serves different purposes for 
different organisational members. While it is used as a performance monitoring tool for 
some organisational members, it can be seen as a performance management tool or a 
planning device for others. 
The re-definitions, modifications and supplementations were possible largely due to the 
open nature of the BSC. Many of the BSC concepts are abstract, vague and ambiguous, 
allowing different actors to mobilise their interests and concerns to interpret, modify and 
construct their own versions. Moreover, as the BSC accommodates different 
interpretations, it still survives, even when some of the linkages in the assemblage are 
blocked or undone. Within the organisation, the BSC still retains its identity as a BSC 
with four dimensions of performance linked in causal chains in some ways. It is the open 
yet robust nature of the BSC, rather than its superior set of techniques, that makes it 
powerful. 
The above discussion has provided a summary of the research. Section 8.2 discusses how 
this research contributes to the management accounting and control theory, which is 
followed by a discussion of managerial implications of the research in Section 8.3. 
Finally, Section 8.4 discusses the limitations of the research and suggests some 
opportunities for future studies. 
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8.2. Theoretical Contributions of the Study 
The research offers a critical, systematic investigation and analysis of the development 
and implementation of an integrated performance measurement system. It sheds light on 
the process of changes in performance measurement and management practices in an 
organisational context. It provides insights into the process of how a global management 
idea like the BSC is introduced into an organisation and influences organisational 
practices while, at the same time, being localised and shaped by local practices. It also 
highlights the importance of placing the BSC in contexts in which its design, 
implementation and use occur. By adopting a `performative' view to examine BSC 
concepts and the BSC construction process, the research contributes to management 
control literature, particularly literature on the BSC and management accounting change, 
in several respects. 
With regard to the BSC literature, this study enhances our understanding of the nature of 
the BSC. Discussions around what the BSC is and how it is used usually focus on its 
technical properties (see, for example, Norreklit, 2000; Malmi, 2001). In addition, much 
of the BSC literature which attempts to investigate how the BSC is used in practice 
adopts a large-scale, survey-based approach (e. g. Hoque and James, 2000; Malmi, 2001; 
Speckbacher et al., 2003). Although large-scale research may provide a broad view of 
how organisations use their BSC, a survey-based approach can only provide a snapshot of 
what the respondents believe (or want researchers to believe) about how the BSC is used 
in their organisations. The current study has shown how BSC meanings and identities are 
situated in time and space, and how they emerge through the interplay of relations 
between heterogeneous actors, human and non-human, associated with the BSC. It also 
shows the significant role played by local conditions, circumstances and practices in 
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shaping the meanings and identities of the BSC. The BSC means different things and 
serves different purposes in different places and at different times, yet it is robust enough 
for people to recognise it as a BSC. If one takes the BSC out of the contexts in which it 
operates, one can only have limited understanding of how and why the BSC is used in a 
certain way in a particular place for a period of time. Thus, this research highlights the 
importance of studying the construction and use of BSC in its context. 
In addition to insights into the meanings and identities of the BSC and some of its 
concepts, this study advances existing knowledge about how the integrated performance 
measurement model operates in conjunction with other performance measurement and 
management control systems. The study explains why the ambition of the BSC 
proponents to integrate all management areas from strategic to operations management 
issues is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. It illustrates how some of the linkages in 
the BSC assemblage were obstructed by human actors who did not buy into the BSC idea, 
and by such non-human actors as other performance measurement networks which had 
stronger ties in their assemblages. In particular, the research provides insights into 
relationships between integrated performance measurement and one of the conventional 
management accounting controls - budgetary control. The study reveals that mediation 
between BSC and budgeting takes place in the process whereby various actors associated 
with the BSC and budgeting networks negotiate their interests and conflicts. In the case 
organisation, as budgeting had stronger ties of association, it was the BSC that had to 
compromise. 
Furthermore, the study shows that organisational participants are frequently aware that 
their versions of the BSC differ from the BSC `theory'; they also recognise that their BSC 
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does not integrate all management areas as BSC advocates may have claimed. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that their BSC is incomplete; rather, this reflects the 
ability of the BSC to be moulded in different ways to make it work in local contexts. By 
not following the exact BSC `theory', the organisation can sometimes gain unexpected 
benefits, for example, making the BSC design less complicated. 
In relation to the accounting change literature, the research has provided a rich empirical 
description of how the idea to adopt BSC was initiated, and how the BSC was translated 
into practice. Whereas much of the accounting change literature often explains changes 
as driven by the external environment, whether competitive or institutional, the present 
study, consistent with some other ANT studies (e. g. Briers and Chua, 2001), shows that 
changes are often the results of heterogeneous actors attempting to build actor-networks 
of associations to support their own agendas and beliefs. Both local and global actors 
prove to be connected and play roles in initiating the BSC construction process. The 
research has also shown, in this regard, that making a sharp distinction between internal 
and external or competitive and institutional factors may not be very useful in explaining 
changes. 
Differing from many implementation studies, which often tend to regard the accounting 
technology being implemented as a fixed object, and fail to pay attention to the identities 
and meanings of the technology, the present research provides a rich empirical 
description of how the technology is translated and transformed during the construction 
process. The research shows that the way in which the global management idea or 
technology works in practice is not known in advance, and that identities and meanings of 
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the technology are not pre-determined but emerge through continuing translations during 
the construction process. 
While much of the research focusing on the accounting implementation process tends to 
suggest a passive role of organisational participants who accept the new technology, this 
study shows that even organisational members who agree with the adoption of the new 
technology do not passively take it as it is. Rather, they translate and appropriate it to 
make it suit their local conditions. In the current study, the roles of agencies in 
constructing networks to support, resist and transform the BSC are highlighted. Agencies 
here also include non-human objects. Although physical objects may not have 
intentionality, they act, and are made to act, and as they do they generate and leave traces 
which have effects and play roles in mediating the BSC network. Physical objects, such 
as the `operation room', computers and other forms of IT device and performance reports, 
can be seen modifying the state of affairs, and making a difference in the course of other 
agents' actions. 
The current study is complementary to other ANT studies on accounting change in certain 
ways. It describes accounting technology as being constructed by associations of 
heterogeneous actors or actants, human and non-human. It suggests that the associations 
are momentary and fragile. It shows that different organisational participants may use 
accounting technologies in different ways, and meanings of control can change with 
changing network coalitions and objectives. However, the present study also extends the 
existing knowledge obtained to date from other ANT research. 
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One of the key issues relates to the time that accounting change stops. Most of the ANT 
studies to date are not dissimilar to research studies on accounting change which draw on 
other theories/approaches in that they stop their analysis either when the technology 
comes into existence and begins to be used, or when the technology is completely 
abandoned. Findings from the current research suggest that translations do not stop after 
the technology has come into existence. In the case organisation, translations still 
continued even after the BSC had been in existence for more than two years. 
Organisational participants are not always satisfied with all elements in the design of the 
BSC, and so the BSC is challenged, re-defined, re-designed and transformed. Change 
does not stop after the BSC is in place; rather, it continues, turning the BSC into 
something it was not, and that it was not originally envisaged to be. 
The current research has also contributed to showing how a theoretical approach which 
was initiated from science and technology studies can help enhance our understanding of 
management accounting and control practices. The research highlights the importance of 
bringing accounting into an interface with other kinds of knowledge and expertise, and 
encourages more interdisciplinary thinking about accounting practices. One of the 
implications of the present research is that there could be opportunities for other critical 
cross-disciplinary thinking to be applied to accounting research. 
8.3. Managerial Implications 
Whilst the current research advances our existing theoretical knowledge in terms of the 
process of change in management accounting and control as well as the nature of 
management control initiatives, particularly the BSC, theoretical and empirical insights 
from the research are also relevant to managers and practitioners. The research provides 
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an overview of the process of BSC implementation that took place in the organisation. It 
takes managers away from their day-to-day implementation activities and enables them to 
see from a broader perspective how the BSC was operationalised within their 
organisation. 
The research shows potential complexities in relation to BSC design. It demonstrates 
how concepts proposed in practitioner-oriented, normative literature may, even though 
they seem to be attractive at first sight, create difficulties when organisations attempt to 
make BSC operable in practice. The research also confirms some of the known 
behavioural implications of the management accounting and control system 
implementation. The research confirms how, when introducing the new MACSs into the 
organisation, the organisation frequently encounters non-cooperative behaviour among 
organisational participants, which may take on different forms (for example, disregard, 
negative response, or minimal engagement). It confirms how, when employing a top- 
down implementation approach, the new MACSs may not get total commitment from 
relevant organisational participants. Frequently, a range of different emotions and 
interpretations can be observed. This does not suggest that adopting an alternative 
implementation approach would necessarily avoid these problems. Nevertheless, the 
current research confirms some of the ways in which a top-down approach is likely to 
create uncertainties and confusions. 
Whilst technical and organisational issues can create difficulties and complexities in 
designing and implementing the new MACSs, the research demonstrates that such 
complexities do not necessarily affect the process in a negative way. Difficulties in 
designing and implementing the new systems can provide opportunities for organisational 
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participants to modify the system or the process in various ways in order to make it work 
in their local conditions. This research suggests that what is crucial for organisations is 
knowledge of how to deal with the complexities and problems that arise during the 
design, implementation and utilisation process. 
Overall, the insights from the study enhance our understanding of the contingent nature of 
management accounting and control technologies and their implementation. Different 
organisations have different structures, problems and concerns, implying that the way in 
which the management accounting and control innovations are designed, developed, 
implemented and used will also be different. Organisations cannot simply `plug in' the 
management innovations that are claimed by their proponents to be universally applicable 
to any organisation. Whilst a particular set of management innovation techniques may 
well be important, it is also crucial for organisations to understand their own structure, 
culture and circumstances in order to make such techniques `make sense' in their 
organisational context and adapt them to the specific organisation's local conditions and 
circumstances. 
8.4. Limitations and Opportunities for Future Research 
Whilst the present study may have provided theoretical and empirical contributions in 
several respects, like any research, it is subject to limitations. One of the limitations is 
that the researcher did not get into the organisation from the beginning of the BSC 
construction process. Much of the data on the early stage of BSC construction is based 
on available interviews and documents. The researcher therefore, has had to rely, to some 
extent, on the memories of organisational participants. In order to enhance reliability of 
such data, when discussing events that happened a long time ago, the researcher asked for 
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detailed elaboration, as well as specific examples, whenever appropriate. The researcher 
also cross-referenced data from the interviews with data from other sources, and further 
examined issues if data from different sources suggested conflicting evidence. One may 
therefore argue that the researcher may have missed some important events by not 
entering the field at the start of the construction process. However, if such events are 
important, they will arguably leave traces in some form, and key issues or events will 
become apparent along the way. Even if the researcher had been in the field at all times 
during the BSC construction process, this would not guarantee that the researcher would 
have been able to observe every relevant and important event, as important events can 
occur at the same time in different places. 
Although not being present in the field when the BSC construction started may have 
., prohibited the researcher 
from observing some important events as they occurred, it has 
given the researcher the opportunity to observe how the BSC is currently used, and to 
note changes in organisational practices since the organisation started using the BSC. It 
has also enabled the researcher to observe further translations of the BSC after it came 
into existence within the organisation. As discussed in Section 3.4.2, given with the 
limited time that can be spent in the field due to time constraints within the PhD 
programme, the researcher would not have been able to observe so much of the 
subsequent use and further translations of the BSC if she had entered the organisation at 
the start of the BSC implementation, as it took more than two years from the initial 
decision to introduce a BSC to the establishment of the first BSC. 
Another limitation of the research is also related to time. The researcher left the field 
when the BSC was still being further constructed and translated. As described in Chapter 
334 
6, the BSC has not yet become institutionalised as a set of taken-for-granted management 
practices; neither has it disappeared. It is in the last analysis impossible to anticipate 
whether (or when and how) the BSC will become institutionalised, or at the other extreme 
ultimately abandoned. As the empirical findings from the research have shown, the 
institutionalisation process for the BSC has not been straightforward to date. One may 
suggest that as long as it is still in use in the organisation, it is likely that new problems 
will emerge which will lead to further translations and modifications of the BSC. If the 
researcher had been able to stay in the field for a longer period, it would have been 
possible to observe and analyse these further developments, but time constraints on 
research mean that a termination point has to be reached somewhere. 
Despite these limitations, the researcher believes that the time spent in the field was 
sufficient to observe, analyse and interpret various versions of the BSC that emerged 
through the continuing construction and translation process in order to produce 
descriptions and explanations of the issue, which provide new insights into management 
control, particularly management accounting change literature. 
In addition to limitations relating to time spent in the field, another limitation of the 
research is concerned with the theoretical approach underlying the analysis of the study. 
The ANT approach suggests that all relations which constitute what the world is can be 
observed; nothing is so deep that it cannot be reached (Mouritsen et al., 2002). ANT 
implicitly assumes that researchers can capture every connection and actor or actant. 
However, as Mouritsen et al. (2002, p. 507) have questioned, "Is it possible for a 
researcher to see all the connections that work in and on a setting with the limited 
corporeal capacity available? " In other words, it is arguably naive to assume that 
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everything can be observed, as there will always be limitations, whether physical or 
conceptual or both, which will prevent researchers from seeing some connections while 
leading them to see others. 
Inevitably, researchers are selective in identifying what to include in their descriptions of 
phenomena, not least because researchers becoming, by choosing to do their research, 
part of the networks they research; this is the context within which they construct their 
narratives to describe and explain the phenomena. In the iterative process of moving 
between fieldwork, transcription and interpretation, they inevitably choose, whether 
consciously or not, actants, actors or relations that seem to make sense for them. It is 
therefore always possible that researchers may have excluded actants or actors that they 
have not observed, or have observed but perceived to be irrelevant. Nevertheless, as long 
as researchers undertake this iterative process recognising their situation within the 
networks they research and the role that choice consequently plays in the process, they 
will arguably capture actors and connections which offer reasonably complete 
descriptions of the phenomena under research, and provide insightful and relevant 
explanations. Insofar as they do so, their research will arguably have value to the 
scientific community. 
Based on the current study, several future research opportunities can be identified. 
Firstly, further detailed analysis of the use of the `operation room' could be fruitful. As 
argued in Chapter 6, the `operation room' provides a physical space in which 
performance indicators can be discussed. A monthly meeting to review performance is 
organised in the `operation room' in the head office as well as in provincial offices that 
have constructed the `operation room'. It would be interesting to analyse how the design 
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and architecture of the `operation room' has an impact on the use of BSC information. It 
might also be beneficial to compare the perception and use of the BSC in provincial 
offices that have an `operation room' with those without one, and/or to compare the 
perception and use of BSC in provincial offices that have `operation rooms' but in 
different formats or designs. 
Secondly, the analysis of the current research focuses primarily on the organisational 
level; that is, why the BSC was brought into the organisation, and how the BSC was 
developed and used within that organisation. It would be interesting to extend the 
analysis to a broader level. Also, further analysis on how BSC adoption, implementation 
and utilisation within the case organisation contribute to a wider discourse on strategy and 
BSC in Thai communities could be conducted. 
Thirdly, it might be useful to re-visit the organisation and observe translations of the BSC 
in that environment for a longer period. Staying longer in the field would provide an 
opportunity for the researcher to examine the extent to which the BSC and its identities 
can be changed. The researcher would be able to observe whether and how the BSC has 
stabilised and become institutionalised. Alternatively, if the BSC has been completely 
abandoned, the researcher can analyse why and how it was discarded. 
Finally, this study focuses primarily on a development of the BSC, which is only one of 
the contemporary management accounting and control ideas. It would be fruitful to 
examine the introduction and translation of other management accounting ideas. Findings 
from such a study could be used to compare and contrast with findings from the current 
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study, to examine whether, and/or what part of, the findings from the current study are 
specific to the BSC. 
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Appendix 1: Summary of Research Activities 
Pilot stage (December 2003 - January 2004) 
Main objectives 
(1) To identify and clarify research issues 
(2) To establish initial relationships with potential case organisations 
Fieldwork activities 
Interviews 
Organisation Interviewees Major issues of discussion 
Bank A Senior vice president - Central administration Performance measurement 
department systems and practices 
Bank B First executive vice president Major changes within the bank 
after the 1997 crisis 
Vice president and manager - Accounting BSC, management accounting 
department reports, profitability analysis, 
Vice president - MIS department transfer pricing 
Senior vice president - HR department BSC development and 
Staff- HR department implementation 
Bank C Senior vice president - Investor relations BSC at corporate level, 
Staff - Investor relations corporate strategic programme, 
performance measurement at 
individual level 
Treasury business strategy specialist BSC at divisional level 
Bank D Performance measurement manager Performance measurement 
systems and current 
development 
Manager - Asset management Performance measurement at 
departmental level 
Bank of Thailand Assistant governor - Operations group Current issues on regulations 
and supervisions 
Current policies on financial 
services sector reforms and 
development 
Others Academic Current performance 
measurement practices in Thai 
companies, Literature on 
performance measurement in 
Thai organisations 
Member of the Thai cabinet Current policies on financial 
services sector reforms and 
development 
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Exploratory stage (July - September 2004) 
Main objectives 
(1) To further explore issues related to BSC implementation 
(2) To identify the main case organisation 
Fieldwork activities (in the organisations that are not the main case organisation) 
Interview 
Organisation Interviewees Major issues of discussion 
Bank A Senior vice president and manager - Performance measurement systems and 
Costing and financial statement practices, management accounting 
department reports, roles of management accountants, 
relationships between accounting 
department and other main business units 
Bank B President Recent changes after the 1997 crisis, BSC 
development 
Senior vice president - Training centre BSC development and implementation 
Bank C Senior vice president - Corporate strategy BSC development process 
department 
Bank E Executive vice president - Planning and Development of performance 
budgeting department measurement systems, strategic 
management and business planning 
process, budgeting process, BSC 
development, performance evaluation by 
the Ministry of Finance 
Vice president - Planning and budgeting Performance measurement systems at 
department (performance measurement) corporate, business unit, department, and 
individual levels, BSC development 
process 
Vice president - Planning and budgeting BSC development process 
department (BSC development) 
Senior vice president and manager - Profitability analysis, transfer pricing 
Management information department 
External consultant BSC development process, Management 
cockpit development 
Fieldwork activities (in the AgroBank) 
Interviews 
No. Department and/or Division Position Duration 
(Minutes) 
1. Human resources department Senior vice president 165 
Human resources planning division Assistant director 
Audit department Senior executive inspector 
2. Monitoring and evaluation division Director 60 
Human resources planning division Director2 
3. Monitoring and evaluation division Assistant director' 30 
4. N/A President 301 
5. System analysis and development division Director 40 
Observations 
Meeting between representatives from TRIS and the AgroBank's management staff to discuss 
performance criteria, measurement process and targets 
Visit the corporate 'operation room' 
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Main investigation (April - August 2005) 
Fieldwork activities (In the AaroBank only) 
Interviews 
No. Department and/or Division Position Duration 
(Minutes) 
1. N/A Ex-president (Retired October 120 
2004) 
N/A Senior executive vice president 
N/A Member of board 
2. Branch administration department Vice president, Regional office 75 
3. N/A Member of board 35 
4. Branch administration department Director of provincial office 60 
5. Branch administration department Director of provincial office 110 
6. Brach administration department Branch manager 75 
Chief of finance section 
7. Branch administration department Vice president, Regional office 75 
8. Branch administration department Vice president, Regional office 60 
Branch administration department Vice president, Regional office 
9. Branch administration department Director of provincial office 35 
10. Branch administration department Branch manager 30 
11. Branch administration department Chief of business development 30 
12. Branch administration department Branch manager 30 
13. Branch administration department Director of provincial office 30 
14. Branch administration department Director of provincial office 60 
15. Branch administration department Director of provincial office 90, 
Branch administration department Branch manager 
16. Branch administration department Director of provincial office3 120 
17. Monitoring and evaluation division Director 60 
18. System analysis and development division Director2 90 
19. System analysis and development division Non-management staff 75 
20. Consultancy company External consultant 45 
21. Risk management office Vice president 165 
Monitoring and evaluation division Assistant director 
22. TRIS Director of performance 90, 
evaluation division 
Analyst 
23. Branch administration department Senior vice president, Regional 45 
office 
24. Programme and budget division Director 60 
Non-management staff 
25. Monitoring and evaluation division Assistant director 90 
26. Management accounting division Director 120 
Analyst 
Observations 
Workshop to formulate annual strategic and action plans at corporate and regional level 
Monthly performance review meeting at one provincial office 
Visit 'operation room' at provincial offices 
Visit Management Cockpit® at the business school from where the AgroBank learned the idea 
1 These interviews were not tape-recorded. Notes were taken. 
', 'Interviewees are the same persons. 
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Appendix 2: Interview Guides 
It should be noted that the interview guides were used in a flexible and iterative manner. 
They were only used as a guideline to ensure that, in overall, interviews covered key 
research issues. The interview guides were also continually revised to capture new issues 
emerging from discussions of previous visits. 
I. Interview Guide for the Pilot Stage 
Introducing the research 
Introducing research topic 
Purpose of the interview & Confidentiality 
Scope of the interview 
Focus on the experience of the interviewee 
Seek permission to record the interview 
Background information 
Current position and main responsibilities 
How did you come to be in this job? (What was your career before? ) 
Particular reasons for working with the bank 
Are there special things about the bank? 
What do you think the bank is particularly good at? 
Changes in performance measurement systems 
Traditionally, how has your bank assessed whether the bank is performing well? 
Have there been any major changes in performance measurement recently? 
If yes, follow with questions in the Process of developing performance 
measurement systems section 
If no, ask whether there were any other major changes before and follow up for 
detail 
Process of developing performance measurement systems 
Can you explain how the new system has been developed? 
Who initiated the change? 
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In your opinion, what are the important factors for the bank in deciding to change 
performance measurement systems? 
Who has the main responsibility in developing the systems? 
Who are involved in the process of designing and implementing the new systems? 
How have managers and/or employees in the departments that the new performance 
measurement systems will apply been involved in the process? 
How has the top management provided support for the process? 
Have there been external consultants involved in the process? Please explain. 
What success have you had in developing and implementing new performance 
measurement systems? Any difficulties? Please explain. 
Current performance measurement system design and practices 
What kind of information are you interested in when evaluating whether you bank (or 
department) is doing well? 
Are you interested in any kind of non-financial information? 
(Ask for example of performance reports) 
Why do you focus on these aspects of performance? 
Ask for details on how each aspect of performance is measured 
If focusing on more than one aspect of performance, what connections do you see 
between these performance indicators? 
Do you give weight to each aspect of performance? Please explain 
How are targets set for performance indicators? 
Do you compare your performance with that of other banks? 
How are the performance result analysis handled? 
How often do you review performance of your bank (or department)? 
Who produce performance reports, and to whom are these reports sent? 
Do people in different departments focus on different aspects of performance? 
Do you perceive any tensions from focusing on different aspects? Please explain 
In your bank, how far are rewards, compensation and promotion based on performance? 
Please explain. 
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Consequences of the new performance measurement systems (if the organisation 
recently changed its performance measurement systems) 
Please explain how far the new performance measurement system has brought changes to 
the way you work. 
Please explain how far the new performance measurement system has brought changes to 
the organisation. 
How far have there been unexpected consequences from adopting the new performance 
measurement system? 
Opinions on current performance measurement practices 
Are you happy with the current performance measurement systems? 
What are the key strengths? 
Are there any significant problems? What about minor problems? 
Is there anything that you want to change? Please explain. Is it reasonable to 
expect such changes in the near future? Follow for details. 
If the bank did not have any change in performance measurement systems recently, does 
the bank have any plan to change under consideration at the moment and who is likely to 
be involved? 
Closing comments 
Thanks for giving time to be interviewed 
Is there anything you want to add? Is there anything you expected that you would be 
asked, but you were not asked? 
Is there anything want to ask? 
Thanks a gain and explain how their contribution will help the research 
Reassure about confidentiality and the use of interview data 
Possibility of re-contact if further clarification is necessary 
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II. Interview Guide for the Main Case Organisation 
Introducing the research 
Introducing research topic 
Purpose of the interview & Confidentiality 
Scope of the interview 
Focus on the experience of the interviewee 
Seek permission to record the interview 
Background information 
Current position and main responsibilities 
How did you come to be in this job? (What was your career before? ) 
Particular reasons for working with the bank 
Are there special things about the bank? 
What do you think the bank is particularly good at? 
Changes in performance measurement systems 
Traditionally, how has your bank assessed whether the bank is performing well? 
Have there been any major changes in the way in which your bank measures performance 
recently? Follow up for details. 
BSC development 
Reasons for BSC and implementation process 
When and how did you first hear/learn about BSC? 
When did the bank introduce the BSC? 
Why did the bank want to adopt a new performance measurement system? And why BSC 
in particular? 
What did you expect the bank to benefit from adopting the BSC? 
Please explain how BSC has been developed within your bank. Issues of discussions 
should cover, but not limited to, the following: 
Who did initiate the idea of using BSC? 
Who have had the main responsibility in developing the BSC? 
Who have been involved in the process of designing and implementing the BSC? 
How have managers and/or employees in the departments that the BSC will apply 
been involved in the process? 
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How and how much has the top management supported the BSC developing 
process? 
Have there been external consultants involved in the process? Please explain. 
What success have you had in developing and implementing the BSC? Any 
difficulties? Please explain. 
BSC design and usage 
At which level of the organisation that the BSC was first developed? 
At which level(s) of the organisation that the BSC is applied? 
Which aspects of performance are included in the BSC? (Ask to see example of BSC) 
How did you decide which dimensions and performance indicators to be included 
in the BSC? 
Ask for details on how each aspect of performance is measured 
What connections do you see between these performance indicators? Please 
explain. 
In your opinion, how these indicators are related to the bank's strategy? 
Do you give weights to each aspect of performance? Please explain. 
How are the targets set for each indicator on the BSC? 
Who produce the BSC reports, and to whom the reports are sent? 
How often do you review performance on the BSC? 
Do you have any particular important target? 
What do you do if targets are not met? 
Are there any other indicators outside BSC that you regularly review? 
Please explain how did you develop BSC at lower level(s)? 
How are BSCs of different departments related? 
How far are rewards, compensation and promotion based on BSC? Please explain. 
How far has the BSC brought changes to the way other control systems work? 
How are BSC and other performance measurement tools related? Follow up for 
details. 
Do you continue to use budgeting system the same way as you used it prior to the 
BSC? If not, please explain how it has been changed. 
What would you do if the BSC targets are achieved but budgets are 
overspent? 
Is there any situation when achieving BSC targets is more important than 
meeting budgeting targets? Please explain. 
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Opinion on the BSC 
In your opinion, how well does the BSC reflect performance of the bank? 
How far has the BSC brought changes to the way you work? 
What are the major changes you have observed since your bank started implementing and 
using BSC? 
How far have there been unexpected outcomes from the BSC? 
In your opinion, are the current performance measurement systems with the BSC better 
than the systems you had before? Please explain. 
Is there anything that, in your opinion, could be improved? 
Budgeting process 
Please describe your budgeting process 
What have been the most significant changes in your budgeting process during the past 
few years? 
Does BSC have any impact on budgeting process? 
How are budgeting and BSC process related? 
ISO development 
When did the bank introduce ISO? 
What did you expect the bank to benefit from adopting the ISO? 
Please explain how ISO has been developed within your bank. 
Who did initiate the idea of adopting ISO? 
Who have had the main responsibility in developing ISO? 
Who have been involved in the process of implementing ISO? 
How and how much has the top management supported the ISO implementation 
process? 
What success have you had in developing and implementing ISO? Any 
difficulties? Please explain. 
Performance measurement at employee level (PMS) 
When did the bank start to implement PMS? 
Why did the bank change the performance measurement system at employee level? 
Please explain how PMS has been developed 
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Who did initiate the idea of changing the performance measurement system at 
employee level? 
Who have had the main responsibility in developing and implementing PMS? 
Who have been involved in the process of implementing PMS? 
How and how much has the top management supported the PMS implementation 
process? 
What success have you had in developing and implementing PMS? Any 
difficulties? Please explains. 
Performance measurement practices at departmental/provincial/branch levels 
How do you assess that your department/office/branch is performing well? 
What are the performance reports that you regularly review? (Ask for examples) 
Who determine what to measure in these reports? 
In these reports, what are the indicators do you normally focus? Why? 
Do you pay attention to non-financial performance indicators? 
How are these performance indicators related to the corporate indicators? 
How long have you been using this performance measurement system(s)? 
In your opinion, what does it mean by having a good performance? 
How well do the current performance measurement systems and reports cover and 
represent these areas? 
Is there anything that you think should be measured but is not measured? 
Do you have any areas of focus which are not included in these performance 
reports? Please explain how do you monitor those areas of performance. 
Do you have any performance indicators on which you focus but are not 
determined by the head office? 
How much does the head office pay attention to the indicators that you use within 
your department/division but are not determined by the head office? 
How do you set the targets for these indicators? 
How do you allocate these targets to your staff? 
How often are these targets reviewed? 
How do you motivate your staff to work when they have already reached the 
targets? 
If BSC is not mentioned, ask whether the department/office has BSC? And how is BSC 
used (if it is used at all)? 
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How do you see the performance measurement systems you focus are related to 
the BSC? 
In your opinion, does the BSC adoption have any impact on the way you work? 
For provincial offices with `operation room' 
Why did you decide to build the `operation room'? 
Please explain how BSC and operation room have been constructed in your office. 
Who were involved in the process? 
Support from the head office 
Normally what do you use the operation room for? 
Have you observed any changes since the office has built the operation room? 
What are benefits/drawbacks of the operation room? 
In your opinion, does the operation room construction have any impact on the way you 
work? Please explain. 
For provincial offices without `operation room' 
What is your opinion on `operation room' at provincial office level? 
Do you have any plan to build the operation room in the near future? Why (or why not)? 
Opinion on overall performance measurement systems 
In your view, what does the vision of the organisation of becoming a modem 
development bank mean? 
How does your work contribute to the bank in order to achieve the vision and goals? 
In your opinion, how well the current performance measurement systems can reflect this? 
Are you happy with the current performance measurement systems? 
What are the key strengths? 
Are there any significant problems? What about minor problems? 
Is there anything that you want to change? Please explain. Is it reasonable to 
expect such changes in the near future? Follow for details. 
Closing comments 
Thanks for giving time to be interviewed 
Is there anything you want to add? Is there anything you expected that you would be 
asked, but you were not asked? 
Is there anything want to ask? 
Thanks a gain and explain how their contribution will help the research 
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Reassure about confidentiality and the use of interview data 
Possibility of re-contact if further clarification is necessary 
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